WORLD POLITICS

A Quarterly Journal of International Relations

Volume XXXIX, Number 3 April 1987

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WORLD POLITICS is indexed by *ABC POL SCI, Book Review Index, Combined Retrospective Index Sets (CRIS), Combined Retrospective Index to Book Reviews in Scholarly Journals, 1886-1974 (RSJ), PAIS Bulletin, Social Science Index*, and *Monthly Periodical Index*; it is abstracted and indexed in *United States Political Science Documents, International Bibliography of Periodical Literature (IBZ)*, and *International Bibliography of Book Reviews (IBR)*. Abstracts of articles also appear in *Book Review Digest, Historical Abstracts*, and *International Political Science Abstracts*.

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WORLD POLITICS (ISSN 0043-8871). Published quarterly by Princeton University Press, 3175 Princeton Pike, Lawrenceville, N.J. 08648. April 1987, Vol. XXXIX, No. 3. Second class postage paid at Trenton, N.J., and additional mailing offices. Send address changes to Princeton University Press, 3175 Princeton Pike, Lawrenceville, N.J. 08648. Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press.

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WORLD POLITICS

Vol. XXXIX • April 1987 • No. 3

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ABSTRACTS

Tacit Bargaining and Arms Control

By G. W. DOWNS and D. M. ROCKE

This paper evaluates the capacity of cooperation-based tacit bargaining strategies to stabilize or reduce arms races. In order to extend the generalizability of the findings beyond the unrealistic context of a single game with known utilities, simulation is used to explore the ability of specific strategies to cope with decision environments complicated by uncertainty about the strategy of the rival state, misinterpretation, the time preference of decision makers, and multiple response options. Of particular note is the finding that a state will rarely be certain enough about an opponent's response to make a large cooperative gesture, and the opponent will rarely be trusting enough to respond enthusiastically to a small one.

Extended Deterrence in the Middle East: American Strategy Reconsidered

By J. G. STEIN

When is extended deterrence appropriate as a strategy of conflict management outside Europe? This examination of six controversial attempts by the United States to extend "immediate" deterrence to allies in the Middle East suggests that the strategy has been both overvalued and badly used as a basic instrument of conflict management. First, the strategy fared poorly against low-intensity violence, yet this kind of resort to force is fairly common outside Europe. Second, extended deterrence did not succeed against regional powers, whether they acted alone or jointly with the Soviet Union. Third, challengers were driven not primarily by "opportunity" but rather by "vulnerability"; U.S. policy makers have consistently paid inadequate attention to the weaknesses of their challengers. Fourth, the outcome of deterrence could not be read from the balance of conventional or strategic capabilities. Fifth, strategic reputation proved to be both less important and more robust than is generally anticipated. Finally, the only cases in which deterrence did not fail were those in which it was used conjointly with reassurance.

The Perception of Power: Russia in the Pre-1914 Balance

By W. C. WOHLFORTH

If "power" is translated into state policy through the perceptions of those who act on behalf of states—the most likely causal explanation—a direct examination of those perceptions may be a contribution to the literature on the relationship between the distribution of capabilities in the international system and the onset of war. In the present case—the perception of Russian power before World War I—such an investigation reveals that the numerical estimators often used to test various power theories do not correspond to *perceived* power. Unless the case of World War I is unique, this finding suggests that such estimators do not provide an adequate basis for testing the various contending propositions about the balance of power and the onset of war (including that the two are unrelated). The perceived balance of power does explain important aspects of the coming of the war in 1914 that are often attributed to organizational and other factors.

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Consensus Lost?

Domestic Politics and the "Crisis" in NATO

By W. K. DOMKE, R. C. EICHENBERG, and C. M. KELLEHER

The early 1980s saw widespread discussions of a "crisis" in the NATO Alliance. Although this crisis was ascribed to causes that varied from pacifism or neutralism to theories of generational change, most analysts agreed that NATO had experienced an erosion in the domestic consensus that had supported the Alliance for over thirty years. The authors of this essay challenge these diagnoses. They review public opinion surveys on security issues and compare the findings to interview material gathered in discussions with European elites during the peak of the "crisis" in 1981 and 1982. Their analysis suggests that, with the exception of the nuclear issue, European governments are largely in tune with public opinion; the clearest line of domestic division is partisan rather than generational. The authors discuss implications for harmonization in NATO.

Maoism and the Liberation of the Poor

By E. FRIEDMAN

An overwhelming accumulation of solid data falsify and disprove the assertions of some liberation theologians and others that Maoist policies of food-grains-first, of national and local self-reliance, and of wiping out a small commodity economy will raise the poor and bring about social equality. Recent books reporting on rural China allow one to see how Maoist policies, rather than liberating the poor, actually locked them out of the blessings of the modern world and institutionalized a polarization of the stagnant rural poor and those favored by the resources of the urbanized state sector. This new information permits analysts to see how Maoism brought malnutrition, famine, and economic stagnation, and enhanced international dependency. Contrary to the claims of Maoists and of liberation theologians, post-Mao reforms in a China without landlords have—through decollectivization, commodification, pricing incentives, export promotion, and diversification—ended a life of stagnant misery for at least two-thirds of the poorest of the poor.

Ideology and Learning in Soviet Third World Policy

By G. W. BRESLAUER

Recent literature on Soviet policy in the Third World demonstrates that a rise in Soviet expectations of gain from Third World competition during the mid-1970s was followed by a decline in such expectations during the 1980s. Some authors treat this decline as a familiar, cyclical phenomenon in Soviet policy, with few implications for fundamental reevaluation of ideological postulates. Others consider recent changes to be far-reaching and capable of providing the foundation for major changes in Soviet policy. Relating the recent changes in perspective to a four-dimensional categorization of the components of Soviet ideology, the reviewer outlines features of the Soviet political-ideological order and of the international environment that could facilitate or frustrate fundamental learning.

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TACIT BARGAINING AND ARMS CONTROL

By GEORGE W. DOWNS and DAVID M. ROCKE

Introduction

A STATE bargains tacitly with another state when it attempts to manipulate the latter's policy choices through its behavior rather than by relying on formal or informal diplomatic exchanges. The process is tacit because actions rather than rhetoric constitute the critical medium of communication; it is bargaining and not coercion because the actions are aimed at influencing an outcome that can only be achieved through some measure of joint, voluntary behavior. Obviously, states rarely rely on either purely tacit or purely formal negotiation. However, the theory of tacit bargaining does not become totally inapplicable when there is verbal or written communication between the principals. It simply becomes increasingly relevant as states rely more on actions than on conventional negotiation. Examples of tacit bargaining are plentiful in international relations: a retaliatory tariff is announced in response to trade barriers; a state at war refrains from using chemical weapons or from bombing nonmilitary targets in the hope that its opponent will behave similarly; an austerity program is implemented by a financially troubled government in order to convince foreign banks that they should continue to extend credit.

In the past few years, the slow progress and modest achievements of formal negotiations have prompted speculation about the potential of tacit bargaining as an alternative mechanism for promoting arms control. Within the Reagan administration, the Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Kenneth Adelman, has argued that the formal arms control process has led to keeping obsolete and even dangerous nuclear weapons in the arsenal in order to bolster bargaining leverage; he has suggested that the reduction of nuclear weapons can be most effectively pursued by way of unilateral or reciprocal restraint outside the context of negotiations.[1] Outside the administration, physicist Richard Garwin has offered a far more specific and radical tacit bargaining strat-

[1] Adelman, "Arms Control with and without Agreements," *Foreign Affairs* 63 (Winter 1984/85), 240-62.

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egy that would call for reducing our strategic forces temporarily by 50 percent.[2]

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of tacit bargaining generally, and to evaluate the capacity of specific, cooperation-based tacit bargaining strategies to stabilize or reduce arms races. In order to extend the generalizability of the findings beyond the unrealistic context of a single game with known utilities, simulation is used to explore the impact of factors that are regularly present in historical (as opposed to game-theoretic) formulations of arms races. These factors include uncertainty about the strategy of the rival state, misinterpretation of the opponent's behavior, multiple-response options, and variations in the time preference or discount rate of decision makers. Despite the complexity of the decision environment created by the simultaneous operation of these different factors, certain rules of thumb emerge, which can aid a state in deciding whether tacit bargaining is feasible and how it should be conducted. Of particular note are the findings (1) that no single strategy such as Tit-for-Tat performs well across a broad range of plausible decision environments, and (2) that the uncertainty which is likely to plague real-world arms races generates a fundamental paradox of tacit bargaining that must be recognized if cooperation is to emerge; that is, a state will rarely be certain enough about an opponent's response to make a large cooperative gesture, and the opponent will rarely be trusting enough to respond enthusiastically to a small gesture. The paper concludes with a discussion of how these prescriptions and other aspects of the model permit a better understanding of the past and future role of tacit bargaining in the arms control area.

Background

Most of the speculation about the potential of tacit bargaining in the arms control area has had the limited aim of sensitizing the policy community to the existence of tacit bargaining and describing how it might usefully be employed. Until recently, there has been little attempt to eval-

[2] Garwin, "Is There a Way Out?" (symposium), *Harpers* (June 1985), 35-47. Specifically, Garwin suggested the following:

> The United States ought to build 400 Midgetmen, the small, not very accurate, single-warhead missile proposed by the Scowcroft Commission, and put them in Minuteman II silos. Meanwhile, we should reduce our forces temporarily by 50 percent—send half our submarines to cruise in the Antarctic, pile 20 meters of earth over half our minuteman silos, and put half our strategic bombers in mothballs. Then we should invite the Soviet Union to follow suit within six weeks, and if it does, we should make the arrangement permanent (p. 44).

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uate the merits and limitations of specific strategies or to describe the factors that must be considered before an optimal choice is possible. Thomas Schelling, for example, describes how tacit bargaining can operate to limit arms races without explicit negotiation; but he does not discuss alternative strategies or explore their capacity to cope with uncertainty, and the different games that might have inspired the situation.[3] This is also true of Charles Osgood, whose *Alternative to War or Surrender* reveals a deep understanding of both the problems associated with formal negotiations and the potential of tacit bargaining.[4]

The tacit bargaining strategies dealt with in this paper are all based on cooperation, in the sense that they require the state that implements them to limit its rate of arms growth below that which would otherwise be optimal. The extent of this reduction, its duration, and how it is adjusted as a result of the rival state's response are what distinguishes one strategy from another. In each case, the goal of the strategy is to convince the rival that both states would fare better if the current arms race were slowed, and that the initiating state (i.e., the one employing the strategy) is willing to engage in the self-controlled behavior necessary to establish this more mutually satisfying equilibrium.

A tacit bargaining strategy designed to slow an arms race need not, of course, be based on cooperation. It might rely instead on the selective use of negative reinforcement in the form of escalations in arms growth to convince the rival that the absence of restraint would be extremely costly. This was the approach periodically adopted by Britain in its naval races with France in the 19th century and with Germany before World War I. From a historical standpoint, examples of such punishment-based tacit bargaining strategies are far more common than cooperation-based ones, and their logic is embedded in the rhetoric justifying countless military appropriations requests. The focus on cooperation-based strategies in this paper is justified not by the frequency with which they are employed, but by their potential ability to reduce the intensity of an arms race without the dangers and costs of requiring that it first be escalated. Despite the popularity of punishment-based strategies, they have not been notably successful. It has proved to be no simple matter to convince a rival state tacitly that an escalation in arms growth is aimed at stabilizing the race rather than at obtaining increased policy leverage. Because the behavior is likely to appear indistinguishable from previous escalations that were

[3] Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963). See also Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin, *Strategy and Arms Control* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961).

[4] Osgood, *An Alternative to War or Surrender* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962).

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motivated by more aggressive aspirations, it can easily be given a provocative interpretation and result in a still more intensive arms race.

The most thorough treatment of cooperation-based tacit bargaining to date has analyzed the capacity of various strategies to promote cooperation within the context of an iterative Prisoner's Dilemma. In *The Evolution of Cooperation* and a number of articles, Robert Axelrod describes the results of two computer-simulation competitions in which contestants were asked to submit strategies that they expected to dominate those of other contestants in a Prisoner's Dilemma game played a large but unknown number of times.[5] As is now well-known, Axelrod discovered that the simple strategy of reciprocity—or Tit-for-Tat (TFT)—submitted by Anatol Rappaport, which begins with cooperation and then prescribes a response that reflects the rival's behavior, emerged victorious. Axelrod discusses the ability of these results to illuminate a variety of important behaviors, ranging from contract violations among firms to the periods of temporary truce that appeared to emerge spontaneously in trench warfare during World War I. Although arms-race behavior—which, analysts frequently argue, emerges from a Prisoners' Dilemma—is not discussed in any detail, the implications are clear and hopeful.

> The potential for attaining cooperation without formal arrangements has its bright sides in other contexts. For example, it means that cooperation on the control of arms does not have to be sought entirely through the formal mechanism of negotiated treaties. Arms control could also evolve tacitly. Certainly, the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union know that they will be dealing with each other for a very long time should help establish the necessary conditions. The leaders may not like each other, but neither did the soldiers in World War I who learned to live and let live.[6]

Whether or not such cooperation actually emerges depends, of course, on the degree to which the iterative Prisoners' Dilemma that structures Axelrod's computer-simulation competition is representative of actual arms races, and the extent to which the results are sensitive to any departure from this ideal type. One trivial difference between the computer competition and an ongoing arms race is that the former game begins with each side encountering the other for the first time; the other context is colored by a long history of defection. We must therefore adapt possible tacit bargaining strategies by adding an explicit provision for initiating cooperation in the face of defection. Other differences are not so easily

[5] Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Robert Axelrod, "The Emergence of Cooperation Among Egoists," *American Political Science Review* 75 (June 1981), 306-18; Robert Axelrod and William D. Hamilton, "The Evolution of Cooperation," *Science*, No. 211 (March 1981), 1390-96.

[6] Axelrod (fn. 5), 181.

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dealt with. Arms races are characteristically plagued by serious problems of interpretation and information, and the consequences of even the most modest departure from perfect information have been shown to be substantial. If there is only a 1 percent chance that one side will interpret a cooperative move as a defection, the use of the TFT strategy by both sides will lead to a game that stabilizes with at least one state defecting (i.e., increasing its arms level) 75 percent of the time.[7] In short, the arms race will continue. To control an arms race under these conditions, it is necessary for at least one side to adopt a more forgiving strategy in which retaliation is delayed or is parceled out at a rate of less than 1 for 1.

Knowledge about this limitation of TFT may keep us from being overoptimistic about its potential; but we are still in the dark as to whether the apparent superiority of this more lenient, modified TFT will be preserved once we relax other unrealistic assumptions. The dramatic change in the effectiveness of TFT after such a small departure from idealized conditions, and the extent to which this iterative Prisoners' Dilemma ignores factors commonly found in many historical arms races, should combine to create suspicion about the robustness of any strategy. Although it is obviously impossible to test alternative tacit bargaining strategies in an environment that is a satisfactory representation of even the simplest real-world arms race, the technology of simulation enables us to explore the impact of four factors, the importance of which is suggested by bargaining theory and historical experience. The factors and the rationales behind their inclusion are presented below.

A. Uncertainty about the Rival State's Utility Function and Strategy

While social scientists have often attempted to characterize the underlying dynamic of arms races by reference to a particular game (e.g., Prisoners' Dilemma, Deadlock, Stag Hunt), there are good reasons for believing that (1) different arms races are best characterized by different games; (2) a state is frequently uncertain about its rival's preferences and strategy; and (3) any single race that goes on for a significant length of time is probably best represented by an assortment of games. It is not difficult to argue, for example, that Germany during the 1930s and the Soviet Union during the 1950s each evidenced preferences in their respective arms races that were more characteristic of the game Deadlock than of Prisoners' Dilemma. That is, both states appeared to prefer an active

[7] George W. Downs et al., "Arms Races and Cooperation," *World Politics* 38 (October 1985), 118-46, at 139-42, reprinted in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., *Cooperation under Anarchy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).

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arms race with their opponent(s) to the alternative of mutual cooperation. A similar assertion can be made with regard to China during the 1960s and Iran during the 1980s. This is not to imply, of course, that the motivation underlying the policy choices of these countries was identical—but that the decision to increase arms stocks would not have been affected by the arms behavior of the rival state. Any time a state increases its arms because of internal pressures from domestic constituencies rather than because of any particular behavior on the part of its rival (a situation that unquestionably characterized British arms increases during the 1870s) or because of expectations that are only tenuously linked to present actions (a situation that may be characteristic of the U.S. arms build-up of the 1980s), it is demonstrating Deadlock-like preferences. On the other hand, some races do appear to warrant being classified as Prisoners' Dilemmas. The Anglo-German naval race in its later stages, the French-German race just before the outbreak of World War I, the Japanese, U.S., and British naval race that was temporarily halted by the Washington Treaty of 1923, and the U.S.-Soviet race prior to SALT I, all can arguably be placed into this category.[8]

The use of modifiers such as "appear to warrant" and "arguably" in categorizing a particular arms race as Deadlock or Prisoners' Dilemma is not academic false modesty. It stems from the real difficulty of determining a state's motives, and even of accurately describing its arms policy. If, given the benefit of hindsight and access to internal documents that were unavailable to the rival states at the time, it is impossible to be completely confident about French or German motives at the turn of the century, how certain could the British have been? How certain can any contemporary U.S. or Soviet analyst be about the arms strategy of the other? This uncertainty is exacerbated by unanticipated changes in the underlying game which seem to characterize any protracted arms race. There have been periods—some of which are referred to above—during the last 40 years when the United States and the Soviet Union oscillated between Deadlock and Prisoners' Dilemma preferences. The Anglo-French arms race in the 19th century and that between Britain and Germany during the early decades of the 20th also appear to have been characterized by instability in the underlying game. The implications of the likelihood that no single game characterizes all arms races, or even the same arms race over time, are not particularly attractive for those social scientists engaged

[8] Formally, the only requirement for an arms race is that each side prefer mutual escalation to unilateral reduction. This leaves open the possibility that a given arms race could be motivated by a wide variety of games. Of course, each participant in an arms race may have a different set of preferences and may thus be playing a different game.

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in the persistent attempt to create a general model of arms races. The concern here, however, is not so much to criticize these efforts as to argue that it is essential that the performance of particular tacit bargaining strategies not be measured by their success in dealing with a specific game, but be explored across a variety of plausible contexts.

The existence of arms races driven by different games creates the expectation that under conditions of perfect information, the optimal course of action will be the employment of no single strategy, but rather a mixed strategy that calls for different courses of action as the game changes. Under the more realistic assumption of uncertainty, we have a situation in which the optimal tacit bargaining strategy is determined by a probability estimate of the nature of the underlying game that the opponent is playing. Simulation is a methodology particularly suited to describing how the choice of an optimal tacit bargaining strategy is sensitive to changes in these estimates.

B. Misinterpretation

In the experiments that served as the basis of Axelrod's work, problems of information were not at issue. Every move of an opponent was instantly registered and its significance correctly interpreted. Yet, problems of intelligence and interpretation abound in international relations. For example, estimates of force and weapon capability, which frequently play a key role in a nation's arms policy, have often proved incorrect. The Anglo-French naval races of the 19th century were fueled by a number of forceful responses to nonexistent moves; German mobilization against France in 1875 was precipitated by a similar combination of poor intelligence and wild misinterpretation.[9] Although there is a tendency to believe that increasingly sophisticated monitoring procedures will eliminate miscalculations based on faulty intelligence, the evidence in favor of this position is not entirely convincing. Controversies among agencies (e.g., CIA, DoD, NSA) with regard to Soviet capabilities were still common throughout the 1970s; on a number of occasions, an agency's revision of its own previous estimate has been dramatic.[10]

Even in the unlikely event that intelligence failures ceased to be a problem, the larger difficulty of misinterpretation would continue. No tacit bargaining strategy can successfully promote cooperation unless the gestures that one state sends are correctly interpreted by the other. Unfor-

[9] Richard Cobden, *The Political Writings of Richard Cobden* (London: William Ridgway, 1868); F. W. Hirst, *The Six Panics* (London: Methuen, 1913); G. P. Gooch, *Franco-German Relations, 1817-1914* (London: Longmans, 1923).

[10] William T. Lee, *Understanding the Soviet Military Threat* (New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1977).

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tunately, there is ample reason to believe that problems of misinterpretation are endemic. The rationale for this pessimistic belief is partly historical—instances where states appear to have misperceived the actions of other states are legion—but it is also grounded in modern cognitive psychology. Consider, for example, the tendency of individuals to view the concessions they make during bargaining as being greater than the concessions they receive.[11] In the context of tacit bargaining, each side thus tends to discount the cooperative gestures made by its rival in such a way that, ceteris paribus, genuine reciprocity will be difficult if not impossible to achieve. Instead, each side sees in the response to the other a modest degree of defection (often described as an attempt to exploit) depending on the tacit bargaining strategy being pursued. This leads to deteriorating relations as each responds with a diminished level of cooperation on its own part. When one adds a corresponding tendency to view the "punishment" that each receives for defection as being greater than that which it hands out, the situation becomes still worse. Thus it should come as no surprise that the substantial reduction in the size of the Soviet army during the 1950s was largely dismissed by the United States, or that the more recent calls for mutual actions such as a moratorium on underground nuclear testing are often regarded with suspicion.[12]

The misinterpretation-inspired process of deteriorating relations that can take place even in an environment where the underlying preferences of both sides are consistent with a cooperative outcome is further exacerbated by what psychologists call the "fundamental attribution error." This refers to the inability of an individual to appreciate the extent to which an opponent is simply responding to the individual's own behavior or to elements beyond the opponent's control.[13] Decision makers, like people in general, believe that they act aggressively because they are forced to do so, while their opponents act aggressively because they want to. It is the fundamental attribution error, of course, that underlies the well-known security dilemma: a state, with no aggressive intent, attempts to make itself more secure without realizing that the resulting behavior will make another state feel less secure. The second then responds to what it sees as threatening behavior, and the cycle repeats itself.[14] In the case of

[11] Michael Ross and Fiore Sicoly, "Egocentric Biases in Availability and Attribution," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 37 (March 1979), 322-36.

[12] David Finlay, Ole Holsti, and Richard Fagan, *Enemies in Politics* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967), 60.

[13] Lee Ross and Craig Anderson, "Shortcomings in the Attribution Process: On the Origins and Maintenance of Erroneous Social Assessments," in Daniel Kahneman et al., eds., *Judgment Under Uncertainty* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 129-52.

[14] Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30 (January 1978), 167-214.

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tacit bargaining, the attribution bias described above inspires a reduction in cooperation, and the fundamental attribution error reduces the probability that the source of the confusion will ever be discovered. Each state will attribute the increased aggressiveness (or decreased cooperativeness) of the other to an internally inspired effort to exploit it, and will respond accordingly.

A final bias that further reinforces the tendency toward misinterpretation and exacerbates the biases just discussed concerns the interpretation of new evidence. Social psychologists have produced experimental evidence showing the limited ability of individuals to evaluate objectively new information that conflicts with their deeply ingrained predispositions. People not only tend to dismiss high-quality information that contradicts their position in favor of information from more suspect sources that supports their views, but they often use the conflicting evidence to support their position.[15] There is no evidence to suggest that foreign policy decision makers are any more capable of processing new information than the average individual. In fact, there is an abundance of anecdotal evidence to suggest that they share this limitation. In terms of tacit bargaining, the implication of this inability to accept new evidence that conflicts with predispositions is that it becomes impossible for a state to accept any "signal" other than the one that is anticipated. If, as is often the case in an arms race that has existed for a significant length of time, ideology and experience create a predisposition to expect aggressive arms policies on the part of a rival state, the ability of that rival to communicate a willingness to develop a more cooperative policy will be slim. Leaving aside the question of the actual motives of Soviet officials, one can scarcely imagine what set of conciliatory gestures could have convinced John Foster Dulles that the Soviets were interested in genuine detente in 1956.

C. Variable Response

In an arms race that is based on Prisoners' Dilemma, each side may select one of two choices—defect or cooperate. In a real-world arms race, the alternatives are not as limited. They range from deactivating weapon systems and releasing troops from active duty to committing every available resource to increasing weapon stockpiles. The fact that modern superpowers possess a vast array of weapon systems and are developing new ones at a rapid rate simply expands the menu of alternative defection and cooperation behaviors to an unprecedented degree. One implication of this large number of options for tacit bargaining is that it opens the

[15] Richard E. Nisbett and Lee Ross, *Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1980), 170.

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possibility of increasing the effectiveness of signaling behavior and minimizing its associated risks. For example, a state might attempt to overcome the atmosphere of suspicion created by a protracted arms race and simultaneously minimize its own vulnerability by engaging in a number of modest unilateral concessions over a substantial period of time. Alternatively, a state concerned with the potential for misinterpretation might choose to make a single, dramatic gesture that it considered to be impossible to misinterpret, and then in the clearest possible terms demand an equivalent action from its rival as a prelude to further cooperation. These two strategies do not, of course, begin to exhaust the possibilities created by the availability of continuous as opposed to dichotomous alternatives. A state could begin with a modest gesture and then gradually increase it, or begin with a dramatic cooperative move and then reduce it in such a way as to signal both a continued willingness to cooperate and a refusal to be exploited. The real questions are which strategy is best under the sort of conditions that are believed to characterize a particular arms race, and how robust any given strategy might be if decision makers miscalculated.

The existence of a continuum of arms policies that might be pursued raises the prospect that an ongoing arms race can not only be reduced through the use of tacit bargaining, but can accelerate as well. This is an important point because the Prisoners' Dilemma representation of an arms race encourages the belief that unsuccessful tacit bargaining will, at worst, result in the temporary exploitation of the state that initiates the cooperation. That is, there may be a situation of mutual defection that is interrupted by unilateral cooperation and then settles back into mutual defection. An actual arms race, where each side can choose to adopt an arms policy that is more aggressive than that represented by the status quo, is more dangerous. If the state that makes the cooperative gesture feels that it has been exploited and emerges more convinced than ever that its rival is interested in gaining strategic superiority, or if the rival views the gesture as creating a window of opportunity to be used to its advantage, tacit bargaining can work to increase the intensity of the arms race beyond the level that originally existed.[16] There are those who would argue that there is a danger of the first situation arising out of the recent failure of the United States to respond positively to the Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing or restraint in deploying SS24's and SS25's. The window-of-opportunity analogy is probably best exemplified by the Ger-

[16] For simplicity, in the simulation the rival states were assumed already to be proceeding at their individually optimal rate. This means that substantial deterioration could not occur. Had we started the simulation at a lower rate, it would clearly have reinforced our conclusions at the cost of some additional complexity of presentation.

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man response to British appeasement during the 1930s, although it can be argued that the Germans might have adopted no less aggressive an arms policy in the face of British reciprocity.

D. The Time Preference of Decision Makers

Axelrod is careful to stress that the key to the success of reciprocity in an iterated Prisoners' Dilemma lies in the relative value that the players place on the future as compared with the present. If the benefits that will accrue through long-term cooperation ("the shadow of the future") are large, players will not be seduced by the prospect of the modest gains that can be had by defecting in the present. This simple principle can provide the basis for a variety of strategies designed to promote cooperation; Axelrod discusses a number of them—such as increasing the frequency and the length of time with which two players interact.

In Axelrod's simulation experiments, the shadow of the future affects both players in the same way. That is often a reasonable assumption. If Player *A* can look forward to 20 meetings with Player *B*, it is likely that Player *B* will share the same expectation. If they then employ the same discount rate to translate future benefits into current benefits, they will place the same value on their interactions. In the case of arms races (and other classes of international interactions), however, symmetry may be absent. It is true that the United States can expect to have to deal with the Soviet Union as often as the Soviet Union with the United States; key decision makers in these countries, however, may have quite different expectations about the length of time they are likely to be in office (and therefore directly responsible for the future relations between their countries), and very different views about the relative importance of present exigencies vis-à-vis future benefits. It is not enough to specify that the administration assuming power in State *A* hold Prisoners' Dilemma preferences, or even to define a specific payoff matrix. The discount rate that will be used by the new administration must be specified. It is one thing to believe in the superiority of mutual cooperation over mutual defection, and another to be willing to make the short-term sacrifice that will communicate the desire for cooperation. Only the latter will make the long-term benefits associated with a less intensive arms race achievable.

The Structure of the Simulation

Although substantially more complicated than any past representation of tacit bargaining, the simulation that will be described here contains a number of simplifying assumptions. These are discussed below, together with the general structure of the simulation. In part, the simplifications

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represent the inevitable sacrifices of complexity that characterize any effort at model building; another constraint is generated, however, by the need to make the presentation as accessible as possible. Long lists of output, showing how a large number of strategies vary in attractiveness as an equally large number of parameters change, are virtually incomprehensible without extraordinary effort on the part of a reader. A small number of summary statistics with no clear reference to policy options, supplemented by ten qualifying footnotes, is no better. With these difficulties in mind, we decided to depict graphically the results of a small number of simulation experiments in which the most critical parameters are varied. In keeping with the experimental design literature, we have used only two values of each parameter instead of a large number.[17] Two widely separated values allow the detection of the major effects; intermediate results can be inferred approximately by interpolation. Thus we examine the impact of 2 dramatically different discount rates rather than all possible ones, and a set of 3 possible arms strategies instead of 20 or 30 that a rival state may plausibly employ. In the sections on Simulation Results and on Implications, we summarize what we consider to be the major descriptive and prescriptive policy findings, leaving the reader to employ the charts for answers to more specific and/or complicated questions.

The simulation is designed to model a situation in which a new administration assumes power in one of two states (subsequently referred to as State *A*) currently engaged in a bipolar arms race. This administration sees substantial economic and security advantages to be gained by slowing the arms race, but appreciates both the dangers of losing ground relative to the rival (State *B*) and the policy leverage that arms superiority occasionally permits. In short, its preferences can be represented by one side of the classic Prisoners' Dilemma. This sort of preference ordering is probably common to many 19th- and 20th-century regimes that were interested in but not dedicated to arms control. The preference for mutual cooperation (i.e., arms reduction) over mutual defection (i.e., arms increases) is obviously a prerequisite for any tacit bargaining initiatives. A distaste for permitting the enemy to gain a noticeable advantage in an ongoing arms race seems almost universal; an appreciation of the benefits of arms superiority seems common (if misplaced). To capture the effect of variations in the perceived benefits and costs of arms superiority simultaneously, we will look at two different sets of payoffs. What we refer to

[17] George E. P. Box, William G. Hunter, and J. Stuart Hunter, *Statistics for Experimenters* (New York: John Wiley, 1975). In the simulation, we examine the effects of three parameters. In order to simplify the presentation, we use a base case and three sensitivity analysis cases that vary one parameter at a time. A full factorial design was not used because of the difficulty of grasping eight charts simultaneously.

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as the Base Case is typical of Prisoners' Dilemma studies; the Low-Benefit Case represents a situation where less value is placed on arms superiority.

We have adopted a much broader definition of the game than is usually employed in Prisoners' Dilemma studies. In our game, the status of each side is a level of armaments. On each move, each side may increase or decrease its arms level by any amount. After both sides have moved, each side attains a benefit that is proportional to the difference in arms, minus a maintenance cost associated with its own arms stock. (The benefit/cost ratio is 6:1 and 3:1 in the two cases.) In addition, a building cost is included to avoid having an instantaneous, infinite arms build-up as an optimal move. In the results of this model, a myopically rational actor will increase arms by 2.5 units per year in the Base Case and by 1 unit in the Low-Benefit Case. The Prisoners' Dilemma aspect of this model is that each side is better off if both sets of arms are lower, but it is even more advantageous to build when the rival does not.[18]

For reasons described in the previous section, State A is likely to be uncertain about the intentions and strategies of its rival, State B. While in theory the range of possibilities is infinite, we will begin by assuming that State B's utility function and expectations are such that it has adopted one of three possible arms strategies. In the first, its preferences are identical to those of the new administration of State A, and it has adopted a strategy of reciprocity. State B has not, however, made any recent cooperative gestures. An explanation for this lack of cooperative initiative is not difficult to imagine. B prefers mutual arms reduction to a continued arms race, but it possesses no confidence that a unilateral arms reduction will inspire reciprocity on the part of A, and fears the cost of losing ground. If B has adopted a strategy of reciprocity, a cooperative gesture on the part of the

[18] Formally, we suppose that a state achieves a net benefit of

$$a(T_A - T_B) - bT_A - c(T_A - T_A^0)^2$$

when arms are increased, and

$$a(T_A - T_B) - bT_A - d(T_A^0 - T_A)$$

when arms are decreased, where T_A and T_B are the new levels of arms for the two sides, and T_A^0 is the last turn's arms level for side A. The cost function is quadratic for arms increases, to represent the difficulties that the industrial infrastructure and the political system have with arbitrarily large increases. Values used in the simulation are $b = 1.0$, $c = 1.0$, and $d = 0.5$ in all cases, with $a = 6$ in the Base Case and $a = 3$ in the Low-Benefit Case. It is easily seen that the "optimal" increase of arms for side A is given by

$$\Delta_A^{opt} = (a - b)/2c$$

regardless of the level chosen by side B. Thus, the simulation is begun by assuming that the arms race has been proceeding at this "optimal" level for some time. Note that it is possible for A to choose an arms increase greater that Δ_A^{opt}. Although it might seem irrational, some punishment-based strategies could have this result.

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new administration will yield large benefits; the larger the gesture, the better.

A second possibility is that State B is prepared to continue its arms build-up regardless of any action taken by State A. The reasons are countless: the pace of its build-up may be determined by internal constituencies whose economic and internal political motives are insulated from the effect of cooperative gestures; it may fear that it is being duped when it is urged to make a significant sacrifice in response to what it views as a trivial cooperative move; its economy may recently have improved to a point where it can afford substantially greater arms expenditures; its political goals may have become more aggressive; and so forth. Historical precedents for each of these motives are easy to find; collectively, they help us understand the relative infrequency with which arms races have been resolved through either formal negotiation or tacit bargaining.[19] From the standpoint of A, the suspicion that B holds such Deadlock preferences and/or is committed to a strategy of continual defection obviously discourages a cooperative gesture.

The third possibility is that State B prefers mutual cooperation to mutual defection, but will respond only partially to a cooperative gesture. This less-than-reciprocal response represents the caution experienced by an opponent in an extended arms race about the sincerity of the cooperative gesture that has been extended. Is the gesture a trick? Does it signify nothing more than a momentary lull in arms development caused by economic strain or indecisiveness about which weapon system to invest in? The atmosphere of distrust that builds up in an arms race is not dissipated overnight; it may require the adoption of a patient strategy that calls for making a number of cooperative gestures without expectation of an immediately cooperative response. In the simulation, this model is operationalized by the opponent basically playing Tit-for-Tat, but returning a cooperative gesture with one that is only half as strong.[20]

[19] Downs et al. (fn. 7), 123.

[20] In the first case, when B employs a reciprocal strategy, the increase will be

$$T_A^o - T_A^*$$

matching A's increase (or decrease) from last time, where the o and * superscripts refer to the last move and the one before that. In the second case, B will continue its past build-up no matter what, so the increase will be

$$T_B^o - T_B^*.$$

Thus, the current increase is exactly the same as the last turn's increase. In modeling cautious reciprocity, we imagine that B examines A's change last time compared to B's own change two turns ago. If A were playing a reciprocal strategy, these two quantities would be identical. If they are, or if A's move is larger, then B plays reciprocally, subject to staying below the optimal increase; otherwise, B makes an increase midway between A's last move and B's own last move. Although this strategy seems complex, it only amounts to following up a cooperative gesture with a smaller cooperative gesture.

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It should be clear from the previous section that, whatever strategy our cooperatively minded state chooses to play, it will have to be carried out in a less-than-perfect information environment. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that each side has an accurate picture of what it itself has done, but that perceptions of what the opponent has done are subject to bias and error. The bias component represents the psychological tendency of individuals (and the historical inclination of states) to underestimate the magnitude of an opponent's cooperation and to overestimate the extent of its defection or continued weapons build-up. The value we chose is relatively small, 0.05 units.[21] In addition to bias, we assume the existence of a normally distributed noise component that summarizes the impact of all of the other factors which essentially operate at random to degrade the information environment. These might include delays in updating force structures and weapons assessments, or inaccurate intelligence estimates, but could also arise as a function of the complexity and variation of weapons inventories. Tacit bargaining across disparate weapon systems made up of equipment that is far less homogeneous than battleships and that is valued differently by different states is an uncertain, "noisy" process. We employ a noise distribution with a standard deviation of 0.1 for the base case and go on to describe the implications of a high-noise scenario where the standard deviation is 0.5.

To capture the implications of the administration of State *A* taking a long- or short-term view of the benefits of cooperation vis-à-vis continued defection, we work with discount rates of 0.05 and 0.10, which represent the long- and short-term perspectives. While one might argue that 0.10 rate which depreciates future benefits at the rate of 10 percent is actually not as high as that employed by many short-term-oriented politicians, it hardly matters. As the next section will reveal, if the discount rate approaches this value, an uncertain State *A* will be driven away from making any cooperative gesture.

Table 1 summarizes the four decision environments that are utilized in the analysis and that provide the context in which State *A* will attempt to cope with the three possible strategies of State *B*. The simulation is designed to tell us how sensitive *A*'s choice of strategy is to these changes in context.

The strategic alternatives that are available to the new administration of State *A* involve maintaining parity with the rival state by continuing the arms race at its present level or making some cooperative gesture (*G*), which will be continued for some duration (*d*) before it is reduced at some

[21] A larger bias makes tacit bargaining almost impossible; anything less would be historically naive.

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TABLE 1
PARAMETERS FOR THE FOUR CASES

	Discount Rate	*Benefit of Arms Superiority*	*Noise Level*
Base	0.05	6	0.1
High Discount	0.10	6	0.1
Low Benefit	0.05	3	0.1
High Noise	0.05	6	0.5

rate (c). To eliminate ambiguity about what G actually represents, we will define it in terms of the parity strategy. That is, a cooperative gesture of size G means G units less than what would be required to maintain parity. If G is 2 units of armaments and the opponent's last move was to build 10 units, then State A will attempt to demonstrate its willingness to cooperate by building only 8 units of arms; if the opponent's last move was 7, State A will build 5. Because both states act simultaneously, the duration parameter (d) will be at least 2 in order to allow time for the other to react.

SIMULATION RESULTS

The first stage of the simulation was designed to reduce the limitless set of strategies from which the new administration of State A might choose to a number that is realistic in a policy sense and also permits coherent discussion. One way to do this is to examine some simple but fundamental relationships among the variables central to the analysis, and to see whether they suggest any strategic alternatives that are dominant over a wide range of conditions. A sensible place to begin is with the effect of uncertainty on the magnitude of the initial cooperative gesture. Obviously, if State A is convinced that its rival is pursuing a strategy of reciprocity and will respond in kind to any cooperative gesture, the optimal strategy is to make a very large gesture as quickly as possible. Such an action would lead to mutual disarmament within a few moves. The question is whether such large gestures are still a viable strategic possibility when State A is uncertain about the nature of B's response. That is, to what extent does the possibility that the rival may not respond positively lead a rational actor to make more modest and tentative unilateral gestures?

Figure 1 depicts the optimal concession level against an opponent who

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

FIGURE 1

CRITICAL PROBABILITIES OF DEADLOCK FOR VARIOUS CONCESSION LEVELS AND FOUR CONDITIONS

has a probability p of playing Deadlock (i.e., of ignoring a cooperative gesture and continuing to expand its arms at the previous rate) and a probability of $1-p$ of responding with an equivalent gesture. For each environment and each potential level of concession, the figure shows what probability of response is required to make that gesture.[22] What is interesting here is that, once the probability of unresponsiveness is believed to be greater than about 23 percent—a relatively low figure—the optimal concession level is less than 3. That is true for each of the decision environments described in Table 1: the Base Case with standard Prisoners' Dilemma payoffs, low discount rate, and low noise, as well as the three alternative decision environments with lower benefits for arms superiority, a higher discount rate of 10 percent, and high noise. In terms of policy, this means that if there is even a modest suspicion that the rival may not be receptive to a cooperative gesture, State A will limit its cooperative gesture to what amounts to a one-year moratorium on weapon increases rather than offer something more substantial; this decision is not significantly affected by varying the decision environment.

Figure 2 depicts the relative benefit that accrues to State A from mak-

[22] The numbers were calculated from simulations run separately for the case in which the opponent is playing Deadlock and the case in which the opponent is employing the reciprocal strategy.

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

FIGURE 2
RELATIVE BENEFIT OF VARIOUS CONCESSIONS
AGAINST CAUTIOUS RECIPROCITY

ing gestures of various sizes against an opponent employing a strategy of cautious reciprocity.[23] It might at first appear that if one could be certain that the other side was engaged in a strategy of cautious reciprocity, the optimal move would be to make a dramatically large initial gesture, just as one would do if one could be certain that the opponent was pursuing a normal reciprocal strategy. This, however, is not the case. Although it is true that certainty insures a favorable response, a basic attribute of the cautious reciprocity strategy is that the response will be proportionately smaller than the initial cooperative gesture. The difference between the gesture that State *A* makes and the response that it gets is a cost because it constitutes an arms advantage for a potential adversary, and there is a limit on how large a cost the new administration in State *A* is willing to incur. Figure 2 shows substantial differences in the relative benefit (depending on the assumptions we make about noise, etc.); remarkably, it also reveals that the largest relative benefit always takes place in the 3-4 range. As in the case of Figure 1, this tells us that the optimal concession will be no greater than a 12-18 month moratorium on increases.

The results described above simplify our subsequent simulation and presentation task significantly because they establish an upper bound on

[23] If the payoff for making no cooperative gesture is P_O and the payoff for making a cooperative gesture of size G is P_G, then the quantity graphed against G is $(P_G - P_O)/P_O$. The required numbers were estimated by simulation.

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the initial concession level of 3. For State *A* rationally to offer more, it would have to be at least 80 percent certain that State *B* would neither ignore the gesture nor respond to it cautiously—a level of confidence that is rarely found in the real world. The upper bound on the initial gesture allows us to conduct the subsequent simulation using a relatively narrow range of strategies. We have chosen seven: pure reciprocity by which State *A* increases its arms at precisely the same rate as *B* with no cooperative gesture, and six cooperative strategies with two levels of initial gesture and three levels of patience. These are described in Table 2.

The second portion of the simulation consists of evaluating the merits of each of State *A*'s seven possible strategies against each of State *B*'s strategies in the four different environments. The results are presented in Figures 3 to 6. For each triangle, the vertices represent certainty that the rival will employ the labeled strategy. Any degree of uncertainty about what strategy the rival will employ is represented by a point along the edge or inside the triangle. The numbers indicate which of State *A*'s strategies is optimal at that level of uncertainty.[24] For example, in the Base Case in Figure 3, suppose the new administration believed that there was a 50 percent chance that the rival was playing a reciprocity strategy, a 50 percent chance that it was playing a cautious reciprocity strategy, and a 0 percent chance that it was playing Deadlock. In that case, the unlikelihood of the rival's constant defection focuses our attention as far from the left

TABLE 2
PARAMETERS FOR THE SEVEN STRATEGIES

Strategy Number	*Initial Concession*	*Decay of Cooperation upon Nonresponse*
1	0	—
2	1	1.0
3	3	1.0
4	1	0.5
5	3	0.5
6	1	0.25
7	3	0.25

[24] Payoffs were calculated by simulation for each of the seven strategies against each of the opponent's strategies for each environment. A typical point (p_1, p_2, p_3) in the triangle represents an estimated probability of p_i that State *B* is playing its first strategy, etc. The expected payoff to a given strategy is a weighted average, by p_1, p_2, and p_3, of the outcomes against the three possible strategies of State *B*. From the payoff formula for each strategy at each point, the areas of optimality for each strategy within the triangle were easily computed.

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

FIGURE 3
BASE CASE

vertex as possible and places it on the right side of the triangle. Because we know that there is a 50 percent chance that the rival has adopted a strategy of reciprocity and a 50 percent chance that it has selected cautious reciprocity, we locate a point halfway between the top and the right-hand vertices on the right edge and see which strategy is prescribed. In this case, the probability of reciprocity versus cautious reciprocity is irrelevant since Strategy 7 (the most generous and trusting strategy) is prescribed at every point along the right side; that is, Strategy 7 is best whenever there is no chance that the rival will constantly defect. Note that this is the only situation in which the knowledge of one probability provides sufficient information for choosing the optimal strategy. Had we been told that there was a 0 percent chance of the rival employing cautious reciprocity, we would have to know the relative probabilities that it would constantly defect or behave reciprocally before we would know whether Strategy 1, 2, 3, 4, or 7 was superior. To take another example, suppose the new administration believed that there is an equal probability that the rival will play any of the three strategies (i.e., the probability of each is 33.33 percent). Attention would then shift to the center of the triangle where we see that the optimal course of action is Strategy 4, which involves a small initial concession of 1 that is diminished by a factor of 0.5 per round if there is no response.

Let us consider the Base Case in greater detail. One striking feature is

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that if the estimated probability that the rival will employ a strategy of Deadlock or ignore a cooperative gesture is greater than about 55 percent, the optimal strategy is to make no gesture at all, not even a small one. This suggests that it would not be difficult for a rational but uncertain administration to talk itself out of initiating any serious tacit bargaining. Moreover, the prevalence of 2's and 4's suggests that even when the estimated probability of Deadlock falls to about 20 percent, the size of the initial overture is likely to be modest. The initial gesture of 1 that is basic to both strategies represents a moratorium of less than one-half of one year's weapons growth. The large initial gesture of Strategies 3, 5, and 7 is rarely optimal and requires a great deal of assurance—an impossibly great deal of assurance in the case of Strategy 7—that the opponent will not simply ignore it. The optimal strategy is also often conservative from the standpoint of how quickly the initial gesture is decreased in light of nonresponse. Of the strategies that are the most generous in the face of nonresponse (i.e., 6 and 7), one is never optimal and the other is optimal only under very unusual conditions. Strategy 5, which prescribes a proportional decay rate that is twice as great as these, is still relatively rare; Strategy 4, which has a similar decay rate, is more popular only because the size of its initial gesture is so modest that subsequent gestures are relatively costless.

Figure 4 depicts the same situation except that State *A* has a short-term



FIGURE 4
HIGH-DISCOUNT CASE

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perspective (that is, it discounts future benefits at a fairly high rate of 10 percent per year). As Axelrod suggests in his discussion of the shadow of the future, a prerequisite for the cooperative resolution of Prisioners' Dilemmas is that future benefits be valued highly. What is notable about the figure is just how little uncertainty can be tolerated in an environment with a short-term perspective before the optimal strategy will be to continue with the arms race and make no move toward tacit bargaining. If there is even a 10-percent chance that State *B* will ignore the cooperative gesture, the cooperatively minded state will do nothing.

Figure 5 deals with the case where the advantage of arms superiority—or the temporary disadvantage of falling behind—is thought to be modest. As one would expect, such a decision environment promotes tacit bargaining. The probability of a nonresponse that is needed to discourage any bargaining overture climbs to about 80 percent; Strategy 3 (which involves a large initial concession but a steep withdrawal rate) and Strategy 4 (which consists of a small initial gesture but only a moderate withdrawal rate) both become optimal in many situations. Note, however, that even in this relatively benign environment there is a limit to the degree of generosity that is prescribed. Strategies 5, 6, and 7, which involve either slow decay rates or slow decay rates and large initial gestures, are still optimal in only a small proportion of possible situations. This means



FIGURE 5
LOW-BENEFIT CASE

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

FIGURE 6
HIGH-NOISE CASE

that the declining marginal utility of weapons or "overkill" environments would tend to promote tacit bargaining, but would not lead states to embrace it with the fervor that more aggressive partisans of arms control might desire.

Finally, Figure 6 depicts the case in which there is a high level of noise and misperception in the system. Whether this is brought about by problems of weapons incomparability, poor intelligence, or the difficulties of trying to bargain tacitly across different categories of weapon systems, it greatly suppresses the tendency of the cooperatively minded state to make an initial cooperative gesture. To be specific, if misinterpretation is a strong possibility and there is more than a 20 percent chance that the other state is pursuing a Deadlock strategy, it would be optimal to make no cooperative gesture. If the chance of a Deadlock strategy on the part of the rival is less than 20 percent, Strategies 5 and 6 are often prescribed. These strategies meet the problem of noise head-on because they contain a decay rate that is small relative to the size of the initial gesture. That is, they cope with the problem of noise by assuming the need to repeat the message (i.e., the cooperative gesture) a number of times. Note, however, that the advantages of repetition do not extend to expanding the role of Strategy 7. Unless the decision maker is virtually certain that Deadlock is an impossibility, the large initial gesture and slow decay rate prescribed by that strategy continue to make it irrationally generous.

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Implications

The foregoing results have a number of implications for the conduct of tacit bargaining by foreign policy decision makers in a cooperatively minded state. Perhaps the most important lesson is that there is no specific strategy that is always dominant and upon which a state can always rely. The simulation shows how the optimal strategy changes as the nature of the decision environment changes; and the history of arms races leaves little doubt that the decision environment does vary. Decision makers therefore have no alternative but to estimate certain values and probabilities before they select a strategy. They need to estimate, first, the extent to which they value the benefits of security and budgetary savings that may not be realized for some time (i.e., the discount rate), the amount of noise in the system and the likelihood of misinterpretation, and the strategic cost associated with their cooperative gesture being ignored by the other side. Then they need to make some judgment about the strategy the rival nation is employing as it conducts its arms race. Since it is highly doubtful that decision makers can make this judgment with absolute certainty, it will inevitably take the form of an estimate of how likely it is that the rival has chosen each of the various possible alternative strategies. Only after this information has been gathered is it possible to recommend an appropriate tacit bargaining strategy. Although it would be conceptually neater and also more reassuring if someone could formulate a tacit bargaining strategy that was robust across all decision environments and made fewer information demands on policy makers, it is extremely unlikely that such a strategy exists.

Although it is impossible to summarize the implications of the simulation by prescribing a single strategy that can always be confidently employed to reduce the intensity of arms races, certain guidelines do emerge. One of the clearest holds the most disheartening implication: if the chances that the rival state will ignore a conciliatory gesture are estimated to be greater than 55 percent, then the cooperatively minded state should continue to increase its arms strength at the same rate as the other until it receives a conciliatory gesture. It is true that if the cost of falling behind in the arms race is particularly small, this figure rises, but it is also true that it falls dramatically in the presence of high noise or a high discount rate. Since one suspects that the presence of noise and misinterpretation problems is at least as likely as a conviction that falling behind in the arms race is relatively costless, the optimal strategy may all too often be to make no cooperative gesture.

The analysis suggests that, even when the likelihood of constant defec-

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tion on the part of the rival is relatively low, the magnitude of the conciliatory gesture should be modest. Although its precise size varies with the basic assumptions and probability estimates, it would rarely represent more than the equivalent of a six-month moratorium on arms increases and almost never more than an eighteen-month moratorium. It is surprising that this is true even when the conditions for tacit bargaining are almost ideal (i.e., when there is only a small benefit associated with an arms advantage and a strong possibility that the rival is engaging in a strategy of pure or cautious reciprocity). Regardless of the other factors that compose the decision environment, a small amount of uncertainty has a pervasive effect on the character of the opening move.

Decision makers in the cooperatively minded state must also decide how patient they will be in dealing with responses that do not immediately match their initial gestures. To some extent the answer is contingent on the character of the first move. The fact that Strategies 2 and 7 seldom dominate the other strategies indicates that it is unwise to be extremely impatient if the initial gesture has been small, or extremely patient if it has been large. Strategy 2 is problematic because it is difficult to interpret in a noisy and uncertain environment; Strategy 7 is usually a poor choice because it permits exploitation. The message of moderation is reinforced in the Base and Low-Benefit environments generally. Note that uncertainty about the strategy of the opponent leads to the domination of Strategies 3 and 4, which call for the moderate decay rate of 0.5. One might expect that the optimal amount of patience would always depend on the magnitude of the opening gesture, as it did in the case of Strategies 2 and 7. Yet it does not; as uncertainty about the opponent's strategy increases, the level of patience that is optimal stabilizes and ceases to depend on the initial concession. "Reduce your offer—whatever it is—by half in the face of nonresponse" is a robust tacit when dealing with an enigmatic rival.

It is also wise to avoid tacit bargaining across weapon systems and in areas where estimates of weapon effectiveness are far apart. Either situation creates an environment analogous to the high-noise case. The rival state may well miss the significance of the initial concession; even if it does not, there is a real possibility that its cooperative response will be misinterpreted. The history of U.S.-Soviet negotiations has taught us that either side's initial calculations about the value the other side places on a given system are often wildly incorrect, and that one of the virtues of formal negotiation is that it provides a context in which these estimates can be revised. Tacit bargaining presents a rival with little opportunity to inspire such a revision and raises the possibility that misinterpretation or misintelligence will lead to further escalation of the arms race.

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Another prescription concerns the periodic reevaluation of arms policy in light of changing conditions. The absence of a broadly dominant tacit bargaining strategy and the ever-changing character of some of the factors that determine the "best" strategy make it unwise to pursue a single strategy over a long period. For example, the probability of misinterpretation can change with the development of new weapon systems. The country that develops the system may view it as consistent with the current equilibrium, but the rival may believe that it represents an escalation of the arms race. Different administrations are also likely to have at least marginally different views of the benefits associated with being slightly ahead or behind in the arms race; depending on their political security, they could be using different discount rates as well. Any of these changes might well favor the choice of a new tacit bargaining strategy. The most frequent and significant changes, however, may be prompted by uncertainty about the arms strategy the rival state is pursuing. Each of the figures illustrates that, as assurance mounts that the rival has committed itself to a specific strategy, the prescribed tacit bargaining strategy of the cooperatively minded state can change dramatically.

Finally, if cooperation-based tacit bargaining is to be successful, decision makers must do everything possible to minimize the bias with which they view a rival state's actions as well as their own natural inclination to avoid risk. That is equally true whether they are sending a cooperative message to their opponent or trying to determine whether they have been sent such a message. The simulation results reveal what might be called the basic paradox of tacit bargaining. The key is uncertainty. *A state will rarely be certain enough about an opponent's response to make a large cooperative gesture, and the opponent will rarely be trusting enough to respond enthusiastically to a small one.*

This paradox is one of the basic reasons why tacit bargaining is such a fragile, opaque process and why tacit bargaining initiatives often end in frustration or further escalation. The only way around the problem is for decision makers to approach tacit bargaining with the expectation that the other side would be acting irrationally if it made a gesture large enough to be unambiguous. If a state chooses to take the initiative, it should prepare itself for a response that is slower in coming and smaller in magnitude than it might desire. If a state chooses to be conservative and wait for a cooperative signal from its rival, it should know that the signal will almost certainly be modest.

Although the goals of this simulation exercise are primarily analytic and prescriptive, our confidence in the results would be strengthened if its descriptive implications were broadly consistent with the historical record and particularly with the U.S.-Soviet experience. One obvious im-

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plication is that a world fraught with uncertainty about a rival's motivation and strategy, misinterpretation, and limited time horizons is unlikely to be one in which cooperation-based tacit bargaining plays a major role in limiting the rate of arms growth. Tacit bargaining played no central role in ending any of the 19th- and 20th-century arms races, and its contribution to containing the scope and pace of the U.S.-Soviet arms race has not been great.[25]

The importance of uncertainty about the rival's intentions is corroborated by internal debates about the consequences of making an initial cooperative gesture or of responding to one. If the U.S.-Soviet race—the arms race about which we have the best information—is characteristic, these debates are endless. Should the U.S. halt deployment of the MX and sea-launched cruise missiles (SLACMs) and wait for a response? Should it extend its unilateral ban on developing an antisatellite weapon (ASAT) while a treaty is being negotiated? Should it discontinue SDI development in hopes of inspiring a spirit of cooperation that will lead to significant disarmament? Each policy has supporters who are convinced that the Soviet Union will be eager to cooperate if its negative expectations are overcome, as well as opponents who argue that it has no intention of exchanging its strategic build-up for U.S. restraint. Debates about the intentions that may have motivated a potentially cooperative gesture initiated by the Soviet Union are no less frequent or controversial. Certainly there is no more consensus on the meaning of the Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing in 1986 than there was on Soviet troop reductions in Eastern Europe in 1956.

The sensitivity of tacit bargaining to noise and interpretation has implications both for the simplicity and decomposability of the agreements that are achieved and for the time they are likely to last. Because problems of noise and interpretation work against the construction of complex agreements, we would generally expect successful tacit bargaining to involve only one type of weaponry or weapon system. Historically, this always seems to have been the case. Tacit bargaining in the Anglo-German and Anglo-French naval races each involved a single type of ship, and U.S.-Soviet gestures have been similarly focused. The American unilateral renunciation of nuclear weapons in space (1962) and renunciation of biological and toxin weapons (1969) can be viewed as gestures that are characteristic in this regard.

When a substantial amount of noise and/or misinterpretation is cou-

[25] For a list and discussion of these arms races, see Samuel Huntington, "Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results," *Public Policy* 8 (1958), 41-86; Paul Kennedy, *Strategy and Diplomacy* (Aylesbury, England: Fontana, 1984), 163-78; Downs et al. (fn. 7), 119-21. For one viewpoint on the role of cooperation-based tacit bargaining in the U.S.-Soviet arms race, see Adelman (fn. 1).

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pled with a tacit bargaining strategy that is based on anything approaching reciprocity, any cooperative equilibrium will collapse quite rapidly. This is implied in Figure 4 by the dominance of strategies with a low decay rate. Since we argue that noise/misinterpretation problems are prevalent, and suspect that states rarely appreciate the needs for continuing to make cooperative gestures in the face of an apparent rejection, we would expect to find that tacit bargains are rarely sustained unless they are institutionalized in a formal treaty. Even in the absence of other destabilizing factors such as technological or internal political change, this seems to be the case. One of the most conspicuous properties of the tacit bargains described by Axelrod that took place in World War I trenches, that limited the use of aerial bombardment in the initial months of World War II, and that are connected with arms control, is their short duration. Unless they are quickly supported by a formal treaty (as in the case of nuclear weapons in space) or made irrelevant by the progress of technology, interpretation problems soon arise and a spiral of retaliation ensues.

Still another expectation involves the magnitude of the conciliatory gesture and what we have called the fundamental paradox of tacit bargaining. The simulation leads us to expect that even though a state is basically cooperatively minded, it will nonetheless make very modest cooperative gestures. It is difficult to think of any counterexamples. One might argue that British pacification gestures in the 1930s are an exception, but these did not really take place within an ongoing arms race. The examples already mentioned, of possible tacit bargaining gestures initiated by the United States and the Soviet Union, certainly do not run counter to expectations. There is little risk in declaring a moratorium on tests that you may not need to conduct, or to abandoning unilaterally the development of a weapon that you cannot afford or that is technologically unsatisfactory.

Conclusion

The small number of instances in which cooperation-based tacit bargaining has led to progress in arms control, coupled with the limitations that emerge from the simulation, might easily lead one to underestimate the potential contribution of the process. It is true that its inability to deal with complex tradeoffs means that it is unlikely to lead to comprehensive arms reduction. It is also true that the belief in a single strategy that can reliably serve policy makers in every situation is chimerical; nonetheless, it can play an important role. If skillfully applied to specific categories of weapons, it can stabilize an arms race by limiting the deployment of such

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weapons or restricting the conduct of tests necessary to their development; in some cases, it can lead to their dismantling.

Despite its limitations, tacit bargaining enjoys a number of advantages over formal negotiations. Its iterative character permits progress to occur in small increments with low transaction costs. No summit conference need be convened; no broad treaty need be accepted or rejected wholesale; no elaborate ratification process need be overcome. True, a tacitly bargained agreement is less "institutionalized" than a formal treaty, and therefore more vulnerable to violation from both sides. But this permits states to experiment with cooperation at a lower cost than a formal treaty would demand. If the tacit bargain does not produce the desired results, it can be allowed to dissolve.

The natural affinity of tacit bargaining for decomposable problems, which bounds its ability to produce comprehensive disarmament, can inspire decision makers to cooperate in specific areas even while most of their interactions continue to be uncooperative. Just as tacit bargaining led to unrestricted travel within the city of Berlin even during the height of the Blockade, so it can lead to the control of nuclear weapons in space or the development of an antiballistic missile system during a period when a new generation of long-range strategic missiles is being deployed. Moreover, the fact that the weapon systems most likely to yield to tacit bargaining must be decomposable from other weapon systems for negotiation purposes does not mean that they are decomposable in a historical sense. By slightly altering a state's expectations about the strategy and motivations of its opponent, every successful tacit bargain increases the likelihood that another will take place. Eventually, they can accumulate to the point where the arms race is significantly slowed and where the climate is improved for the formal negotiations that are necessary to handle the difficult and complex tradeoffs that a major disarmament effort would require.

The catch is that skillful tacit bargaining, like skillful negotiation, is more difficult than one might at first imagine. Its successful application is dependent on information that is likely to come from a number of different sources, a thorough understanding of the probabilistic effect of several key parameters, and a willingness to switch strategies when conditions change. Perhaps it depends above all on an ability to cope with the inevitable ambiguity caused by the fundamental paradox of tacit bargaining.

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EXTENDED DETERRENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
American Strategy Reconsidered

By JANICE GROSS STEIN*

WHEN leaders extend deterrence, they attempt to prevent a military attack against an ally by threatening retaliation should force be used against their protégé. At present, most analysts locate extended deterrence at the intersection of nuclear and conventional force in Europe; the United States relies heavily on this strategy to protect its allies. The extension of deterrence to Europe, however, is only one among several possible applications of the strategy. It has been widely used by the United States, for example, to manage conflict in the Middle East. We propose to examine this wider extension of deterrence.

While attention to the dynamics of extended deterrence in Europe is understandable in view of its political and strategic importance to both superpowers, it is of limited theoretical relevance. There is a small body of case material from the European theater, a limited record of successes and failures that can be empirically assessed. In consequence, we often tend to argue deductively rather than to demonstrate empirically that extended deterrence either does or does not work.[1] Because the relevant evidence is limited, we cannot develop the kind of differentiated and policy-relevant theory that would permit us to demonstrate the varying conditions under which extended deterrence can work. We need "useful" case studies to assess when, whether, and how extended deterrence is effective.

To restrict the evaluation of extended deterrence to Europe would be to eliminate from the analysis precisely those cases that may be explosive, that threaten to escalate from regional theaters and involve the two superpowers through their proxies. This is especially so in the Middle East, where both the United States and the Soviet Union have extensive commitments to regional powers. Often, the concern of each is not only to prevent direct military action by the other but also to deter the ally of its

* I wish to acknowledge the valuable comments of Alexander George, Franklyn Griffiths, Robert Jervis, and Richard Ned Lebow.

[1] A major exception is the seminal study of deterrence by Alexander George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).

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adversary—an ally that has its own political and strategic agenda. Extended deterrence meets its most severe test in this gray area. To treat extended deterrence only at the strategic level and to limit its application only to Europe is to distort its strengths and weaknesses as a strategy of conflict management.

Although we recognize that extended deterrence generally refers to nuclear deterrence and that it applies principally to Europe, we focus our analysis more broadly to include a range of cases where there are no agreed-upon lines of demarcation between the two superpowers and where recourse to force can occur at differing levels of intensity. Not surprisingly, as we complicate the number and kinds of application of extended deterrence, the complexities of the strategy become apparent. It is precisely these complexities, however, that merit our attention because they can confound the workings of deterrence. In this regard, the U.S. attempt to extend deterrence in the Middle East is especially instructive because the region has so often been a "flash point"—an arena of sharp and dangerous confrontation between the two superpowers.

In this article, we assess attempts by the United States to deter the use of conventional force against its allies in the Middle East in the sixties and seventies by examining every major attempt by American leaders to deter an anticipated use of force against an ally. Although this criterion of case selection appears to be straightforward, it biases the interpretation of the evidence in several important ways. Unfortunately, some of these biases would confound any investigation of deterrence, irrespective of the research strategy used; they reflect the fundamental epistemological problems that inhere in the analysis of deterrence.

First, we include only the attempt to extend "immediate" rather than "general" deterrence.[2] We shall therefore look only at cases in which American leaders thought that the probability of a military challenge was, if not imminent, certainly very high. This selectivity biases the analysis; deterrence is less likely to work when, as happens in some of the cases, leaders estimate the probability of failure to be high even before they make an explicit commitment to deter. The alternative, an examination of "general" deterrence, is no more satisfactory. Identification of a universe of cases of general deterrence is problematic: when a protective umbrella is extended to an ally, it is difficult if not impossible to establish with confidence whether an adversary intended to use force and whether

[2] See Patrick Morgan, *Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, rev. ed., 1985), 30, for a discussion of the difference between "immediate" deterrence (the attempt to prevent an imminent use of force), and "general" deterrence (the extension of a general protective umbrella to an ally).

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it was deterred from doing so by the generalized commitment. Any judgment must rest implicitly on counterfactuals. The record of immediate deterrence, in contrast, is somewhat easier to read. We can establish, given reasonably adequate and valid evidence, whether or not an adversary did consider military action and whether force was used. It is important to acknowledge, however, that analysis of immediate deterrence constitutes the most rigorous and demanding test of the strategy.

Second, the use of force is not an entirely satisfactory criterion of evaluation of the strategy of extended deterrence because it may not accurately reflect the range of objectives that leaders pursue. The United States may seek to preserve a friendly regime or to prevent escalation of a low-intensity conflict; under these circumstances, it may well tolerate a limited use of force against its ally. Nevertheless, we risk stretching the concept of deterrence too far if we admit an elastic set of purposes. Moreover, it is especially important not to consider *post hoc* justification of a strategy by policy makers who shift from one objective to another in the face of a disappointing performance. While we examine the range of objectives American leaders pursued when they attempted to extend deterrence, we use as the minimum criterion of case selection an effort to prevent some use of military force against an ally at any level of intensity.

Third, because our criterion of case selection is an attempt by American leaders to deter a use of force, their subjective expectations about the imminence of a military challenge and their estimates of the appropriateness of a strategy of deterrence define the universe of cases. Such a criterion, which is generated by leaders' subjective expectations and estimates, can produce apparent anomalies in the identification of relevant cases. Leaders may exaggerate the likelihood of a use of force, or they may choose to deter inappropriately, under conditions that enhance the likelihood of failure. Washington's attempt to deter the introduction of Soviet military personnel in Egypt in the midst of a fierce war between Egypt and Israel in the spring of 1970 may be such a case: American leaders tried to prevent the introduction of Soviet combat forces in part because they feared that Soviet forces might engage Israel's air force and spark a wider confrontation. Nevertheless, we include this case in the analysis and, in the conclusion, we speak to the appropriateness of varying conditions for the extension of deterrence.

Finally, our analysis is restricted to only one region, the Middle East. The scope of the analysis is limited in part because deterrence is contextual; the conditions under which it is tried are important in determining its impact. Detailed knowledge of the regional context and of each case is

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essential to a valid interpretation of the evidence. Although we limit the analysis to the Middle East, we nevertheless introduce the class of bias characteristic of the studies that focus exclusively on Europe; only the specifics change. It is important, however, to broaden the analysis of extended deterrence and to move beyond the Eurocentric focus; the difference in specifics is not trivial. Because of the flux and ambiguity that is so characteristic of the Middle East, it is especially difficult to estimate the balance of interests. Extended deterrence may be far more problematic where interests are less clearly defined and commitments are more ambiguous than they are in Europe.

Before we begin our examination of American strategy in the Middle East, we shall examine two of the major controversies that surround explanations of the success or failure of deterrence. These controversies highlight the major variables that inform the analysis of deterrence in American policy in the Middle East.

I. The Dynamics of Extended Deterrence: Two Controversies

Elaborated largely through deductive reasoning, the formal theory of deterrence reduces to the core proposition that, when a challenger expects the probable benefits of military action to outweigh its probable costs, deterrence is likely to fail. If, on the other hand, leaders estimate the probable costs of a use of force to be greater than its probable benefits, deterrence should succeed; logically, the challenger should forgo the use of force. Crucial to a challenger's estimates is the credibility of a defender's commitment either to punish or to deny. The capacity to deny is far more important outside the European theater, where the use of conventional military force is not uncommon. Credibility, in turn, is generally a function of a challenger's estimate of a defender's capability and resolve. In its essence, the theory of deterrence is one of motivation, but motivation of a singular kind. It asserts that would-be challengers seek an opportunity to make gains, that they look for "windows of vulnerability," and that, when they find them open, they jump through. Only a credible capacity to deny or to punish militarily, to inflict costs and risks at an unacceptable level, only military windows that are closed, can dissuade an adversary from attack. We call this abstract statement of the logic of deterrence a "theory of opportunity."

A different explanation of the failure of deterrence does not look primarily to the capabilities of the defender, but rather to the weaknesses of

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the challenger.[3] Leaders who expect an unfavorable change in relative capabilities, who fear an attack by others, or who are unable to absorb a first strike, may decide to use force even though they see no "opportunity"; they are motivated primarily by suspicion and fear. Jervis and Snyder have demonstrated how the workings of the international security dilemma can confound deterrence. When leaders can assure their own security only by threatening others, miscalculation and escalation may spiral, as was the case among German decision makers in 1914.[4] Russett has shown that the Japanese leaders who decided to attack Pearl Harbor did not identify a "good" option, but chose to use force because they considered a military attack less damaging than inaction.[5]

More recently, it has been shown that challengers considering a use of force see in the perpetuation of the status quo not only international loss, but also acute political and economic consequences.[6] Very often, the domestic political system imposes heavy costs on leaders who permit the perpetuation of an intolerable status quo. It is not—as abstract concepts of deterrence would lead us to expect—that leaders see opportunity and act, but rather that they estimate the costs of inaction as unacceptable. Lebow persuasively demonstrates that under these circumstances, leaders sometimes do not so much jump through "open windows" as crash through shutters that are closed.[7]

Those who emphasize the vulnerability of a challenger dissent in important ways from the formal model of opportunity. They expect that leaders whose attention is focused on their own weaknesses are likely to be inattentive to the signals and the interests of the defender. Under these circumstances, the actions of the defender may well be irrelevant. Equally important, challengers who feel vulnerable are especially likely to engage in wishful thinking and other forms of motivated error in considering their own interests. We call this interpretation of a challenge to deter-

[3] For a related distinction, see the discussion of deterrence and spiral models as explanations of war in Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 58-113. Spiral theorists pay attention to leaders' fear of others, while those who emphasize vulnerability consider leaders' domestic weaknesses as well.

[4] *Ibid*. See also Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30 (January 1978), 167-214, and Jack Snyder, "Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914," in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 153-79.

[5] In his examination of their decision-making calculus, Bruce Russett highlights the pervasive emphasis on loss by Japanese leaders. See his "Pearl Harbor: Deterrence Theory and Decision Theory," *Journal of Peace Research* 4 (2, 1967), 89-105.

[6] Jervis, Lebow, and Stein (fn. 4).

[7] Richard Ned Lebow, "Windows of Opportunity: Do States Jump Through Them?" *International Security* 9 (Summer 1984), 147-86.

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rence which stresses leaders' weaknesses, their domestic constraints, their political and psychological need to end an intolerable situation, their emphasis on avoiding loss, and the dynamics of the international security dilemma, a "theory of vulnerability."

In assessing the relative importance of opportunity and vulnerability in an explanation of a leader's decision to challenge deterrence, we confront a methodological difficulty. Leaders under stress who have chosen to use force primarily to seek gain may subsequently engage in "bolstering" by exaggerating the disadvantages of the status quo once their decision has been made.[8] To validate an interpretation of vulnerability, it is important to find accompanying evidence of domestic political, economic, and social strain, as well as the technological and geographical attributes of the security dilemma that fuel fear and suspicion. We look for this kind of validating evidence in this study of American deterrence; when it accompanies challengers' estimates, we can have greater confidence in an interpretation of weakness as the primary motive of action.

The two explanations are not mutually exclusive, either in theory or in practice. Leaders may be motivated by opportunity or vulnerability under different conditions at different times; they may be driven by both simultaneously if they expect considerable gain from military action even as they estimate major losses from inaction. Nevertheless, the relative weight of opportunity and vulnerability in motivating a challenge to deterrence is relevant in large part because the policy implications of the two approaches are quite different. Leaders may act not primarily because they see opportunity, but largely because they are driven by vulnerability; if that is the case, a strategy of extended deterrence, which treats only the military component of a challenger's calculations, is dangerously apolitical. It is distorting in its singular emphasis on the relative military balance, and inadequate as a predictor of a likely challenge to an ally. Scholars who stress opportunity will tend to emphasize capability and credibility; those who stress vulnerability will emphasize the importance of conciliation and reassurance to mitigate the weaknesses that drive an adversary's challenge. As a defender devises a strategy of conflict management, it is important to determine whether opportunity or vulnerability dominates an opponent's calculations.

Empirical investigations of the workings of conventional deterrence speak only in part to this debate. Two broad clusters of explanatory variables have been used to assess the success and failure of deterrence. The first looks to associations between structural or environmental factors and

[8] Alexander George has drawn attention to this problem in interpreting the evidence.

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the outcome of deterrence; the second draws a causal relationship between the calculus of leaders and the success and failure of deterrence.[9] Studies that rely on structural factors can speak only indirectly to the motivations and calculations of challengers that are at the heart of the controversy between proponents of opportunity and vulnerability.

Huth and Russett's recent investigation of 54 cases of extended deterrence from 1900 to 1980 did find, for example, that successful deterrence was strongly correlated with a local military balance that favored the defender and its protégé.[10] If "opportunity" is the dominant calculus, other things being equal, we can infer that when a challenger perceives an unfavorable military balance, deterrence should hold. If, however, "vulnerability" influences leaders' estimates, they are likely to give less weight to an unfavorable military balance.

In their seminal study of U.S. attempts to extend deterrence, George and Smoke are skeptical of the impact of conventional military superiority.[11] They look not at the conventional military balance itself, but rather at the challenger's perception of that balance, and assess the weight of that perception in the decision-making calculus. Their investigation of a challenger's perception of the adequacy and appropriateness of a defender's military capability suggests only that an assessment of a negative military balance might "favor" the success of deterrence. Because conventional forces are multipurpose and flexible, determined challengers can overcome conventional military inferiority. They can diagnose weakness within general strength and develop options that maximize their local advantage at the expense of an otherwise strong defender.[12] Because leaders generally have multiple and flexible military options, and because they can often "design around" the deterrence commitment of a defender, George and Smoke underline as a central conclusion the frailty of conventional military superiority as an effective generalized deterrent. We shall look at the challenger's estimate of the balance of capabilities as one

[9] A recent investigation by Huth and Russett of extended deterrence from 1900 to 1980 looked for correlations between structural factors and success and failure of deterrence; George and Smoke "traced the process" through which leaders made their choices to use force. See Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980," *World Politics* 36 (July 1984), 496-526, and Alexander George's discussion of "process tracing" in his "Case Studies and Theory Development," paper presented to the Second Annual Symposium on Information-Processing in Organizations, Carnegie-Mellon University, October 1982.

[10] Huth and Russett (fn. 9), 518-19.

[11] George and Smoke (fn. 1), 520-22, 532, 562-65.

[12] See Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence, Calculation, and Miscalculation: The View from Cairo," in Jervis, Lebow, and Stein (fn. 4), 34-59, for a similar argument.

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of the critical variables in the analysis of six U.S. attempts to extend deterrence in the Middle East.

A second controversy concerns the impact of "intrinsic interests" and "strategic reputation" on the outcome of extended deterrence. The two controversies are not unrelated. Analysts who emphasize opportunity tend to pay a great deal of attention to the credibility of a deterrent reputation, to the importance of "standing firm," and to the "interconnectedness of interests." To be effective, deterrence must rest not only on superior capabilities, but also on the credibility and resolve to use these capabilities if necessary. The "interconnectedness of interests" makes it imperative to stand firm even when the specific provocation would not necessarily dictate a response.[13] Those who stress vulnerability pay less attention to the credibility of a deterrent reputation and give greater weight to the interests at stake, both for the defender and the challenger.[14] The intrinsic interests at stake can compound the vulnerability of a challenger and shape the resolve of the defender. Consequently, these scholars attend less to the dynamics of signaling and the requisites of credibility, and more to leaders' evaluations of their own interests and those of others.

In their empirical investigation of extended deterrence, Huth and Russett tend to give greater weight to the importance of intrinsic interests than to strategic reputation. They find that successful deterrence was most strongly associated with close economic and political ties between the defender and the state it was trying to protect.[15] Again, their evidence is indirect; but it suggests that would-be challengers read these ties as indicators that mitigate against a military challenge. Closely related is the lack of support for propositions linking behavior in past crises, for standing firm, to the subsequent success of extended deterrence. Here, too, their evidence suggests that challengers judge the resolve of a defender not primarily by past behavior or by reputation, but by the interests at stake.

This review of only two of the several controversies that surround the strategy of extended deterrence suggests a series of questions relevant to the investigation of U.S. strategy in the Middle East. In order to validate the propositions relating structural conditions to the outcome of deter-

[13] Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 55.

[14] See Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," *World Politics* 31 (January 1979), 289-324, for a discussion of the importance of intrinsic interest. See also Stephen Maxwell, "Rationality in Deterrence," *Adelphi Paper* 50 (London: Institute of Strategic Studies, 1968); Alexander George, David Hall, and William Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); and George and Smoke (fn. 1), 560-61.

[15] Huth and Russett (fn. 9), 503, 518.

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rence, we need evidence of the way in which leaders perceived and evaluated these factors. Consequently, we shall examine the relationships among environmental factors and the outcome of deterrence as well as leaders' perceptions and evaluations of these critical variables.[16]

First, we need to know the purposes of U.S. leaders when they extended deterrence. What were they trying to prevent? Did the strategy work better in pursuit of some kinds of objectives than of others? Was it wholly inappropriate for some kinds of purposes? Did extended deterrence work better in preventing certain kinds of military action?

Second, did the strategy work differently against different kinds of targets? Was success more likely if the United States was trying to deter the Soviet Union rather than a regional power?

Third, how important was a challenger's vulnerability, real or perceived, when deterrence failed? How often did leaders seize an opportunity they saw, and how often did they respond primarily because they considered the costs of inaction intolerable? What was the relative weight of vulnerability and opportunity in motivating a challenge? How much importance did the challenger attach to the local conventional balance in determining whether or not to use force? Were challengers who were driven by weakness able to compensate for local conventional military inferiority and break through the umbrella of extended deterrence?

Fourth, how much consideration did leaders give to strategic reputation and intrinsic interest when they weighed a military challenge? Did standing firm in one crisis have an appreciable impact on the outcome of the next—as is often suggested by policy makers and scholars? How fragile or robust was the deterrent reputation of the United States? In addressing these four sets of questions, we should be able to uncover some of the dynamics of past U.S. attempts to extend deterrence in the Middle East, and to speculate on their policy implications for the future.

II. American Strategy in the Middle East: Six Cases of Extended Deterrence

Between 1960 and 1980, the United States made at least six major attempts to deter military action of varying scope and intensity against an ally in the Middle East.[17] The U.S. attempted: (1) to prevent an Egyptian

[16] George (fn. 9) distinguishes between "congruence" and "process-tracing" as research methodologies within a single case study.

[17] We include in the analysis only those cases in which (1) there is evidence that U.S. leaders estimated that a use of force against an ally was under active consideration; (2) the historical record demonstrates that such action was indeed under consideration by a would-be chal-

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attack on Saudi Arabia during the early phases of the war in Yemen; (2) to deter Soviet intervention in the final days of the Arab-Israeli war in 1967; (3) to deter the Soviet Union from sending combat personnel to Egypt during its war of attrition against Israel in early 1970; (4) thereafter, to deter the Soviet Union and Egypt from advancing an antimissile system into the Suez Canal zone; (5) to deter a Syrian attack against Jordan in September 1970; and (6) to deter Soviet military intervention in the last days of the October War in 1973.[18]

Table 1 summarizes the relevant data. The record is not encouraging: the strategy failed in four of the six cases in which it was tried (column 2). Moreover, because the strategy did not fail only in cases where it was used in conjunction with other strategies of conflict management, this interpretation of the data exaggerates its success. As we shall see, the disappointing record is explained to some degree by the poor execution of the strategy, but, more significantly, by its inappropriate application. In order to isolate the factors that constrain the workings of deterrence, we shall look at the targets of the strategy, at the objectives leaders pursue when they use deterrence, at the execution of the strategy, at challengers' estimates of their vulnerabilities and opportunities as well as their perceptions of the balance of capabilities, and at defenders' estimates of relative interest.

American leaders were restrictive in the regional allies they chose to protect. They extended deterrence only to states that were closely tied to the United States (column 3). Israel's links to the United States are widely acknowledged and intricate; Saudi Arabia, the largest oil producer in the Middle East, has long been America's most important ally in the Gulf; and Jordan has had a close and friendly relationship with the United States. In all three cases, these ties between the United States and each of the three regional states were so intimate and so transparent that it is difficult to conceive that a challenger could misperceive the interest of the United States. The data suggest indirectly, then, that deterrence was challenged even when leaders knew the links between the defender and its regional allies to be strong. Contrary to the evidence of Huth and Russett, publicly proclaimed and widely acknowledged ties between the

lenger; and (3) either explicitly, or tacitly through the deployment of military force, U.S. policy makers threatened retaliation if the challenger proceeded to use force. The threat may be specific or phrased in general, even vague, language; leaders may prefer commitment or flexibility under different circumstances. See Charles Lockhart, "Flexibility and Commitment in International Conflicts," *International Studies Quarterly* 22 (No. 4, 1978), 545-68.

[18] Huth and Russett (fn. 9) include only one of these six in their universe of cases of extended deterrence. This difference in the criteria of case selection could well account for some of the discrepancies in findings.

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TABLE 1
SIX CASES OF EXTENDED DETERRENCE

(1) *Case*	(2) *Outcome*	(3) *Ally*	(4) *Challenger*	(5) *Defender's Objectives*	(6) *Deterrence Posture*	(7) *Reassurance*	(8) *Vulnerability/ Opportunity of Challenger*	(9) *Challenger's Perception of Balance of Capabilities*	(10) *Defender Stands Firm*	(11) *Defender's Perception of Balance of Interests*
Yemen (1962-1963)	Failure	Saudi Arabia	Egypt	To deter border attacks, escalation	Moderate	Some	Vulnerable	Favored challenger	Yes	No evidence
Arab-Israel War (1967)	Did not fail	Israel	Soviet Union	To deter military intervention	Strong	Yes	Vulnerable	Favored defender	Yes	Favored challenger
War of Attrition (January 1970)	Failure	Israel	Soviet Union	To deter military intervention	Weak	None	Vulnerable	Favored defender	Yes	Symmetrical
War of Attrition (May 1970)	Failure	Israel	Egypt and the Soviet Union	To deter movement of missile system to Canal zone	Weak	None	Vulnerable	Favored defender	No	Symmetrical
"Black September" (September 1970)	Failure	Jordan	Syria	To deter use of force	Ambiguous/ weak	None	Ally of challenger vulnerable	Favored challenger	Yes	Favored defender
October War (1973)	Did not fail	Israel	Soviet Union	To deter military intervention	Strong	Yes	Vulnerable	Favored defender	Yes	Favored challenger

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defender and its ally were not associated with the successful extension of deterrence in these cases.

The Soviet Union figured prominently as the target of American strategy (column 4). In three of the six cases, it was the principal target; and in 1970, the United States attempted to prevent a joint military action by the Soviet Union and Egypt. Only twice, in Yemen in 1962 and in Jordan in 1970, did American strategy focus on deterring the use of force by regional powers—Egypt and Syria—acting independently. The evidence suggests that U.S. leaders conceived of regional conflict in terms of superpower rivalry. Insofar as this is so, the American experience in extending deterrence becomes relevant beyond the Middle East.

Not surprisingly in the Middle East, a theater of regional conflict, the strategy of extended deterrence is configured very differently than it is in Europe. The objectives of the United States in these six cases differed from those generally ascribed to a strategy of extended deterrence (column 5). First, it is extraordinary that none of these cases includes an attempt to deter an impending military attack of major proportions against an ally.[19] Equally important, in five of these cases the United States sought to prevent a limited use of force in the context of an ongoing local war. It committed its reputation and prestige to restraining an ally's adversary while fighting was underway. Indeed, because deterrence was almost always intrawar, it frequently shaded into compellence. Third, the United States frequently attempted to deter the use of limited or low-intensity force, a difficult objective to achieve. Finally, as will become apparent, American objectives were inappropriate to their context in some of the cases.

In 1962-1963, the United States sought to deter Egypt from using force locally along Saudi Arabia's border with Yemen and to prevent the escalation of a limited war. In the initial phases, the strategy did not address the Saudi supply of royalist forces in Yemen. Escalation of military force became especially attractive to Egypt's leadership as military action bogged down.

In the spring of 1970, during the course of an intense war of attrition between Egypt and Israel over the Suez Canal, the United States attempted to deter Egypt and the Soviet Union from moving a system of

[19] Such attacks did occur, of course, in 1967 and again in 1973, but neither of these two cases is relevant here. In October 1973, when Egyptian and Syrian forces struck at Israel, American policy makers were surprised by the attack and, consequently, had no opportunity to attempt deterrence. In 1967, President Johnson focused on trying to prevent Israel, America's ally, from resorting to a preemptive use of force against Egyptian military concentrations in the Sinai peninsula. The President at no time threatened Egypt directly with retaliation if it were to attack.

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anti-aircraft missiles forward from the Egyptian heartland to the theater of battle along the Canal. Egypt sought to push the missiles forward in order to improve its capability to conduct military operations across the Canal, while Israel resisted these efforts strenuously, precisely to prevent a Canal crossing. And in the autumn of 1970, after fighting had erupted between the forces of King Hussein of Jordan and Palestinian militias, President Nixon attempted to deter Syria from committing its armor to battle against the Jordanian army on behalf of the Palestinian militias.

The context was very different in June 1967, in January 1970, and in October 1973, when American leaders attempted to deter Soviet military intervention as Israel was on the verge of inflicting a massive military defeat on Syria and Egypt respectively—both close allies of the Soviet Union. In these last three cases, the Soviet Union threatened to intervene on behalf of its regional allies when they were confronted by military catastrophe.

How vigorous was the United States in extending deterrence? Did American leaders rely exclusively on deterrence to prevent a use of force, or did they simultaneously use other strategies to manage the conflict? Columns 6 and 7 show significant variation among the six cases. When the United States was trying to deter Egypt from escalating its attacks against Saudi Arabia, it dispatched aircraft to Saudi Arabia, sent a warship to call at Jeddah, conducted aerial exercises over Riyadh, and scheduled joint training exercises between Saudi and American military units to reinforce its public commitment to "the maintenance of Saudi Arabian integrity."[20] At the same time, President Kennedy linked the show of force and the public reiteration of the American commitment to a major attempt to de-escalate the conflict; he dispatched Ellsworth Bunker to the Middle East to propose a disengagement of Egyptian forces and a cessa-

[20] It was not easy for the United States to signal to Egypt the extent of its commitment to Saudi Arabia. President Kennedy had recognized the fledgling Republic of Yemen in 1962 and had also attempted to improve relations with President Nasser of Egypt during the first two years of his administration. The limited evidence that is available on Egyptian decision making suggests, however, that President Nasser understood the American commitment to the defense of the regime in Saudi Arabia, but rejected the attempt to constrain Egyptian military activity along the Saudi Arabian border as long as the Saudis supplied the royalist forces. The memorandum of a conversation in March 1963 between the American ambassador in Cairo and President Nasser is instructive. The Egyptian President insisted that his purpose was solely "to stop or make ineffective Faisal's support of dissident tribesmen," and reiterated that "the purpose of the campaign was not a prelude to an attack on Saudi Arabia or a campaign to overthrow Faisal's government." See Mohamed Heikal, *The Cairo Documents* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1973), 220-21, for citation of the Memorandum of Conversation. The evidence suggests that President Nasser did not misperceive the American commitment, but challenged its appropriateness when it was extended to Saudi support of the royalist forces.

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tion of Saudi military aid to the royalist forces in Yemen.[21] While the disengagement plan was under discussion, Egypt halted its military attacks across the Saudi border. When negotiations broke down, however, Egypt intensified its bombing of the Saudi border towns of Najran, Jizan, Khamis, and Mushait, and substantially increased the size of its military contingent in Yemen. Deterrence had failed.

The United States acted less forcefully in the spring of 1970, when it attempted to deter the Soviet Union and Egypt from moving an anti-aircraft missile system forward to the Suez Canal. Deterrence was at first restricted to a single warning given privately to the Soviet ambassador in Washington.[22] On June 2, 1970, during a fierce war between Israel's air force and Soviet and Egyptian ground crews, Secretary of State William Rogers met with Ambassador Dobrynin to issue the following warning:

> We believe that the introduction of Soviet military personnel into the delicate Suez Canal combat zone [within 30 kilometers of the Canal] could lead to serious escalation with unpredictable consequences to which the United States could not remain indifferent.[23]

Some analysts of American foreign policy consider the language of this warning to be stern. In the diplomatic lexicon of the time, the threat that the United States "could not remain indifferent" meant that it was prepared to use force in retaliation. No threats were issued publicly, however; no commitments were affirmed; and there was no movement of military forces. Within the month, on the night of June 29-30, the Soviet-Egyptian missile system was moved toward a new line about 30 kilometers west of the Canal, and a number of Egyptian-manned missile batteries were stationed even closer to the waterway, although no Soviet-manned batteries crossed the 30-kilometer line.[24]

President Nixon was alarmed, and attempted to reinforce deterrence by sending the Soviet Union a strongly worded note.[25] Shortly thereafter, in a television interview, the President warned of the escalating danger of a superpower confrontation and likened the Middle East to the

[21] Simultaneously, Ralph Bunche, Under-Secretary at the United Nations, traveled to the region to discuss the stationing of U.N. observers to supervise the mutual disengagement. On April 29, 1963, a joint U.N.-U.S. plan was provisionally accepted by all parties.

[22] As Kissinger astutely notes, even that message was mixed. The United States did warn the Soviet Union against advancing the missiles to within 30 kilometers of the Canal, but at the same time acquiesced in the presence of Soviet combat personnel in the interior of Egypt, although it had strenuously tried to prevent their introduction only three months earlier. Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 574.

[23] *Ibid.*

[24] Yitzhak Rabin, *The Rabin Memoirs* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 178.

[25] Richard Nixon, *RN, Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset & Dunlop, 1978), 482.

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Balkans before World War I.[26] Neither the warning nor the growing risk of confrontation prevented further escalation of the war. An intense battle ensued between Israel's air force and Soviet and Egyptian ground and air crews, culminating in aerial combat between Soviet and Israeli pilots. Final and irrefutable evidence of the failure of extended deterrence came only after Egypt and Israel agreed to an American-sponsored cease-fire; in the first few hours after it went into effect, Soviet and Egyptian crews pushed their missiles into the standstill zone, well within 30 kilometers from the Canal.

Deterrence was tested again only a few months later. Although American military intelligence had expected a crisis in Jordan for several months, it was not until two days before Syrian tanks crossed the Jordanian border that President Nixon threatened publicly that the United States was "prepared to intervene directly in the Jordanian war should Syria and Iraq enter the crisis and tip the military balance against government forces loyal to Hussein."[27] Moreover, despite the deployment of the aircraft carrier *Independence* just off the coast of Lebanon, the dispatch of the *John F. Kennedy* to join the Sixth Fleet, and the positioning of an amphibious task force 36 hours away from Lebanon, senior American officials disagreed in public about the capability of the United States to take effective military action on behalf of King Hussein.[28] At the time, the United States was heavily committed in Vietnam; at best, the American deterrence posture was ambiguous, and it is very likely that Syria's President underestimated the resolve of American leaders and misjudged their capability to intervene.[29]

Deterrence was far more vigorous, and executed unambiguously through words and deeds, when the United States attempted to prevent

[26] Text of President Nixon's interview, July 1, 1970, *Department of State Bulletin*, July 27, 1970, 112-13.

[27] *Chicago Sun Times*, September 17, 1970, cited in William Quandt, *Decade of Decisions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 114.

[28] Members of the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG), the interagency mechanism for crisis management, considered military action in Jordan problematic because the United States had lost most of its staging areas in the Middle East. Moreover, the United States had only four brigades capable of reaching Jordan quickly, and such an operation would commit its entire strategic reserve. Kissinger (fn. 22), 605, 608, 614.

[29] The epilogue to the crisis is beyond the scope of this study, as American strategy shifted from extended deterrence to "compellence." In a sharply worded note, the United States demanded that the Soviet Union impress on Syria the urgency of the withdrawal of its forces from Jordan; more to the point, Washington began to coordinate its military response with Israel. The following day, Israel began to maneuver its forces ostentatiously on Syria's flank as American naval forces were augmented in the Mediterranean. On September 22, an emboldened King Hussein engaged and defeated Syrian tank forces; the commander of the Syrian air force, Hafez al-Assad, refused to provide air support to the Syrian ground forces; and Damascus began to pull its troops back across its border.

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Soviet military intervention in 1967 and 1973. In both cases, the U.S. tried to deter the introduction of Soviet military forces in the context of an ongoing war. When battlefield fortunes changed and Israel threatened Syria in 1967 and Egypt in 1973, the Soviet Union threatened to take unilateral military action to prevent the defeat of a regional ally. The United States moved swiftly to deter, both through stern warnings and the alert and movement of military forces. Even more to the point, it moved expeditiously to meet Soviet demands.

In 1967, in an urgent message to President Johnson, Premier Kosygin warned of the danger of "grave catastrophe," spoke of a "very crucial moment," and threatened that, unless Israel unconditionally and immediately halted all operations, the Soviet Union would take the "necessary actions, including military."[30] American leaders treated the Soviet threat of intervention seriously and immediately ordered the Sixth Fleet to move toward Syria's coast.[31] At the same time, they compelled Israel to cease its military operations and reassured the Soviet Union that Israel would halt its military advance. American leaders recognized the legitimacy of Soviet interests and moved both to deter and to meet the Soviet demand. Deterrence was used conjointly with reassurance. Because the two strategies were used together, we cannot argue that, even though the Soviet Union did not resort to force, deterrence succeeded; the impact of one strategy cannot be disentangled from the other. At most, we can make the more modest assertion that deterrence did not fail.

In 1973, in the closing hours of the October War between Egypt and Israel, American leaders considered the probability of Soviet intervention to be even greater. Israel had surrounded and cut off the Egyptian Third Army, and its forces were still advancing. On the evening of October 24, Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin telephoned the White House to deliver an urgent message from Brezhnev. It proposed that joint Soviet and American military forces ensure the implementation of the cease-fire. The note continued:

> It is necessary to adhere without delay. I will say it straight that if you find

[30] Lyndon Johnson, *Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1971), 301-2.

[31] The credibility of the Soviet threat to intervene is a matter of some controversy. Secretary of State Dean Rusk recalled that the expectation was that the Soviet Union was indeed on the verge of using its airborne troops. Paradoxically, however, Rusk made clear that American policy makers never considered using the Sixth Fleet to interdict a Soviet landing, but only as a "limiting show of force." See the interview of Dean Rusk by Anthony Wells, March 1977, in Bradford Dismukes and James McConnell, eds., *Soviet Naval Diplomacy* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971). Most analysts of Soviet policy doubt that the Soviet Union had the military capability to organize and project force into Syria before Israel's army completed its advance.

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> it impossible to act jointly with us in this matter, we should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider the question of taking appropriate steps unilaterally.[32]

Brezhnev concluded with a demand for an "immediate and clear reply."

The United States took the threat seriously. The C.I.A. had reported that the Soviet airlift to the Middle East had stopped early that morning, Soviet airborne divisions were on alert, an airborne command was aloft, and it appeared that transport aircraft were being diverted.[33] Kissinger estimated that the Soviet Union had decided to send troops when the consequences of an Egyptian military defeat became apparent; his was a defensive rather than offensive interpretation of Soviet intentions. The President agreed, but insisted on "a firm reaction to what amounted to a scarcely veiled threat of unilateral Soviet intervention."[34]

All military commands were ordered to increase readiness to DefCon III. In response to further intelligence that eight Antonov-22 transport planes were slated to fly from Budapest to Egypt, the 82nd Airborne Division was alerted, the carrier *Franklin Delano Roosevelt* was ordered to move rapidly to the eastern Mediterranean, and the carrier *John F. Kennedy* and its accompanying task force were dispatched at full speed to the Mediterranean. Senior American officials hoped that Soviet leaders would read these tacit signals of American resolve before a formal reply to Brezhnev's letter was sent. Early on the morning of October 25th, Nixon replied formally to Brezhnev:

> You must know . . . that we could in no event accept unilateral action. . . . As I stated above, such action would produce incalculable consequences which would be in the interest of neither of our countries. . . .[35]

[32] Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), 583.

[33] *Ibid.*, 587. Kissinger's evidence is not wholly reliable since he wished to underline the gravity of the Soviet threat. However, William Quandt, in his analysis of the intelligence data, essentially confirms Kissinger's interpretation:

> There could be no question that the situation was dangerous. No one knew what the Soviet Union intended to do, but Brezhnev's note conveyed unmistakably his determination not to let Israel destroy the Egyptian Third Army Corps. . . . But did the Soviets have the capability to intervene, whatever their intentions? The answer seemed definitely to be yes. Quandt (fn. 27), 196.

Analysts of Soviet politics also tend to take the Soviet threat in 1973 more seriously than they do Kosygin's threat in 1967. In 1973, the Soviet Union had a far more substantial capability to project force than in 1967. The alert of airborne troops and the concentration of transport aircraft also lent credibility to their threat. See S. Neil MacFarlane, "The USSR and Conflict Management in the Middle East," in Gabriel Ben Dor and David Dewitt, eds., *Sources and Management of International Conflict: The Middle East* (Lexington: Heath Books, forthcoming).

[34] Richard Nixon (fn. 25), 938.

[35] Kissinger (fn. 32), 591.

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At the same time, American leaders put enormous pressure on Israel to cease all military action.[36] Washington, recognizing the legitimacy of Soviet interests and the enormous consequences for Moscow's strategic reputation if it were to allow the defeat of the Egyptian army, moved simultaneously to deter and to meet the Soviet demand. Again, deterrence was used conjointly with reassurance; again, we can argue only that deterrence did not fail.

American strategy was less clearly read in the spring of 1970. Israel, in an effort to compel Egypt to end its war of attrition along the Suez Canal, began deep-penetration bombing of the Egyptian heartland in January of 1970. During a secret and dramatic visit to Moscow, President Nasser insisted on Soviet participation in the construction of an advanced anti-aircraft network. Although Soviet leaders refused to supply the advanced MIG-23 aircraft he had also demanded, they did agree to send air combat units equipped with MIG-21J fighters in addition to ground combat crews to install and man a network of SAM-3 missiles until Egyptian crews could be trained. This was an unprecedented decision—the first time Soviet combat personnel were committed outside Warsaw Pact countries.

In a letter delivered to the United States by the Soviet Ambassador on January 31, Premier Kosygin warned that if the attacks by Israel continued, "the Soviet Union will be forced to see to it that the Arab states have means at their disposal, with the help of which a due rebuff to the arrogant aggressor could be made."[37] The note concluded with the demand that the United States compel Israel to cease its attacks and to withdraw speedily from all occupied Arab territories.

The American response is not easily interpreted. The United States appears to have decided on a two-track strategy of deterrence coupled with reassurance; both, however, were weakly articulated. Henry Kissinger, then National Security Adviser to the President, met with Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington and informed him that "we want the Soviet leaders to know that the introduction of Soviet combat personnel in the Middle East would be viewed with the gravest concern."[38] This is the only warning of record. At the same time, Kissinger informed the Soviet ambassador of his willingness to begin bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union through the "back channel." This time, however, he did not

[36] For a description of the intense American pressure, see Moshe Dayan, *Story of My Life* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1976), 444, 448.

[37] The text of the note was published in the *Washington Post*, February 4, 1970, and in *Arab Report and Record*, March 1-15, 1970, p. 167. See also Kissinger (fn. 22), 560, and Quandt (fn. 27), 96.

[38] Kissinger (fn. 22), 563.

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assure Moscow that the United States would move quickly to compel Israel to cease its raids.[39] Discussions between the United States and Israel did begin; on March 17, Israel agreed conditionally to an undeclared cease-fire.[40] That same day, however, Israel informed Washington of the arrival of Soviet combat personnel in Egypt; deterrence had failed.

This American attempt to deter was weak and ineffectual. Only a single warning was issued, by the President's National Security Adviser—not by the Secretary of State or the President himself. And, although the United States moved to arrange a cease-fire and thereby to halt Israel's deep-penetration raids, it did not do so with dispatch. Indeed, one astute analyst of American foreign policy argues that Kissinger did not appreciate the gravity of the Soviet threat, that he considered it a bluff, and consequently, neither deterrence nor reassurance were pursued seriously.[41]

III. Conclusions and Epilogue

The history of U.S. attempts to extend deterrence in the Middle East in the last two decades is not encouraging. In three of the six cases, the strategy was not well executed, but poor execution alone is not an entirely satisfactory explanation of the disappointing record. To put the point as starkly as possible, extended deterrence failed more often than not. Moreover, it did not fail against the Soviet Union only in cases where the United States recognized the legitimacy of Soviet interests and used deterrence conjointly with reassurance. Even in these two cases we cannot confidently conclude that deterrence was a success, because it is impossible to disentangle the impact of the two strategies of conflict management; we can argue only that deterrence did not fail.

Evidence drawn from these six cases bears on several of the major controversies that surround deterrence. Although the data are partial and region-specific, they are suggestive of conditions where deterrence is inappropriate as a strategy of conflict management. To understand the fac-

[39] The evidence on this point is indirect: on March 10, Ambassador Dobrynin met with Kissinger to suggest that if Israel ceased its bombing, Egypt "on its part will display restraint in its actions, without, of course, any official statement to that effect." Kissinger (fn. 22), 568. This offer suggests that up to that moment the Soviet Union had not received any assurances.

[40] Israel's ambassador in Washington, Yitzhak Rabin, informed Kissinger that Israel would agree to a cease-fire if the replacement figure of its aircraft were doubled and if President Nixon announced publicly his commitment to maintain Israel's air strength and the military balance in the Middle East.

[41] Alexander L. George, "Problems of Crisis Management and Crisis Avoidance in U.S.-Soviet Relations," presented to the Nobel Institute Symposium on War and Peace Research, June 1985, mimeo; and George, "Political Crises," in Joseph S. Nye, Jr., ed., *The Making of America's Soviet Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 134-35.

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tors that constrain extended deterrence, we must look beyond its execution to the appropriateness of the strategy against different kinds of challengers in different contexts. Our evidence suggests that the weaknesses may not inhere only in faulty execution, but also in inappropriate application.

We began by asking whether the success of the strategy was in part a function of the objectives pursued by the United States. Two attributes of American strategy are relevant here. First, the characteristic objectives of the United States in the Middle East were somewhat different from the kinds of aims usually ascribed to American strategy in the European theater. In five of these cases, Washington sought to prevent a use of force in the context of an ongoing local war. At least implicitly, if not explicitly, American leaders were trying to prevent escalation as well as to deter the use of force. At times the United States gave priority to crisis stability rather than to the interests of its allies, and its strategy shaded from deterrence into compellence.

Second, in none of these cases was the United States trying to prevent a full-scale military attack against an ally. Its objectives were less precise and less well defined: it attempted to prevent border attacks, military intervention, escalation of a war, and the emplacement of a weapons system. Some of these objectives fit only loosely under the rubric of deterrence of the use of force. Perhaps the record of extended deterrence can be explained in part by the complex mixture of objectives American leaders sought, as well as by the inappropriateness of some of these objectives, given the political context. It is open to question, for example, whether it was appropriate for the United States to try to deter Soviet emplacement of an anti-aircraft missile system on Egyptian territory west of the Suez Canal while Egypt was engaged in a war with Israel. As we shall argue, this objective certainly did not reflect an accurate reading by American leaders of the relative balance of interests at stake.

The prospects of the strategy are further complicated by the kinds of challengers the United States faced in the Middle East. Extended deterrence failed against the local allies of the U.S.S.R. when these protégés acted alone or jointly with the Soviet Union; it did not fail when the Soviet Union was the sole target. It seems likely, then, that in part, at least, extended deterrence did not fail because of a shared fear of nuclear confrontation, because of the "autonomous risk" of nuclear war. In the two cases where this risk existed, the United States moved expeditiously to meet Soviet demands, which it treated as legitimate. In those two cases, American leaders acknowledged that the balance of interests had swung in favor of the Soviet Union as Soviet allies faced military catastrophe. It

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is far less probable that local challengers will be constrained by the fear of nuclear war; indeed, they are more likely to attempt to manipulate the risk of escalation to secure superpower involvement and commitment.[42] If local powers are not as constrained by the risks inherent in confrontation between the nuclear powers, then the attempt to extend deterrence may be misguided. Yet, the United States relies increasingly on variants of this strategy when it approaches the Middle East. We need look no further than the recent misguided and ineffective American attempt to extend deterrence in Lebanon.[43]

The prospects of the strategy diminish further when we turn to the third focus of our inquiry—the controversy between explanations of "opportunity" and "vulnerability" as the dominant motive of a challenger. The evidence in support of an argument of vulnerability in this set of cases is considerable (Table 1, column 8)—both when deterrence failed and when it did not. In 1962-1963, Egypt's President Nasser faced setback at home and defeat abroad. Internally, the economy was in crisis as the balance of payments deteriorated and imports rose dramatically in response to the emphasis on rapid industrialization;[44] abroad, Nasser had suffered the humiliation of Syrian secession from the United Arab Republic. By 1962, Egypt was politically isolated in the Arab world, and engaged in fierce polemics with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria.[45]

In early 1970, Egypt was also terribly weak; its air defenses were destroyed and its heartland exposed. The Soviet Union risked the loss of one of its most important allies in the Middle East if it failed to close the gap in Egypt's air defense capability. Indeed, President Nasser was so desper-

[42] For an analysis of management by regional allies of their superpower patrons, see Janice Gross Stein, "Managing the Managers: Crisis Prevention in the Middle East," in Gilbert Winham, ed., *New Issues in Crisis Management* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, forthcoming 1987).

[43] The United States pursued a complex mix of objectives simultaneously. It tried to deter attacks by several local militias and Syrian forces against the Lebanese government of Amin Jumayyil as well as against its own forces stationed in the Beirut area. American Marines had been deployed originally not to deter, but rather to act as "peacekeepers" among local warring combatants. In this case, deterrence was extended incrementally amid a civil war on behalf of a narrow, sectarian government; moreover, the targets of the strategy were numerous, small, and difficult to identify. Despite these inauspicious conditions, President Reagan defined the issue at stake in Lebanon as the credibility of America's deterrent reputation. He insisted that the maintenance of the Marines in Lebanon was "central to our credibility on a global scale." He added: "If others feel confident that they can intimidate us and our allies in Lebanon, they will be more bold elsewhere. . . ." *New York Times*, October 25, 1983.

[44] In 1960, the balance-of-payments deficit was 34.7 million dollars; by 1963 it had risen to 171.6 million dollars. By 1964, many factories operated below full capacity because of the scarcity of foreign exchange. See Adeed Dawisha, "Perceptions, Decisions, and Consequences in Foreign Policy: The Egyptian Intervention in the Yemen," *Political Studies* 25 (June 1977), 201-26.

[45] It is logically possible that President Nasser saw the coup in Yemen as an "opportunity" to strike at Saudi Arabia. However, the convergent evidence of domestic strain and international disappointment at the time was so strong that an interpretation of "vulnerability" is more persuasive.

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ate to end Israel's air attacks on Egyptian territory that he insisted that the survival of his presidency was at issue.[46] Because of the intensity and urgency of Egyptian demands and the importance of Egypt to the Soviet Union, it is difficult to conceive of any deterrent strategy that would have worked. President Nasser in 1967 and President Sadat in 1973 invoked the help of their patron as they faced catastrophic defeat on the battlefield. In these four cases, none of the challengers saw "opportunity," but responded to extraordinary vulnerability. The status quo was intolerable.

The evidence is less clear-cut when the Soviet Union and Egypt defied American warnings and advanced their missile defense system into the Canal zone, and when Syrian armor crossed the Jordanian frontier. In neither case were the challengers as badly exposed. Yet, the data even then support an interpretation of vulnerability. In 1970 Egypt and the U.S.S.R. were searching for a credible military and diplomatic option after three years of Israeli occupation of Egyptian territory. Syria, which had long declared itself the champion of the Palestinian cause, came to the assistance of a smaller and weaker Palestinian force that was badly outmanned and outgunned. In none of these six cases, then, did the challengers perceive an "open window" and succumb to temptation. They considered the use of force because the status quo was unacceptable.

This interpretation of the evidence is reinforced by an examination of challengers' estimates of the local balance of capabilities at the time they considered a use of force (Table 1, column 9).[47] As expected, Egyptian leaders actively considered a use of force when they believed that their military capabilities were superior to those of the defender—in 1962 and again in 1967. In both these cases, as we now know, Egyptian estimates were seriously flawed.[48] Egyptian leaders also considered a challenge to deterrence in May 1970, in conjunction with the Soviet Union, and again

[46] Mohamed Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan* (London: William Collins, 1975), 87.

[47] An important caveat is in order here: our evidence speaks only to the impact of capabilities when deterrence was "immediate" rather than "general." The role of capabilities may be quite different when a protective umbrella is extended over time in an environment of general hostility.

[48] In 1962, Egyptian leaders misread the local military balance in Yemen. In the early sixties, the armed forces of Egypt were more numerous and better equipped than those of any other Arab country. Indeed, Egyptian defense expenditure was larger than the total expenditure of Iraq, Syria, and Jordan combined: $314 million compared to their $251 million, respectively. See *United Nations Statistical Yearbook*, 1963, 565-625. This advantage in the regional theater did not translate directly into local military advantage, however, because of the fierce loyalty of northern tribesmen to the deposed Imam of Yemen and because of the primitive state of the republican forces at the outset of the civil war. The early commitment of Egyptian forces was not sufficient to enable the fledgling republican forces to defeat the royalists; consequently, the interdiction of Saudi military supplies, despite its risks, became an increasingly attractive option to Nasser. In May 1967, Field Marshall Amer assured President Nasser that Egypt would lose only 10% of its air force if Israel struck first, and that Egyptian quantitative superiority in armor and artillery would prevail. See Anwar el-Sadat, *In Search of Identity* (New York: Random House, 1977), 172, 174.

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in 1973, even when they believed their local conventional capabilities to be inferior to those of the defender. In both these cases, moreover, they proceeded to use force. This pattern is clearly contrary to the expectations of the proponents of "opportunity." Our evidence suggests that, at least in the Middle East, a challenge to extended deterrence cannot be predicted from a reading of the local military balance.[49] Insofar as challengers can transcend the local balance, conventional military superiority is far from robust as a precondition of a successful strategy.

Nor is the strategic balance between the two superpowers useful as an explanation of the success or failure of deterrence. Nuclear capabilities were largely irrelevant in the four cases of failure, and putatively relevant only in the two cases when there was a direct confrontation between the two superpowers but deterrence did not fail. Even here, however, the evidence is not easy to interpret. In 1967, the strategic balance favored the United States far more than in 1973; yet deterrence, coupled with reassurance, did not fail in either case.[50] The data suggest, then, that the success of extended deterrence could not be predicted from shifts in relative strategic capabilities. This proposition, if it is sustained in the investigation of superpower strategies in other parts of the world, may have implications for much of contemporary thinking about extended deterrence.

Our evidence also bears on the controversy over the importance of strategic reputation as an asset in an ongoing deterrent relationship and speaks as well to the weight given to relative interests when challengers consider a use of force. Strategic reputation proved to be both less important and less fragile than expected. Because our cases are spread over time, with many of the same participants, we can make some judgment

[49] This conclusion contradicts that of Huth and Russett (fn. 9) in their analysis of extended deterrence. The differences can be explained in part by the difference in the selection of cases but, more importantly, by their omission of the factor of vulnerability from the analysis.

[50] Contrary to theoretical expectations, Soviet compellence appeared to succeed in 1967 when both the strategic and the local military balance were unfavorable. Again, any judgment about the success of Soviet compellence must be tentative, pending conclusive evidence about decision making in the United States and Israel. One can argue, for example, that the Soviet Union did not compel the United States to constrain Israel because the United States wished to do so anyway. Indeed, some commentators in Israel have asserted that Kissinger deliberately exaggerated the danger of Soviet intervention in 1973 in order to restrain Israel more effectively. Nevertheless, the record shows, both in 1967 and in 1973, that the United States acted forcefully to restrain Israel's armies, which were still on the move, only after the Soviet Union issued its threats. If the Soviet Union succeeded, it did so from a position of conventional military inferiority in 1973 and of conventional and strategic inferiority in 1967. Its ability to do so was a function not of the conventional balance between the regional powers or the strategic balance between the superpowers, but rather of its clear and obvious interest in the security of its ally—an interest easily read by the United States. In short, if compellence worked, it did so not because of strategic or local superiority, but because of acknowledged strategic interest.

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about the impact that "standing firm" in one case has on the outcome of the next. Although the United States stood firm in five of the six cases, extended deterrence failed in three (Table 1, column 10). Only during the War of Attrition did American leaders shift their definition of the permissible and acceed to the presence of Soviet combat personnel in the interior of Egypt a few months after Washington had warned against their introduction.

It is difficult to disentangle the impact of standing firm from that of the other variables which affected the outcome of deterrence. In three of the cases, for example, the United States did not execute its strategy vigorously. One can also speculate that, had the United States not stood firm when it did, the record would have been even worse. When we look generally at the sequence of cases over time, however, standing firm appears to be insufficient to promote the success of deterrence.

The American evaluation of the balance of interests at stake was somewhat more discriminating (Table 1, column 11). In Yemen, we can find no direct evidence that American leaders assessed the importance of the relative interests at stake. We can infer, however, that Egyptian interests were far greater than were those of the United States; the restrained attempts to deter and the consequent failure of deterrence are not surprising. In the War of Attrition, in January and again in May of 1970, the United States located the challenge within the rubric of superpower competition and treated the stakes as symmetrical; even then, American investment in deterrence was weak. In Jordan in 1970, President Nixon and Henry Kissinger considered American interests preeminent; when deterrence failed, they moved to compellence in conjunction with Israel. Only in 1967 and in 1973 did the United States acknowledge the intensity of the interests at stake for the Soviet Union and move rapidly to a strategy of reassurance as well as one of deterrence. Ironically, it was only when American leaders acknowledged that the balance of interests favored the Soviet Union that deterrence, reinforced by reassurance, did not fail.

Our evidence points to some of the difficulties associated with indiscriminate reliance on extended deterrence as a strategy of conflict management. Although our cases are drawn exclusively from the Middle East, the experience may be relevant to American strategy elsewhere—both when the United States finds itself in indirect competition with the Soviet Union and when its local allies anticipate military threat. Six propositions are of interest.

First, proponents of deterrence tend to argue that its failures are due to the inept execution of the strategy; critics suggest that failure is explained better by its inherent inadequacies. Our evidence speaks to this

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controversy. In three of the four cases of failure, the strategy was weakly articulated; leaders issued one, or at most two, deterrent threats and generally communicated these threats privately rather than publicly.[51] Indeed, it seemed at times as if leaders were "jawboning"—bluffing without the resolve and commitment to retaliate if necessary.[52] Certainly, weak articulation was associated with failure. But deterrence also failed in the case of Yemen, where it was better articulated. And, as we have argued, when deterrence did not fail in 1967 and 1973, we cannot disentangle the impact of well-executed deterrence from that of reassurance. Faulty execution is not a sufficient explanation of failure. We must look to the objectives of the defender and the motives of the challenger in the political context in which the relationship is set.

Second, deterrence may be more difficult to achieve for some kinds of purposes than for others. It may be far harder to deter low-intensity military action—border raids, emplacement of weapons systems—than it is to prevent a clear-cut and unambiguous use of force. Yet it is precisely these kinds of actions that the United States so often seeks to prevent in regional theaters of competition with the Soviet Union, where interests are fluid and not clearly defined. Our evidence speaks to this point only in part, because deterrence failed when American leaders attempted to prevent low-intensity escalation, but also failed when the United States attempted to deter Soviet military intervention in 1970.

Third, the strong motivation of the challenger is more to the point. In all six cases, the challengers were highly motivated—not only because of the importance of the interests at stake, but also because they were vulnerable; they considered the domestic and international costs of the status quo to be high. Extension of deterrence is in all probability ill-advised against a local challenger who is vulnerable, highly motivated, and can dispose of multiple and flexible options. It may be inappropriate, for example, to try to deter limited offensive action through generalized warnings that do not speak to the acute dilemmas of local challengers. Again, these kinds of challengers frequently present themselves when we look beyond the European theater. If the United States continues to rely exclu-

[51] There is some controversy about the classification of American deterrence strategy during the war of attrition in May 1970. Even a single threat, which warned that the United States "could not remain indifferent," could be considered sufficiently stern to constitute strong execution. We classify it as generally weak, however, because the United States did little to convey a message of military consequences. It did not threaten, for example, to supply Israel with the advanced fighter aircraft and the electronic equipment it was then requesting.

[52] Our data are good enough, in most cases, to determine that challengers perceived American purposes accurately—there is little evidence of misperception here—but not good enough to ascertain whether they considered American threats credible.

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sively on extended deterrence under such conditions, it risks, at best, humiliation and, at worst, provocation.

Fourth, and closely related to these constraints that limit the effectiveness of extended deterrence, our evidence suggests that military capability is only one among many components of a successful strategy, and that it is not the most important. Attention to the military dimension of deterrence at the expense of the motivation of the challenger and the political context of the strategy is misguided if not dangerous.

Fifth, strategic reputation proved to be both less important and more robust than generally anticipated. It was less important because, even though American leaders "stood firm" and displayed resolve in five of the six cases, the demonstration in one case had no appreciable impact on the outcome of the next. It appears that, in the Middle East at least, strategic reputation is an insufficient condition of success. Paradoxically, reputation was also far more robust and less fragile than policy makers expected. A senior American adviser acknowledged that in 1983-1984, the United States suffered a stinging defeat in Lebanon; indeed, that was the widespread perception in the Middle East.[53] Yet, within weeks, leaders in the Middle East were again turning to the United States for assistance, support, and protection. In the wake of the debacle in Lebanon, America was neither excluded from the diplomatic process nor rejected as a military supplier. Like military capability, strategic reputation appears to be over-inflated as a component of a successful strategy of extended deterrence. Our data suggest that not every case is critical.

Finally, it is striking that only when it was reinforced by a strategy of reassurance, did deterrence not fail. Analysts who emphasize the importance of "vulnerability" as the animating force of a challenge argue that deterrence is more likely to succeed if it is used conjointly with reassurance.[54] Insofar as a political strategy of reassurance meets at least some of the pressing needs of a challenger, it reduces the incentives to use force. In 1967 and 1973—the only two cases where extended deterrence did not fail—the United States moved expeditiously to meet the fundamental demands of the Soviet Union which it regarded as legitimate. Reassurance succeeded temporarily in Yemen in 1963 as well. President Nasser was far more responsive to the possibility of a mediated disengagement of forces than he was to American threats; it is instructive that as long as the

[53] Interview with a senior member of the National Security Council, May 15, 1985. The "defeat" reflected not only a poorly executed strategy with poorly defined purposes, but an inappropriate extension of deterrence with little attention to the political context.

[54] Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Beyond Deterrence," *Journal of Social Issues* 42 (Winter 1987), forthcoming.

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process of mediation held out some prospect of success, the Egyptian President refrained from a use of force. It appears, then, that the simultaneous use of deterrence and reassurance was far more effective in preventing a military challenge than was exclusive reliance on deterrence. To put the point starkly: we cannot identify a single case in two decades of American strategy in the Middle East where extended deterrence succeeded alone.

The policy implications of this investigation of the use of extended deterrence in the Middle East, with careful attention to the limitations of the data and the biases introduced by the case selection, merit consideration. The strategy seems to have been both overvalued and badly used as a basic instrument of conflict management. A conservative interpretation of the evidence suggests that the importance of opportunity, capability, and strategic reputation—the givens of deterrence—have been inflated. At the same time, U.S. policy makers have consistently paid inadequate attention to the weaknesses of their challengers and to the issues that animate local conflict. Attention to vulnerabilities and interests is especially important outside Europe—where lines are unclear, vulnerabilities are acute, and interests are intensely felt. Effective management of conflict requires a broad spectrum of political instruments; in that spectrum, a strategy of extended deterrence can at best be one.

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THE PERCEPTION OF POWER: Russia in the Pre-1914 Balance

By WILLIAM C. WOHLFORTH*

Introduction

INTERNATIONAL relations scholars do not agree on the connection between the balance of power and war. They question whether or not an equal distribution of power among states or alliances leads to stability, whether the preponderance of power in favor of one actor or alliance leads to peace, or whether the key lies in the transition of preponderance from one power to another. Everyone is familiar with these questions; yet, more than twenty years of rigorous elaboration and sophisticated quantitative testing have done little to produce the answers.[1] Do these inconclusive results suggest that there is no relation between the distribution of power and war?

It would be unwise to draw such a conclusion, because, despite much scholarly effort devoted to the topic, important aspects have not been addressed. One such aspect is the perception of power. If "power" influences international relations, it must do so through the perceptions of those who act on behalf of states.[2] The quantitative measures of power used in the literature to test various power theories are thus estimators of perceived power. It follows that a good way to check the adequacy of the tests is to compare the measure of power used with actual perceptions in a particular case. This is the comparison I shall make with regard to Russia before World War I.

* I am grateful to Bruce Russett for his help in revising earlier drafts and to Paul Kennedy for his helpful comments on the first draft.

[1] The pioneering study is J. David Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty and Major Power War," in Bruce Russett, ed., *Peace, War and Numbers* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1972). Their findings supported the equality-equals-peace proposition for the 19th century, but the preponderance-equals-peace proposition for the 20th. Wayne H. Ferris, in *The Power Capabilities of National-States* (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1973), covered a similar time span; his findings supported the equality proposition for both centuries. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Risk, Power Distributions, and the Likelihood of War," *International Studies Quarterly* 25 (December 1981), 541-68, found no relation between power distribution and the likelihood of war over the same period. See also Alan Ned Sabrosky, *Polarity and War* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985), and, for a good review of the literature, Randolph Siverson and Michael Sullivan, "The Distribution of Power and the Onset of War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27 (September 1983), 473-95.

[2] K. J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1972), 158.

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In one sense, it is not surprising that this route has not been taken before: uncovering decision makers' perceptions is a difficult task. The presentation of the major powers' perceptions of Russian capabilities in the years prior to World War I takes up a significant portion of this article. Furthermore, perceptions as recorded in diplomatic documents are imprecise observations; the best one can expect from even the most extensive historical research is a general sense of contemporary views. Still, the endeavor is worthwhile, for it reveals that indicators of numerical capabilities misrepresent not only Russia's prewar power, but the system-wide distribution of power. These indicators also fail to capture important dynamic elements in the prewar power balance. Although World War I is only a single case, the disparity between perceptions and estimators discovered for the period is sufficiently large to suggest that the inconclusive results of quantitative analyses of power theories may be more a result of measurement problems than of a lack of explanatory power on the part of the variable itself.

A positive dividend of investigating perceptions of power is the contribution to understanding the onset of war. Perceptions (and misperceptions) help to explain the bellicosity of the major powers in 1914, their unwillingness to take risks for peace, and why the war occurred in 1914 rather than earlier or later. The balance of power emerges from all this as an important variable which should not be ignored in the study of international conflict; its influence is exerted in very complex ways that are difficult if not impossible to capture statistically.

Estimating the Prewar Balance

Before turning to a presentation of perceptions, it may be useful to describe how the prewar balance of power is represented by quantitative indicators. Table 1 shows the measure developed by the Correlates of War project—the most widely used in the field. It is a composite index combining the following indicators with equal weights: total population, urban population, energy consumption, steel production, military expenditures, and military personnel. The figures show England, Germany, and Russia vying for first place among the European powers. Russia and Germany appear approximately equal in power; by 1905, both have surpassed England. France is clearly in the second rank, having a power position closer to Japan's or Austria's than to those of the great powers. With regard to alliances, the Dual Alliance between Germany and Austria seems slightly inferior to the Russo-French Entente. When England joins the latter grouping in the wake of the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, the re-

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TABLE 1
CAPABILITIES OF MAJOR POWERS

	Percentage of World Power			
	1900	*1905*	*1910*	*1913*
Russia	15	16	18	18
France	10	9	9	9
England	20	15	14	14
Germany	16	16	17	18
Austria	6	6	6	6
Italy	5	4	4	4
U.S.	22	25	26	26
Japan	5	10	6	6

Source: James Lee Ray, Global Politics (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1979), 106.

sultant combination massively outweighs the Austro-German alliance on the scales of European power. In a more general vein, the figures indicate that capabilities were fairly well dispersed throughout the system, rather than concentrated in one state or alliance.

The main dynamic element portrayed by the indicators is England's precipitate decline, which is perhaps exaggerated by her demobilization after the Boer War. In most respects, power relationships seem fairly stable. France appears to be slowly losing her battle to maintain a place among Europe's great powers. Russia passes Germany in capabilities in 1905 and 1910, but the latter appears to be gaining relative to Russia in the years just before the war. Because the Entente powers' relative capabilities remain stable in the final prewar period, this German rise leads to an improvement in the Alliance's position vis-à-vis the Entente on the eve of the war.

How do contemporary perceptions compare with this picture of a Russia superior in power to Germany until just before the outbreak of war? To address this question, I shall examine the perceptions of each of the major powers (excluding Italy, but including Russia herself) of Russia's capabilities between 1905 and 1914.

PERCEPTIONS OF THE POWERS

BRITAIN

Although Russia's defeat by Japan in 1905 and the subsequent revolution produced a degradation of Russia's power in the eyes of all European

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statesmen, its effect was most muted among the British. British military observers, who had great respect for the qualities of the Russian infantryman (though not the officers) and for the vast numbers Russia could field, did not see the Manchurian defeat as a sign of any fundamental Russian weakness.[3] British officers believed, as stated in a 1908 report of the attaché in St. Petersburg, that Russia "in a defensive war . . . would render a good account of itself even against a combination of its Western neighbours." In contrast to 1905, Russia would, first of all, "perform better in a war that enlisted national sympathies." Furthermore, "there is a strong force already on the frontier and an admirable system of railways from the interior," again in contrast to the Manchurian situation. And "the *elite* of the Russian troops are immediately available. These troops were not touched in the last war." To this must be added the well-known qualities of the Russian soldier who, if "properly led . . . should accomplish anything."[4]

From 1908 to 1914, British military observers continued to assess favorably Russia's extensive efforts to absorb the tactical and organizational lessons of the Japanese war and to increase the overall size of the army. An attaché's memo of 1914, which represented the war office's view and was shown to Prime Minister Grey, took note of continuing problems but concluded that "the army is improving every day . . . [and it is] only a matter of time before [it] becomes a match for all of Western Europe."[5]

British diplomats were similarly reluctant to draw extreme conclusions on the basis of Russia's 1905 experience.[6] By 1908, Ambassador Nicholson was ready to assert that in "any war waged by Russia on behalf of her interests, . . . the Russian government would not be hampered, as was the case in the last war, by anxiety regarding internal disturbances."[7] This optimism was supported by reports from the consulates in the border provinces, which by 1908 noted the virtual absence of overt revolutionary activity and discounted the possibility of uprisings in the event of military

[3] See the attachés' dispatches from 1905/6 cited by P. Towle, "The European Balance of Power in 1914," *Army Quarterly and Defence Journal* 104 (April 1974), 334, 335.

[4] Kenneth Bourne and D. Cameron Watt, gen. eds., *British Documents on Foreign Affairs* (hereafter cited as *BD*), Pt. 1, Ser. A (Russia), V, 177, 178. Wyndham to Foreign Office, 11.19.08.

[5] Cited by Keith Neilson, "Watching the 'Steamroller': British Observers and the Russian Army before 1914," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 8 (June 1985), 212. Naval observers were sceptical of Russian naval capabilities, but this had little influence on the overall assessment because Russia was judged not to be vulnerable to blockade. For representative memoranda, see *BD* (fn. 4), III, 172; V, 84; VI, 247, 261, 281, 282. German assessments may be found in Ivo N. Lambi, *The Navy and German Power Politics* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1984).

[6] See Cecil Spring-Rice's dispatches to Salisbury, *BD* (fn. 4), III, 107.

[7] *Ibid.*, V, 177; to Grey, 19.11.08.

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hostilities.[8] Still, much British optimism was reserved for the future, a view that was bolstered when Russia backed down in the face of a German ultimatum during the Bosnian annexation crisis of 1908. Indeed, Russian Prime Minister Stolypin told Nicholson just after the crisis that Russia "was not yet in a position to meet Germany and Austria combined." This would only be the case "in two or three or four years."[9] Consequently, in his introduction to the Annual Report for 1909, Nicholson, while stressing Russia's "rapid recovery" and her "unlimited resources" and population of "over 150,000,000," concluded that it was only "in two or at most three years" that "Russia will be in a position to take the place in Europe to which she is rightly entitled."[10]

The evidence, as it flowed into London from the St. Petersburg embassy, seemed to bear out Nicholson's judgment: from 1910 on, the Annual Reports document a steady stream of record harvests, excellent finances, military growth and reform, and industrial development. Still, Britons on the scene did not view Russia, even together with France, as offsetting German power on the Continent. Assessing the power balance in light of all the military measures taken by France, Germany, and Russia in 1913, Nicholson's replacement in St. Petersburg, Ambassador Buchanan, acknowledged the "temporary advantages which Germany has secured by her Army Bill of last year." These, however, "will in a few years time be eclipsed by the counter measures which Russia has been obliged to take in self defense." It appeared to him that,

> unless . . . Germany is prepared to make still further financial sacrifices for military purposes, the days of her hegemony in Europe will be numbered; as, even without the co-operation of England, Russia and France combined will then be strong enough to confront the united forces of the Triple Alliance. There are, however, still three critical years to pass before that result is achieved.[11]

Diplomatic and military observers thus agreed in seeing Russia capable only of defense until 1910, regaining the potential for offensive warfare sometime between 1910 and 1912, and by 1913 becoming fully war-ready as the term was understood in those days—that is, capable of mounting offensives on the key fronts. There is no reason to believe that these views

[8] Risto Ropponen, *Die Kraft Russlands* [Russia's power] (Helsinki: Historiallisia tutkimiksia, 1968), 113. This work by a Finnish historian, based on extensive archival research, is the most extensive treatment of perceptions of Russian power during this period.

[9] *BD* (fn. 4), V, 282; to Grey, 07.05.09.

[10] *Ibid.*, 332.

[11] G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperly, eds., *British Documents on the Origins of the War* (London, 1927-1938), X, Pt. 2, 767; to Grey, 18.03.14.

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were not shared by the top decision makers. Grey, although he probably thought in terms of power, was reluctant to express himself publicly in this way, preferring instead more moralistic pronouncements on foreign policy in tune with Liberal sensitivities.[12] The precipitate reduction in Russian power in 1905/6 and its deleterious effects on the European balance were crucial elements in the argument for a "continental commitment" and the initiation of staff talks with the French.[13] Grey did express his desire to see Russia "re-established as a factor in European politics."[14] The 1907 Anglo-Russian entente, designed to accomplish this end (as well as to arrange the two empires' affairs in the East), seemed based on confidence in eventual Russian restoration. Those policy makers around Grey who thought in terms of the balance of power—for example, Nicholson and Sir Eyre Crow—were likely to rate Russia a serious factor, but by no means Germany's equal.[15] This was also true of the forceful director of military operations, General Henry Wilson. It is probably fair to say that Wilson's view of Russian power was a function of his argument for a continental commitment; that is, he expected that Russia, in addition to cancelling out Austria, would draw away from the Western front just sufficient numbers of German divisions to make the contribution of the small British Expeditionary Force appear decisive. Russia had to be just strong enough to make the plans of Wilson and the French look realistic, but not so strong as to make the B.E.F.'s contribution superfluous.[16]

Although Grey did indicate to several interlocutors that he rated Russia as a formidable military power,[17] at no time did he contradict his experts' assessment that only in the future would Russia, with France, be an effective counterweight to German power.

France

From 1905 until 1910/11, the French completely discounted Russia as a factor restraining Germany. As General Moulin, the military attaché in St. Petersburg, saw the situation in 1906, Russia would require at least

[12] See Keith Wilson, "British Power in the European Balance," in David Dilks, ed., *Retreat from Power* (London: Macmillan, 1981), Vol. I, 22.

[13] Keith Wilson, "To the Western Front: British War Plans and the 'Military Entente' with France," *British Journal of International Studies* 3 (July 1977), 156; Paul Kennedy, *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1982), 425.

[14] Quoted by Kennedy, *ibid.*

[15] Ropponen (fn. 8), 287.

[16] See incidents of Wilson's dismissive view of the Russians as recounted by Kennedy (fn. 13), 427, and Ropponen (fn. 8), 246, n. 126.

[17] See the incidents reported by Kennedy (fn. 13), and Erwin Höltze, *Die Selbstentmachtung Europas* [The self-enfeeblement of Europe] (Frankfurt-Zürich: Musterschmidt Göttingen, 1975), 235, 300.

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three years of peace to present any threat to Germany. After a visit to the western theater, Moulin said of his three-year estimate, "add to this the Russian coefficient . . . , by which anything we at home or the Germans could do in one year takes two years in Russia."[18] In the event, his off-the-cuff prediction of recovery by 1912 was quite close to the mark in terms of French perceptions.

International crises in 1908, 1911, and 1912 gave French decision makers glimpses of the Russians' sense of their own capabilities. In each instance, the Russians told them they needed more time. During the Agadir crisis in 1911, for example, the French general staff was informed by its Russian counterpart that, because of its military unpreparedness, "Russia will clearly not be ready for war with Germany with confidence of success before at least two years."[19] This may have been what prompted Prime Minister Calliaux to remark during the crisis, "you forget that the Russian army is worth nothing."[20] During the Balkan War of 1912, the Russians again told their French allies, "even if Austria should attack Serbia, Russia will not fight."[21]

Two factors contributed to the rise in the French perception of Russian power after 1912. The first was impressive Russian improvements of a material kind, including increased army size, new and greater numbers of weapons, and vast improvements in the strategic railroad network. All of these were dutifully reported by the military attaché in St. Petersburg.[22] Even more important, however, was the Russians' shift from a defensive to an offensive strategy, a shift stemming both from an increased estimate of their own capabilities and from the conclusion reached by the Russian general staff that Germany would devote the bulk of its army to the western front at the outset.[23] This knowledge essentially forced the Russians to accept the French argument on the prime importance of a rapid offensive against Germany: if France fell, Russia herself would be at the mercy of Germany, and, even if the struggle in the west were in-

[18] Cited by D. N. Collins, "The Franco-Russian Alliance and Russian Railways," *Historical Journal* 16 (December 1973), 785.

[19] Quoted by A. V. Ignat'ev in *Russko-angliskie otnosheniia nakanune pervoi mirovoi voiny* [Russian-English relations before the First World War] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi literatury, 1962), 116. Unless otherwise stated, all translations are by the present author.

[20] Quoted by L.F.C. Turner, "The Russian Mobilization in 1914," in Paul Kennedy, ed., *The War Plans of the Great Powers* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985), 253.

[21] French attaché in Petersburg, quoted by V. I. Bovykin in *Iz istorii vozniknoveniia pervoi mirovoi voiny: Otnosheniia Rossii i Frantsii v 1912-1914 gg.* [From the history of the onset of the First World War: Russian-French relations 1912-1914] (Moscow: Moskovskogo Universiteta, 1961), 148.

[22] Ropponen (fn. 8), 96, 231.

[23] Jack Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 157.

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conclusive, Russia had an incentive to strike early at Germany's weaker front to end the war quickly and on favorable terms. Because Russian defense-mindedness had long been considered by many French advocates of the offense a shortcoming more serious than any in the material realm, this rise in Russia's offensive spirit cannot be overestimated in explaining the French change of view.

Still, as late as 1913 some Frenchmen had doubts about their ally's capabilities. In a memorandum prepared early in the year, Chief of Staff Joffre questioned whether Russia could mobilize and implement her war plan without being paralyzed by internal disturbances.[24] He noted that workers' organizations were strong and were located in key industrial centers, where strikes and demonstrations could most upset the machinery of mobilization. In late 1913, however, the military attaché sent home a relatively optimistic report in which he rated Russian power as lying somewhere between France's overoptimistic assessment in 1904 and her overpessimistic one in 1906.[25] By 1914, the mood in official Paris was more upbeat than at any time since 1905. Russia's recently adopted "Great Program" of armament was expected to increase her military capabilities relative to Germany's. In May 1914, Ambassador Paleologue submitted a long memorandum countering Joffre's contentions on every point.[26] He maintained that the balance of forces remained in favor of the tsar and that the wide masses of the people remained loyal to him; that the revolutionary forces, though strong in many industrial centers, were divided and unable to cooperate; and that the outbreak of war would produce a rise in patriotism. "In this huge army," Paleologue wrote, "discipline is excellent." The regime was still able to "drown the revolutionary forces in blood." On the question of Russia's ability to mobilize and implement her war plan, Paleologue had no doubts: "In order for the alliance to be effective, we need a powerful Russia. And, I think I can certify that she is powerful . . . in her own manner."[27]

Germany

For the majority of German officials whose thoughts on the subject are in the historical record, the revival of Russia's power and the realization of her obvious latent potential were factors greatly to be feared, but they were expected to happen in the future. This relegation of the revival of Russian power to the future seems to have been nearly as true in 1914 as it was in 1905.

[24] Ropponen (fn. 8), 168.
[25] *Ibid.*, 281.
[26] *Ibid.*, 167.
[27] Quoted by Bovykin (fn. 21), 35, 191.

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From 1905 to 1908, reports from diplomats and military attachés stressed Russia's weakness on all three scales of the 1914 view of power: military forces, economic-financial position, and societal cohesion. Even Moltke's general staff reports, which stressed Russia's strong points more than the attachés' reports from St. Petersburg, were, before 1912, uniformly dismissive of Russian power.[28] Political observers shared this dim view, although they placed more importance on societal weakness in Russia and the "specter of revolution." During the Bosnian annexation crisis in 1908/9, the operative assessment in Berlin was that no rational Russian would risk war in view of the country's unpreparedness and weak internal condition. Chancellor Bülow affirmed to the Austrian foreign minister, Count Aerenthal, "Concerning Russia, I am in agreement with you that she is at present hardly in a position to inaugurate an active policy."[29] Moltke wrote his Austrian counterpart, Conrad von Hötzendorf, that the opportunity for war was "unlikely to reappear under such favorable conditions."[30]

The operative perception of Russian power remained the same in 1912, when the First Balkan War raised the possibility of a Russo-Austrian war. The St. Petersburg embassy, as well as the foreign minister, chancellor, war minister, general staff, and the kaiser, all thought Russia too weak to take action.[31] Moltke's 1912 memorandum to the chancellor on the Russian situation concluded: "At the moment Russia is behind in the reorganization of her army and its equipment and weaponry. . . ."[32] The chief of staff wrote to Conrad that "war is unavoidable, and the sooner the better."[33] In October 1913, Berchtold reported on a long discussion with the kaiser. He related that, in the midst of an extended diatribe on Russia's irredeemably hostile intentions, the kaiser maintained that

> for the time being Russia does not inspire [him] with any worry: for the

[28] See Ropponen (fn. 8), 222, 270 for the attaché's and Moltke's 1908 reports. The British attaché noticed "the exceedingly unfavorable opinion that my German colleague holds of the Russian army." *BD* (fn. 4), V, 177; Wyndham to Foreign Office, 19.11.08.

[29] Ludwig Bitter et al., eds., *Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der Bosnischen Krise 1908 bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914* [Austria-Hungary's foreign policy from the Bosnian crisis in 1908 to the outbreak of war in 1914] (hereafter cited as *Ö-UA*) (Vienna and Leipzig: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1930), I, p. 15; 23.07.08.

[30] Cited by Holger H. Herwig, "Imperial Germany," in Ernest May, ed., *Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessments before the Two World Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 80.

[31] Ropponen (fn. 8), 249-50.

[32] Quoted by Ropponen, *ibid.*, 249. Naval assessments in this period paralleled Moltke's, with huge increases in Russian naval capabilities envisaged for the future. Lambi (fn. 5), 395-96.

[33] John C. G. Röhl, "An der Schwelle zum Weltkrieg: Eine Dokumentation über den 'Kriegsrat' vom 8 Dez. 1912" [On the brink of world war: documentation of the "War Council" of 8 Dec. 1912] *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen* 21 (No. 1, 1977), 77.

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> next six years one can be certain on that account. He had discovered this in March when, after a war council at Tsarskoe Selo, a German from the Baltic provinces known to him repeated Tsar Nicholas's pronouncement: *Dieu soit loué, nous ne ferons pas de guerre, avant six ans c'est impossible*. Until then the army will not be ready for action, and furthermore [Russia will be] haunted by the specter of revolution.[34]

Although most German officials in 1914 retained their disdainful view of existing Russian power, Russia's seemingly strong financial position and growing economy, and the adoption of the four-year "Great Program" of rearmament, did make Moltke and other military leaders increasingly pessimistic about the future. In May, Moltke told Conrad that "to wait meant to lessen our chances; it was impossible to compete with Russia as regards quantity."[35] Secretary of State Jagow reported a conversation with Moltke that same month:

> The prospects for the future weighed heavily upon him. In two or three years Russia would have finished arming. Our enemies' military power would then be so great that he did not know how he could deal with it. Now we were still more or less a match for it. In his view there was no alternative but to fight a preventive war so as to beat the enemy while we could still emerge fairly well from the struggle. The Chief of Staff therefore put it to me that our policy should be geared to bringing about an early war.[36]

The Russian component of this argument was virtually the same in 1908 and 1912. Only the stridency of the argument was new, based on recent salient evidence of Russia's capability to recover. Bethman-Hollweg, who had been pessimistic about the future in 1912, was still so in 1914. The day after Austria was given the "blank check" by Germany, he told his private secretary that "the secret intelligence gives a shattering picture. . . . The military might of Russia is growing fast. . . . The future belongs to Russia, which is growing and growing and is becoming an ever increasing nightmare to us." Similarly, Jagow wrote to Lichnowsky, the German ambassador in London, that "in a few years Russia . . . will be ready. Then she will crush us on land by weight of numbers, and she will have her Baltic fleet and her strategic railways ready."[37]

According to Jagow, however, the crux was that at present Germany was ready, while "Russia fundamentally was not."[38] The kaiser himself considered Russian intervention unlikely "because Russia is, at the pres-

[34] *Ö-UA* (fn. 29), VII, p. 515, report to Foreign Office, 26.10.13.
[35] Cited by Fritz Fischer, *War of Illusions* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1975), 400.
[36] Quoted in Fischer, *ibid.*, 402.
[37] Cited by Volker R. Berghahn, *Germany and the Approach of War in 1914* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973), 191-92.
[38] Quoted by Fritz Fischer in *Germany's Aims in the First World War* (New York: Norton, 1967), 159.

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ent moment, militarily and financially totally unprepared for war."[39] Pourtales relates that, "in case of external complications, [the revolutionary organizations in Russia] would create a difficult position for the government."[40] The Austrian ambassador in Berlin, Szögyény, reported in July on a conversation with Chancellor Bethman-Hollweg concerning a "radical solution" to the Serbian question. "From an international point of view," the Austrian reported, the chancellor "considers the present moment more favorable than a later one." In reponse to Emperor Franz Josef's note on Austria's plans, Kaiser Wilhelm offered Austria Germany's full support if Russia fought for Serbia. "In any event," Szögyény reported the kaiser as saying, "as things stand today, Russia is far from being prepared for war, and will think twice before taking up arms." Szögyény continued: "Should we really perceive the necessity of a military action against Serbia, he [the kaiser] would regret it were we to allow the present moment, so favorable to us, to go unused."[41]

Austria-Hungary

Until 1911/12, Austro-Hungarian perceptions of Russian power mirrored those of Germany. In their confrontation with Russia during the Bosnian annexation crisis, Austro-Hungarian officials based their policy on the assumption, as Foreign Minister Aerenthal wrote to Bülow, that "Russia is hardly in a position to inaugurate an active policy."[42] Chief of Staff Conrad von Hötzendorf, the main source of military advice in the cabinet, supported this view, arguing for a preventive war while Russia remained "in an inferior state of war readiness."[43] By 1912, however, improvements in Russia's internal situation, military reforms, and reduction in the time needed to mobilize sowed uncertainty among Austro-Hungarian officials. Although some, including influential general staff officers, continued to stress Russia's weakness and Austria-Hungary's ability to prevail against her,[44] many diplomatic representatives thought Russia capable of serious offensive action.[45]

[39] Quoted in Berghahn (fn. 37), 189.
[40] Cited in Höltze (fn. 17), 238.
[41] *Ö-UA* (fn. 29), VIII, pp. 306-7, 319; to Foreign Office, 5.07.14 and 6.07.14.
[42] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 8, 12.06.08, and 856, 20.02.09.
[43] *Ibid.*, II, p. 389, 2.07.09.
[44] The Austrian military attaché's views are reported by the German ambassador: Johannes Lespius et al., eds., *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette* [Grand policy of the European cabinets] (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1927-1932), XXXVI, 379; Pourtales to Bethman Hollweg, 19.11.12. Chief of Staff von Auffenburg (temporarily replacing Conrad) asserted that "our chances of success would be in no way unfavorable even in a war which we fought out alone against Russia." General Staff Report cited by Ropponen (fn. 8), 243. Auffenburg also believed that the two central powers "would remain victorious even against a coalition consisting of Britain, France, Italy and Russia." Quoted by Fischer (fn. 35), 144.
[45] See Ambassador Thurn's memos to the Foreign Office, *Ö-UA* (fn. 29), IV, 794, 822.

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By 1913, when the Council of Ministers met twice to consider the international situation during the Balkan wars, the lines of debate had changed; whereas in 1908 Russia's very *ability* to intervene was questioned, now only her *intentions* were discussed.[46] Conrad admitted that the chances for success had diminished since 1908, but thought it was still possible to prevail against a Russian intervention on behalf of Serbia, though "every delay, from a purely military standpoint, worsens the situation."[47] Some of this confidence in the face of recognized Russian improvements was due to a belief in the potential for revolution: the military made plans to distribute arms to rebels in Poland, where, it was hoped, an uprising would clear the way to Warsaw for Austro-Hungarian troops.[48]

The perception of a steady relative increase in Russian power, inexorably continuing into the future, was held by a majority of Austrian decision makers by the eve of the war. They viewed the existing distribution of power as marginally in favor of the Central Powers. A foreign ministry memorandum distributed after the murder at Sarajevo asserted: "The goal of the Dual Alliance is to break the military superiority of the two monarchical powers through the assistance of Balkan troops."[49] The putative superiority was, of course, somewhat tentative, for it could be reversed by the addition or subtraction of some small Balkan states. This was essentially acknowledged by Conrad when, in a note on the importance of Rumania, he stated that, with Rumania in the enemy camp, the monarchy's military position would be "very unfavorable." The army was "not in a position to offset the additional increment of power which Russia would achieve by virtue of her new army bill, as well as by the forces previously needed against Rumania."[50]

Only Hungarian officials, particularly Hungarian Prime Minister Tisza, who, for domestic reasons, opposed the monarchy's anti-Serbia policy, argued both that the existing balance was unfavorable and that Russia could get relatively weaker in the future.[51] The majority position—the assessment upon which the council based its policy of reducing Serbia—was expressed by the war minister: ". . . it would be more advantageous to wage war immediately, as the power balance will in the future shift disproportionately to our disadvantage."[52]

[46] *Ibid*, VI, 333-34; Council of Ministers (COM) minutes, 05.02.13.
[47] *Ibid*., 403; COM minutes, 3.10.13.
[48] Ropponen (fn. 8), 11.
[49] *Ö-UA* (fn. 29), VIII, 254.
[50] *Ibid*., 269; to Berchtold, 02.07.14.
[51] *Ibid*., 343 (COM minutes, 7.07.14); and 371.
[52] *Ibid*., 348.

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The most important part of the second meeting, Conrad's long discussion on Austria-Hungary's chances in a war, was unfortunately not included in the minutes. The chief of staff asserts in his memoirs that he told the Council of Ministers that war with Serbia alone was no problem, and "also one [that is, war] against Russia, if Rumania remains neutral, and Germany is on our side." But he quotes himself as telling the meeting that, in "case of a war with Russia, Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro, the chances are not advantageous."[53] In other words, he maintained that Austria could prevail over Russia in the most likely scenario. Still, Conrad was considerably less confident than he had been in 1908, or even in 1912. At one point, he is reported to have said: "In the years 1908-1909 it would have been a game with open cards. In 1912-1913 the chances were in our favor. Now it is a sheer gamble [*ein va-banque Spiel*]."[54]

Russia

In no other country—with the possible exception of Germany—was the assessment of Russian power lower than in Russia herself.[55]

It was the Bosnian annexation crisis that awoke those Russian diplomats who were not already aware of it to the fact of Russian weakness. At the height of the crisis, the war minister told a meeting of top officials convened by the tsar that, because of budget cuts forced upon the ministry by Russia's financial crisis and because of the regime's use of one-third of the army for internal security, Russia's forces "were completely unfit for battle."[56] The tsar and his ministers consequently never seriously considered war. Nicholas lamented to his mother in a letter in March that "we could not help [Serbia] at all in case of an Austrian attack."[57]

Although by 1911 major military programs were finally under way, the assessment of Russian capabilities prevailing during the Agadir crisis of that year had changed little from that of 1909. When the French ambassador indicated in an audience with the tsar that Morocco represented a threat to France's vital interests, Nicholas replied: "Try to avoid conflicts. You know that preparations have not yet been completed by us."[58]

[53] Baron Conrad von Hötzendorf, *Aus Meiner Dienstzeit* [From my service days], IV (Vienna: Rikoln Verlag, 1923), 571.

[54] Quoted by Ole Holsti, *Crisis, Escalation, War* (Montreal and London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972), 124.

[55] See William C. Fuller, "The Russian Empire," in May (fn. 30), 110-20; Snyder (fn. 23), chap 7; and the discussion throughout D.C.B. Lieven, *Russia and the Origins of the First World War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), esp. 142-48.

[56] V. A. Sukhomlinov, *Vospominaniia* [Memoirs] (Leningrad/Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1926), 146.

[57] Edward J. Bing, *The Secret Letters of the Last Tsar* (London: Longmans, Green, 1938), 240, 03.19.09.

[58] Cited by A. S. Avetian, *Russko-germanskie diplomaticheskie otnosheniia nakanune pervoi*

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Chief of Staff Zhilinskii informed the French that Russia could not be ready for two or three years.[59] At the same time, Izvol'skii, the ambassador in Paris, was being instructed to remind the French that "from the point of view of our military preparedness, the present moment cannot be seen as advantageous for military action."[60] A paragraph, later deleted, instructed Izvol'skii to tell the French that a German mobilization might call forth a Russian one, but an offensive could not be promised.

In 1912, the First Balkan War provided another opportunity for the Russians to engage in self-assessment. The evidence, once again, indicates extreme Russian scepticism about the country's capabilities. As noted above, the French military attaché was told at general staff headquarters that "Russia would not fight" if Serbia were attacked by Austria. The same passive posture was advocated by Finance Minister Kokovstov and Foreign Minister Sazonov at a special conference with the tsar in November, and at a Council of Ministers meeting a few weeks later. At both meetings, War Minister Sukhomlinov argued that extensive measures be taken in response to Austria's preparations, which, the Council minutes say, could allow her "to force war at an unfavorable moment."[61] At both meetings, Kokovstov and Sazonov opposed the war minister, arguing that his proposed measures could escalate to war with Austria-Hungary and, hence, Germany:

> War with Germany would be an absolute disaster; moreover, we do not have active military forces on the Baltic, the army has not been brought to a sufficient state of readiness, and the internal condition of the country is far from the kind of enthusiastic and patriotic mood which would permit counting on a powerful rise in national spirit.[62]

In both instances, the tsar supported the more restrained option.[63]

As the French observed, by 1912 and 1913 Russian military plans began to take on a more offensive character: the 1913 plan envisioned offensives against both Austria-Hungary and Germany. This was partly

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mirovoi voiny 1910-1914 [Russian-German diplomatic relations on the eve of the First World War 1910-1914] (Moscow: Nauka, 1985), 97.

[59] Ignat'ev (fn. 19), 116.

[60] *Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia v Epokhy Imperializma* [International relations in the age of imperialism] Kommissiia po Izdanii Dokumentov Epokhi Imperializma (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoe Izdatel'stvo, 1935): Ser. 2, Vol. 28, p. 378; Neratov to Izvol'skii, 30.08.11 (new style).

[61] Quoted by Snyder (fn. 23), 248, n. 98.

[62] Cited by Bovykin (fn. 21), 153.

[63] One of these meetings is recounted by Kokovstov in his memoirs, *Out of My Past*, trans. Laura Matveev (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1935), 345. It forms part of Turner's argument ("Russian Mobilization," in Kennedy, fn. 20) stressing the importance of the Russian mobilization in the origins of the war. See the rebuttals by May (fn. 30), 23, and Avetian (fn. 58), 186.

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the result of the Russians' increased confidence in their capabilities as reform and rearmament programs progressed. Even more, however, it was the result of the reaction of two different Russian military groups to increased knowledge of the Schlieffen Plan; one imperialistically minded group, which wanted to strike at Austria-Hungary, and one European-oriented group, which wanted to fulfill alliance commitments by attacking Germany first. The rivalry of the groups, which lacked an effective organizational basis for its resolution, produced the offensive war plan of 1913. In fact, the arguments of both factions were based on scepticism about Russia's power in comparison with that of Germany.[64]

During the Russian-German diplomatic crisis over the latter's dispatch of General von Sanders to command the garrison at Constantinople (an area Russia sought to keep free from the influence of other Great Powers), France—as she had during the First Balkan War—urged Russia to take a strong stance. There was some sentiment in Russia to do just that. Sazonov, for example, argued on many occasions that, were English support guaranteed, Russia could risk a showdown with Germany:

> Russian action with the support of France is not especially dangerous for Germany. Both powers are scarcely capable of dealing Germany a mortal blow even in the event of success on the battlefield, which is always uncertain. But a struggle in which England took part might be fatal for Germany.[65]

At a special conference of top ministers held in 1914 on the Sanders crisis, Sazonov's view prevailed against War Minister Sukhomlinov's arguments for a more forceful posture. Stressing the potential for revolutionary unrest and military unpreparedness, the conference members decided to continue negotiations in Berlin, but to employ methods of influence that would raise the risk of war only in the event of "active participation by both France and England in joint actions with Russia."[66]

The Sanders crisis reveals that Russia and her allies now considered themselves strong enough to adopt a policy of deterrence or containment of Germany, rather than one of continued conciliation. Ministers like Sazonov—who had long been convinced of Russia's inability to act—now maintained that a more forceful policy was a surer way to peace, or at least peace on acceptable terms. This argument carried the day during the July crisis. At the Council of Ministers meeting called by the tsar on July 24 to consider the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, the council chairman's

[64] See Snyder (fn. 23), 164-66, 175; Norman Stone, *The Eastern Front* (New York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1975), 33-34.
[65] Quoted by Lieven (fn. 55), 48.
[66] Bovykin (fn. 21), 176; Avetian (fn. 58), 231.

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speech, regarded by a participant as the most influential of the meeting,[67] followed this line. The chairman admitted that

> our rearmament had not been completed and it seemed doubtful whether our Army and our Fleet would ever be able to compete with those of Germany and Austro-Hungary as regards modern technical efficiency. [But] the only hope of influencing Germany was to show them, by making a firm stand, that we had come to the end of the concessions we were prepared to make.[68]

After the chairman's speech, the opinions of the two service ministers, Sukhomlinov and Grigorovich, were sought. They noted that the rearmament program was not complete, and that superiority over the Central Powers could not be assumed. Although later they both retracted their assessments of Russian readiness in private,[69] they asserted at the meeting that "hesitation was no longer appropriate. . . . They saw no objection to a display of greater firmness in our diplomatic negotiations."[70] The participants eventually agreed to a partial mobilization, and to support Serbia even at risk of war.

Perceived versus Estimated Power

Static Aspects

It is clear that the indicators in Table 1 vastly overstate Russian power: no one thought of Russia as superior in power to Germany or England in the prewar years. In fact, Russia feared subordination to France which, according to the figures, was only half as powerful. The discrepancy is not limited to the Correlates of War index. In all the quantitative studies consulted in the preparation of this article, the estimators used—whether composite (like the Correlates of War index),[71] based on military expenditures,[72] or based on gross national product[73]—were at least as far off the mark in estimating Russia's power as the Correlates of War figures.

[67] Lieven (fn. 55), 142.

[68] *Ibid.*, 143.

[69] *Ibid.*, 186, n. 125. Sukhomlinov later told an aide to Sazonov that, "even with the support of France, we would find ourselves until 1917, and perhaps even until 1918, in a position of indisputable inferiority with respect to the combined forces of Germany and Austria." N. A. Bazilii, *Memoirs* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, 1973), 91.

[70] Lieven (fn. 55), 143.

[71] Ferris (fn. 1); Charles F. Doran and Wes Parsons, "War and the Cycle of Relative Power," *American Political Science Review* 74 (December 1980), 947-65.

[72] Ned Sabrosky, "From Bosnia to Sarajevo," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 19 (March 1975), 7.

[73] A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).

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In the case of the Correlates of War figures, the underlying misestimation can be explained by disaggregating the data (see Table 2). Estimates of military expenditures and personnel were scrutinized by pre-1914 decision makers, and clearly influenced the formation of perceptions. Thus, the figures on the two first lines of Table 2 probably parallel perceptions fairly accurately. Russia's great expenditures and huge army, however, were discounted by many because of her inefficiency; users of these estimators generally assume that the latter is captured by the other figures (low energy consumption, steel production, and urban population). Two factors, more than any others, account for the discrepancy that nevertheless obtains. First, the estimators overstate the importance of Russia's huge population in comparison with perceptions. Although doubtless a factor in pre-1914 eyes, the tsarist empire's sizable population tended to be discounted because of the prevalent belief that the coming war would be short. Only in a long war would the Russian masses have a military effect, through the calling up of reserves. The Russian population was also discounted because it was perceived as lacking in societal cohesion. This is the nonmilitary variable most often cited in

TABLE 2
DISAGGREGATED ESTIMATORS FOR RUSSIA AND GERMANY
(1905)

	Russia	*Germany*
Military expenditures (pounds sterling)	51,539,000	46,167,000
Military personnel	1,160,000	648,000
Energy consumption (millions of tons coal equiv.)	37	112
Steel Production (millions of tons)	2.7	10
Urban population (millions)	8.4	11
Total population (millions)	147	60

Source: Correlates of War data made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, University of Michigan.

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analyses of pre-1914 decision makers; in general, it had a significant dampening effect on perceptions of the influence of Russia's huge military and population.

One could argue that this focus on perceptions is misguided; that the "objective" distribution of capabilities that must exist at any given time somehow influences state behavior regardless of the perceptions of decision makers. Or one might argue that in most cases "real" power will approximate perceptions, which are difficult to gauge in any precise way. Indeed, the design and use of quantitative indicators seem to rely on such assertions, for they are often based on variables—like steel production—that did not appear in contemporary calculations. The figures seem to be estimating "real," not perceived power. For this reason, it may be useful to compare estimators and perceptions to Russia's "real" power.

The best measure of Russia's capability may be its actual performance in the war. By this standard, Russia's power was overrated by pre-1914 decision makers, although not by as much as some accounts hold, and not at all to the extent implied by the indicators. Russia was correctly expected to be able to defeat Austria and to help defeat Germany. That reality should not be obscured by the fact that the war tore Russian society apart and helped to pave the way for revolution. From 1914 to 1916, the Russians tied down over 100 Alliance divisions on the eastern front. As late as mid-1917, Russia held down 1,528 Alliance battalions, as compared to 1,314 German battalions that were deployed on the western front.[74] Although the German component of the Alliance was unquestionably the most formidable and the majority of German forces were always deployed in the west, the amount of German power drawn off by the Russians should not be underestimated. Until 1917, Russia capatured more German prisoners than Britain and France combined.[75] After their defeat by the Russians at Gumbinnen in 1914, the Germans transported several corps east just when the crucial Marne battle opened. In early 1916, the Germans deployed 48 divisions in the east (compared to 120 in the west). Alliance casualties on all three fronts are presented in Table 3.

The Russians inflicted casualties largely on Austro-Hungarians rather than on the more formidable Germans; the substantial aid of Britain and France must also be taken into account. It is further true that Russia was never able to develop an offensive capable of threatening Germany, as had been expected prior to the war. Nevertheless, her huge size represented a latent threat the Germans had to consider, and her reduction of Germany's Austrian ally drew away considerable German forces because

[74] Stone (fn. 64), 93.
[75] *Ibid.*, 12.

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TABLE 3
CASUALTIES OF THE CENTRAL POWERS ON VARIOUS FRONTS

	Number in Thousands	*Percentage of Total*
Western front	4,668	63
Eastern front	1,858	25
Italian front	915	12

Note: These are casualties produced in major battles. Deaths were a greater percentage of German casualties in the east than in the west. Italy's figure overstates that country's war potential because her armed forces were simply on the scene during the Austro-Hungarian collapse.

Sources: Dupuy and Dupuy, *Encyclopedia of Military History* (New York: Harper & Row, 1975); David Eggenberger, *A History of Battles* (New York: Crowell, 1967); Thomas Harbottle, *Dictionary of Battles* (New York: Stein & Day, 1971); Germany, Reichsarchiv, *Der Weltkrieg*, Vols. 2, 5, 6, 7; I. I. Rostunov, *Russkii Front Pervoi Mirovoi Voiny*, Vol. I (Moscow: Nauka, 1976).

Berlin felt that Austria had to be supported. Russia's collapse in 1917 had an immediate effect on the course of the war: by shifting forces to the west, Germany was able to mount a huge offensive in 1918 which could well have been beyond the capacity of the western Allies to contain if it had not been for the aid of the United States. In short, these casualty figures indicate that Russia's role in preventing a victory by the Central Powers was by no measure a minor one. Perceptions, while off the mark, were not widely so, given the delusions that most decision makers entertained about a future war.

Russia's power, and particularly the country's possible contribution to a long war (which was held to be unlikely), was indeed overrated, but not nearly to the degree implied by the quantitative indicators. Because they took societal cohesion into account, contemporary observers were more accurate than the indicators. The indicators thus misrepresent both perceived power and what we now can suggest was the real power relationship. Because the three different ways of conceiving of power (real, perceived, and estimated) led to such different characterizations of Russian power (and hence the balance of power) in this case, it is important to be clear about the causal link between power and state policy. It matters, in short, whether the indicators are attempting to gauge real or perceived power. There is a disconcertingly common tendency in the literature to equate "power" with estimated power, which can lead to a misunderstanding of the pre-World War I atmosphere.[76] That tendency may well

[76] One article, for example, notes that, based on the Correlates of War estimators, "in 1905, the major power subsystem was still in a general state of equilibrium. By 1910, that equilib-

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be similarly misleading with regard to other important periods of international history.

Quantitative studies of the relation between the system-wide distribution of power and the onset of war do not generally specify how "power" is translated into policy. They do not indicate whether the quantitative indicators estimate real or perceived power. Their main purpose is simply to test for a relation and, if one obtains, whether it supports the equality-equals-war or the equality-equals-peace hypothesis. With regard to World War I, the misestimation of Russian power (of either kind) leads to an inaccurate specification of the system-wide distribution of power. With regard to the alliances of the period, the figures suggest an imbalance in favor of the Entente powers. A more accurate representation of perceived power would surely show a less powerful Russia and a more powerful Germany, implying something closer to balance between the blocs. This would affect not only the relation between the blocs, but the nature of the distribution of capabilities itself: to the extent that the figures overrate Russia at the expense of Germany, they understate the degree of concentration of power in the system.

The effect of this particular discrepancy on statistical results is hard to evaluate. It depends on the number of cases and on whether the "war" variable is operationalized in a way that accounts for the importance of the war. If the set of cases is limited to major wars, or if such wars are accorded particular weight in the analysis, doubts increase as to whether discrepancies in the estimation of power will be randomly distributed across all the cases (or across all the heavily weighted cases).[77] Even if—unrealistic though this may seem—all wars by major powers are treated equally (if war is coded as a dichotomous variable), there could conceivably be systematic bias in power estimation. Germany, for example, constituted a defining factor in the European balance from 1870 to 1945. It is

rium had been upset and the balance altered in favor of the Entente coalition." Sabrosky (fn. 72), 18. Actually, the perceived balance was most disturbed in 1905, with equilibrium only beginning to be restored in 1910.

[77] For example, Singer et al. (fn. 1) code "war" as "nation-months of war underway," thus accounting for the magnitude of conflicts. Their finding that low concentration (CON) of power (equal distribution) was associated with peace in the 19th century but with war in the 20th century has been widely discussed. This finding is heavily influenced by the fact that three very large wars (World Wars I and II and the Korean War) occurred in the 20th century during periods of low CON. In the instance of the First World War, if Russia is assigned 10% (rather than 18%) of world power (the difference going to Germany), the CON figure changes from .208 (close to the lowest value) to .244 (above the median and near the mean CON value of .250). Assigning percentages is of course somewhat arbitrary, but a relatively weaker Russia and a greater concentration of capabilities in Germany are clearly implied by the evidence on perceptions. Thus, the significance of this finding is greatly reduced. If the estimators are similarly off the mark in the case of World War II, the conclusion will vanish entirely.

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quite possible that Germany's central geographical position, her advantage in having interior lines, and her oft-noted organizational superiority had a multiplying effect on the perception of her power. Germany's geographical position may also suggest vulnerability; but, because Germany was a revisionist state for most of the period, her geography was not likely to occupy a high priority in the calculations of her opponents. It is also quite conceivable that technology changes in ways that could bias even composite indicators. The development of the railroad, for example, increased the importance of land power in relation to sea power.[78]

In short, the evidence presented here raises the suspicion that contending propositions about the balance of power have not been adequately tested, for the operative balance can differ from the estimated one in fundamental ways over long periods of time. As far as *estimated* power balances are concerned, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita may be right in concluding "that any effort to infer anything about the likelihood of war from the presence or absence of a particular power distribution is likely to yield no better results than random guessing."[79] One cannot yet, however, draw final conclusions on the usefulness of studying *perceived* distributions.

Dynamic Aspects

The proposition that changing power relationships lie at the root of international war is older even than the various balance-of-power formulations. Dynamic theories range from Gilpin's hegemonic transition, to Organski's power transition, to Doran and Parsons' "inflection point" model.[80] All these theories explicitly rely on perceptions of power and power trends for their causal explanation. How do they fare in the case of World War I?

In the prewar period, perceptions of trends undoubtedly were of crucial importance. Rising German power had, of course, been an issue for a generation. But the evidence presented here indicates that decision makers on both sides perceived Russian power as increasing more quickly than German power—a perception that affected the calculations of the various countries in fundamental ways. The case of World War I provides evidence to support the importance of expectations about future power relationships. The expectation that Russian power would increase

[78] This factor, of course, has further implications for Germany's power in comparison with England's. See Paul Kennedy, "Mahan vs MacKinder" in his *Strategy and Diplomacy: 1870-1945* (London: Fontana, 1983).

[79] Bueno de Mesquita (fn. 1) 566-67.

[80] Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Organski and Kugler (fn. 73); Doran and Parsons (fn. 71).

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more quickly than German power in the future—essential for understanding the onset of the war—was clearly related to past power trends, but it also had a logic of its own. As is indicated by de Tocqueville's observation in 1830 that Russia and America each will "one day hold in its hands the destiny of half the world," there was a venerable historical tradition of assuming that the vast Russian resources would eventually translate into world power. Thus German decision makers—even those who dismissed existing Russian power—always assumed that Russia's power would increase relative to Germany's.

Quantitative tests, which must rely on simplified assumptions, cannot account for the influence such historical "traditions" exert upon expectations. Instead, they assume that expectations are based upon an extrapolation of existing trends.[81] As should be clear, however, trends in the quantitative estimators do not correspond to perceived trends. The Correlates of War figures in Table 1 show Germany and Russia vying for first place, with Germany's capabilities increasing relative to those of the dominant Russia on the eve of the war. Table 4 shows why: German increases in steel production and military expenditures eventually outweighed Russian population increases. The figures alone do not, however, reflect three very important determinants of the perception of rising Russian power. First, the diplomatic documents indicate that Russia's power was felt to be rising quickly in part because it was perceived to have sunk to such a low point. The curve of Russian power, as it appeared in the minds of prewar statesmen, did not slope upward from, say, 10 or 11 percent to 12 percent. Rather, it shot up from effectively zero in 1905/6 to its traditional level in the years between 1910 and 1914. Russian capabilities in this period resembled a massively deflated economy going through its first Keynesian reflation. The country was simultaneously increasing its overall capacity and the proportion of capacity it utilized. The other powers were merely increasing their overall capacity. The upward-sloping curve of Russian power thus seemed steeper, and represented a far more dramatic and dynamic factor in the changing power configuration, than the figures imply.

A second and related aspect not captured by the indicators is the fast-increasing confidence in the cohesion of Russian society as evidence of discontent faded under the reform and repression of the Stolypin regime. Finally, although Germany and the other powers increased the size of their total military forces as fast or faster than Russia, the percentage of the latter's forces that could be deployed at the front in the first few weeks

[81] This is the approach taken by Doran and Parsons, *ibid.*

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TABLE 4
PERCENTAGES OF GROWTH FOR RUSSIA AND GERMANY
(COW Variables, 1900-1913)

	Russia	*Germany*
Military personnel	40	38
Military expenditures	98	123
Energy consumption	79.5	66
Steel production	120	176
Urban population	86	61
Total population	29	19.5

Source: Correlates of War data made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, University of Michigan.

of war increased at a much faster rate than did their overall size. Again, Russia was starting from a lower mobilization base than any other major power: the reduction of Russia's mobilization time greatly increased the real effect of large Russian numbers on pre-1914 minds, ruled as they were by short-war assumptions. Because the figures do not capture these important nuances, however, they misrepresent prevailing trends. A better representation of perceptions and the expectations built upon them would show Russian power increasing *more quickly* from a considerably *lower* base.

Any quantitative test of a dynamic theory, or any casual analysis of numerical indicators of power, will therefore miss an important dynamic element: the perceived rapid decline and rise of Russia. The problem is greater than that, however. Many dynamic theories are concerned with power transitions (points at which the power of one state surpasses that of another) or "inflection points" in the power growth of states (at which there is a shift in the velocity of rise or decline or the direction of change). In any quantitative test of such theories, not only the *change in* but also the *level of* relative power has to be related to the occurrence of war. Unfortunately, the levels of relative power can be grossly misestimated by numerical indicators. In *The War Ledger*, for example, Organski and Kugler found that war occurs "only if one of the contenders [the most powerful states in the system] is in the process of passing the other."[82] In statistical analysis, the Russian-German dyad conforms to the theory in the pre-World War I case, but it does so only because the measure (GNP)

[82] Organski and Kugler (fn. 73), 51.

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shows Russia as the dominant power, not passed by Germany until 1911. War then occurs on schedule in 1914. As far as perceptions are concerned, however, Germany probably passed Russia in the 1870s. In another instance, Doran and Parsons, in testing their hypothesis that war is more likely to occur at inflection points in the long-term cycle of a state's relative power, develop a composite index of power that, unlike the Correlates of War indicators, does capture prewar trends (Russia rising, Germany falling behind). But, as Doran and Parsons expect, their identification of low and high points in power in the prewar period does not seem to correspond to perceptions.[83] This lack of correspondence does not invalidate the theories themselves, but it does suggest the difficulties in testing.

The Perceived Balance and War

Some common themes run through this discussion of testing power theories—most of them suggesting a relationship between perceived power and war. In this final section, I shall consider three of them in turn: differences in perceptions, the volatility of perceptions, and the capriciousness of perceptions.

Differences in Perceptions

Risto Ropponen, in his detailed study of the perception of Russian power in the prewar period, discovered a systematic dichotomy between France, England, and Italy (all of which overestimated Russian power) and Germany and Austria (which underrated it).[84] My own less extensive research supports his general conclusion, with the added observation that British decision makers seemed to be most positive, the French somewhat less so, and the Germans (as well as the Russians) more dismissive of Russian power than the Austrians. In most cases, the perceptual disparity supported a particular policy line. For Britain, a strong Russia implied a balance of power and no need for intervention. For France, Russia had to be strong enough not to make her position hopeless, but certainly not so strong as to obviate the need for a military build-up. For Germany, a Russia temporarily weakened but on the verge of assuming her full potential fit the preventive-war argument.

[83] Doran and Parsons (fn. 71) have the Russian low point in 1894, when by most accounts it rose steadily after the reforms begun in the wake of the Russo-Turkish war of 1879 until 1904. See Laguiche Memo in Ropponen (fn. 8). Doran and Parsons set the German high at 1902, when the evidence presented here would suggest the period from 1906 to 1909 as more likely.

[84] Ropponen (fn. 8).

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Differences in perception cannot be captured by quantitative estimators, but they may reveal much about the onset of war. The fact that Russia's opponents saw her as weaker, and her allies viewed her as stronger, suggests that decision makers on both sides may have thought they had the margin of superiority. Thus, Moltke and Conrad based their actions in July 1914 on the assumption that the Central Powers still had the edge over the Entente, whereas Sazonov, the Russian foreign minister, assumed that, with England firmly on board, Germany could be beaten. The existence of this "dual" balance of power has several implications. The first is that the "objective" distribution of capabilities in 1914 probably came as close to equilibrium as ever occurs in international relations. Thus, it was possible to draw different conclusions about power relationships from essentially the same evidence. It hardly makes sense to speak of the Entente's overwhelming superiority when four years of struggle, the harnessing to the Entente of American economic power, and, eventually, American intervention were necessary to bring victory.

Second, this dual balance of power adds to the discussion on the origins of the war. It helps explain Germany's bellicosity and the Entente powers' refusal to back down. The willingness of all to go to war, or the unwillingness of all to take risks for peace, which is often attributed to organizational imperatives, can in part be explained by the conviction of each side that, "if things came to it," it could win. There is support here for Geoffrey Blainey's notion of war as "a dispute about the measurement of power."[85] Obviously, there are purely aggressive wars forced by the strong upon the weak, but there is some appeal to the proposition that war is often "the outcome of a diplomatic crisis which cannot be solved because both sides have conflicting estimates of their bargaining power."[86] In the case of dynamic theories, this dual balance of power helps to explain why power transitions often cannot be achieved peacefully. If power relationships were completely transparent, it is difficult to see why a weaker challenger would provoke war or a weaker dominant nation would insist on defending the status quo. Because power relationships can be opaque and because each side can see a different distribution, each can see the other's demands as illegitimate and unjustified by the existing distribution of power.

The clarity of the balance of power undoubtedly varies over time. It is often suggested that it is likely to be most transparent after major wars, for, as Gilpin contends, "a hegemonic war is the ultimate test of change in the relative standing of the powers in the existing system."[87] However,

[85] Blainey, *The Causes of Wars* (New York: Free Press, 1973), 114.
[86] *Ibid.*
[87] Gilpin (fn. 80).

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as the case of prewar Russia shows, even smaller wars can have a clarifying effect: from 1905 until after 1910 everyone was more or less aware of Russia's weakness, and hence of the weakness of the Entente's position. Therefore, in the crises of 1905, 1908/9, 1911, and 1912, Russia and her allies adopted conciliatory policies. It was only after Russian reforms really got under way after 1910 that one detects significant differences of views on Russian power in the documents.

Volatility of Perceptions

A large conceptual breach divides long-term power studies from the "crisis management" approach to the study of international war. To the theorist of hegemonic war, a difference of five or ten years in international history hardly seems important. Similarly, specific antecedents to war fade into insignificance next to the fundamental power shifts that make war likely. Proponents of crisis studies respond that war occurs as the result of particular decisions at particular times, and the analysis of these decisions reveals that in many cases the absence of certain perceptual or organizational pathologies could well have prevented war from occurring. Most analysts would admit, however, that neither group of scholars is entirely wrong; that the immediate and long-term causes of war are related. The present case study suggests that the medium-term perception of power captures, to a certain extent, a confluence of the two approaches.

The decisive decline in Russia's perceived power occasioned by the war and revolution of 1905 was a catalyst for solidifying the Triple Entente: Britain began staff talks with the French and concluded an entente with Russia, despite a century of antagonism between the two empires; and France and Russia tightened their alliance. As noted above, for Entente decision makers, including the Russians, Russia's obvious weakness demanded conciliatory policies toward the central powers in the crises of 1905 and 1908/9. Only after several years of active Russian reforms and an improving financial status did the situation become more ambiguous. By 1912, France pushed for a "forward" Russian policy in the Balkan Wars. By 1914, Russian leaders agreed that they were in a position to face down Germany. On the German side, German leaders thought, for a host of reasons, that their country's interests demanded war; yet the kaiser and the chancellor were reluctant to make an unambiguous decision.[88] Thus, the Entente's conciliation frustrated German plans for war in 1905 and

[88] Richard Ned Lebow, "Windows of Opportunity: Do States Jump through Them?" in Stephen Miller, ed., *Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 162-63.

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1908, just when the Central Powers' relative capabilities were probably perceived to be at their highest. Only the Russian decision to oppose the Central Powers in Serbia, based on an internal estimate of increased Russian power, allowed the kaiser and the chancellor to perceive the decision for war as forced upon them by the actions of others.

It is, in short, misleading to discuss the timing of the war solely by reference to systemic shifts in power as measured by numerical indicators. An explanation for the coming of the war that entirely ignored the power variable would also miss important aspects. "Crisis management" studies on the origins of the war have focused on factors like faulty decision making, military strategy and plans, the cult of the offensive, time pressures, communications overload, and so forth.[89] Such studies attempt to show why the July crisis ended in war, and that it need not have done so had some of the factors mentioned not been present. The implication is that power is not an important explanatory factor; that, with incorrect organization, strategy, or communications, any power dynamic or distribution could lead to war, and that with sound organization, strategy, and communications, no power configuration is likely to lead to war. Yet all these phenomena surely also were attributes of earlier crises—as, for example, the Bosnian crisis, which did not end in war. What was different in 1914 was the perceived distribution of power. Bureaucratic and organizational factors undoubtedly affected the proclivity of states toward war. But it may lead to misplaced emphasis on such factors to ignore that, at least in the case of World War I, the willingness of states to go to war was related to their capability for doing so. These capabilities were perceived to be changing rapidly before 1914, thus affecting the war-proneness of the system in fundamental ways.

The Capriciousness of Perceptions

Fritz Fischer has called the First World War "the war of illusions."[90] Another apt description would be "the war of misperceptions," for, as Stephen Van Evera has observed, "misperceptions were the taproot of the war."[91] Van Evera focuses on six misperceptions: the cult of the offensive; overestimation of opponents' hostility; belief that forceful policy would reduce opponents' resistance; belief that empires were profitable; belief in war's positive effects; and nationalistic versions of history that reduced

[89] See *ibid.*; Holsti (fn. 54); Snyder (fn. 21).

[90] Fischer (fn. 35).

[91] Van Evera, "Why Cooperation Failed in 1914," *World Politics* 38 (October 1985), 80-117, at 116. See also Jack Snyder, "Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914," in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 153-79.

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the ability of elites to perceive that the actions of their country might be the cause of the anxieties of others.[92] He shows how these mistaken beliefs so skewed perceived payoffs that cooperative policies were ruled out.

One more misperception could easily be added to Van Evera's list: that of power. True, perceptions of the static balance, despite pre-1914 delusions about the nature of future war, were not far off the mark. But how accurate was the almost universal pre-1914 belief in inexorably increasing Russian power? This question is particularly important in explaining German imperatives. Although all major states had revisionist goals before the war and were more or less disposed to go to war in order to achieve them, Germany is generally regarded as having been the most likely to do so.[93] Van Evera notes that his six misperceptions were most acute in Berlin. The same is true of the perception of rising Russian power, which weighed so heavily on German decision makers that it created one of Gilpin's "preconditions for hegemonic war"—namely, "the realization that the law of uneven growth has begun to operate to one's disadvantage."[94]

At first glance, this extrapolation of perceived prewar trends looks accurate, for Russia's power did surpass that of Germany after World War II, as all quantitative indicators show. But these indicators are skewed by the partition of Germany. In fact, the pre-1914 argument that Russia must grow relative to Germany did not necessarily fit true potential; as Paul Kennedy notes in an analysis of the real distribution before 1914 and beyond, "[had it continued to] occupy its 1937 borders, the united German nation would today be a larger industrial and economic force than the Soviet Union."[95] Even in the near-to-medium term, Kennedy concludes, "the figures suggest that Russia would do well to maintain its position vis-à-vis Germany, let alone improve it."[96] Of course, this is counterfactual (though well-researched) speculation, but from all we now know of Germany's actual power in 1914, and of the demands that modern war places upon the economy and organization of a state, it seems quite likely that, for Germany, war was a tragic mistake even within the confines of all the pre-1914 misperceptions about international politics. A correct calculation of power trends would have led to a German decision

[92] *Ibid.*, 81.

[93] The consensus among those who study the war may now be considered to rest here, after decades of acrimonious controversy, debate, and copious research sparked by the so-called "Fischer School." See John A. Moses, *The Policy of Illusion: The Fischer Controversy in German Historiography* (London: George Prior, 1975).

[94] Gilpin (fn. 80), 202.

[95] Kennedy, "The First World War and the International Power System," in Miller (fn. 88), 30.

[96] *Ibid.*

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for peace, for, as A.J.P. Taylor observed, "peace would have brought Germany the mastery of Europe within a few years."[97]

The upshot is that the perception and misperception of power is also a "taproot" of the war. Changes in the perceived balance help to explain the timing of the war; why earlier crises were peacefully resolved whereas the July crisis was not; why the Entente powers decided to stand up to Germany; why German decision makers felt they had to make a "now or never" stand for the mastery of Europe. But one can at least question the inevitability of all this, for the perception of rising Russian power, necessary for the preventive/hegemonic war argument, may well have been incorrect. The best explanation for the onset of the war may require a combination of the perceptions and the "grand theoretical" power approach. The calculation of relative power was crucial in explaining the onset, and it proceeded in ways that conform to the main power-transition theories. But calculations and expectations were skewed in ways that can only be understood by reference to prevalent misperceptions of the age, such as those analyzed by Lebow, Van Evera, and Snyder. Only these considerations explain why it was that so many decision makers, and not just Germans, foresaw great relative gains for Russia in the next few years.

Conclusion

The calculation of the balance of power is thus important, but not always accurate. Policy-related perceptions of power that do not correspond to numerical indicators or to our best analytical estimate of the real situation must be taken into account when theorizing about the balance of power. Perceived power is clearly an important medium- and short-term explanatory variable. In some ways, it links long-term changes in the distribution of power with short-term perceptual explanations of the onset of war. Whether further research along these lines can produce anything at the "grand theoretical" level is open to question. What such research can do is induce awareness about the importance of numerous mundane historical influences bearing on power and war—an awareness that, although it makes theorizing more troublesome, should also make it more productive.

[97] *The Struggle for Mastery of Europe* (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), 528.

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Research Note

CONSENSUS LOST?
Domestic Politics and the "Crisis" in NATO

By WILLIAM K. DOMKE, RICHARD C. EICHENBERG, and CATHERINE M. KELLEHER*

THE year 1979 saw both the 30th anniversary of the NATO Alliance and the beginning of a widely perceived crisis in Western security relations. Buffeted by external events and challenged by domestic pressures, NATO was subjected to heated debate and proposals for reform in virtually all aspects of its operation. The decision to deploy modern intermediate nuclear forces (INF) was the cause of the most visible controversy, but it was hardly the only one. The revolution in Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the suppression of the Solidarity movement in Poland, the pipeline controversy—all of these issues produced a level of acrimony that at times surpassed even that of nuclear strategy. Finally, just as the INF debate seemed becalmed by the initiation of arms control negotiations, the announcement of the American strategic defense initiative (SDI) produced yet another problem on which Americans and Europeans were challenged to harmonize their views.

To some observers, this succession of arguments and controversies was both familiar and understandable. Anton DePorte, who in 1979 had described the enduring constraints that had anchored NATO for 30 years, restated his thesis in 1983. The Alliance, he argued, had never seen a perfect community of views. Rather, its members were joined by a common interest in deterring Soviet power in Europe—an interest that did not preclude disagreement on the means to the end or differences on issues that went beyond the core of Alliance concerns in Europe. So long as Alliance members recognized the Soviet threat in Europe and the dearth of feasible alternatives to meet that threat, NATO was likely to endure.[1]

Yet DePorte had also cautioned that this structure of stability might be threatened by *domestic* change: "A new challenge, not yet in focus, is the

* The research reported in this essay was supported by a grant from the Ford Foundation.

[1] Anton DePorte, "NATO of the Future: Less is More," *The Fletcher Forum* 7 (Winter 1983), 1-26, and DePorte, *Europe Between the Superpowers: The Enduring Balance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979).

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prospect that economic difficulties and political realignments within the advanced countries may call into question their internal stability and the relations between them."[2] As the 1980s progressed, it was precisely these economic and political difficulties that became the objects of intense concern. The recession of the early 1980s placed a heavy burden on defense debates because reform of security policy raised the prospect of tradeoffs among "guns, butter, and growth." In the political sphere, the explosion of peace movements and the nervousness of public opinion challenged the consensus on which the Alliance had rested for 30 years. Writing at the height of the INF controversy, Lawrence Freedman argued that "whether a strategic doctrine is acceptable to the people for whom it has been developed is as important in an alliance of democratic societies as that doctrine's ability to impress the enemy."[3]

But if the problem of domestic consensus was generally seen as NATO's major ill, specific diagnoses were more difficult to find. To be sure, domestic constraints—especially public opinion—were much studied, but both the degree of dissensus and its origins remained unclear. Summing up a comprehensive historical review of public opinion in all NATO countries, Flynn and Rattinger concluded in 1985: "In a study like this, one is dealing with hundreds and thousands of tiny pieces of information. . . . The problem for the researcher as well as the political decision maker is to make sense out of such a multitude of individual observations."[4]

The purpose of this essay is to present further data on the degree of domestic cleavage on security issues within NATO countries, and to attempt an explanation of these cleavages. The essay includes a summary of research on public and elite opinion in the United States, Britain, France, West Germany, and the Netherlands. In the first section, we summarize public opinion concerning the NATO Alliance, the military balance, defense spending, nuclear weapons, and—in the case of Europeans—the recent drift of American foreign policy. All of these surveys used large samples designed to ensure the representativeness of the results. In the second section, we report major themes and questions that arose in interviews with approximately 180 European and American "influentials." These conversations were held during 1981 and 1982, the period of most intense controversy within the Alliance. Each followed a standard format. Although we do not claim to have studied a represent-

[2] *Ibid.*, 243.
[3] Freedman, "NATO Myths," *Foreign Policy*, No. 45 (Winter 1982), 48.
[4] Gregory Flynn and Hans Rattinger, eds., *The Public and Atlantic Defense* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985), 381.

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ative sample of elites, we believe we can describe the attitudes, concerns, and predictions of officials and other influentials who were closest to policy debates during a critical period in the Alliance's history. In the third section, we compare elite and public opinions; we conclude that, with the exception of the nuclear issue, the public and its officials are largely in agreement.

I. Consensus Lost? Public Opinion and National Security

As controversy in NATO deepened during the early 1980s, the most frequent concern expressed by scholars and government officials was the apparent rise in European neutralism and American unilateralism.[5] These fears seem to have been unfounded. Table 1 summarizes available surveys on the perceived need for the NATO Alliance or support for continued membership. Public support for the Alliance has been quite high in four of the five countries examined here, and largely stable over time in all countries. Not surprisingly, it is only in France that support for NATO is low. In Britain, West Germany, and the Netherlands, support for NATO has been high and largely unwavering from the mid-1960s through the most recent poll in 1984. In the United States, support for maintaining or increasing the NATO commitment rose from 54 percent in 1974 to 67 percent in 1978 and 1982. Support for the use of American troops to defend Europe also increased from about 50 percent in the early and mid-1970s to 64 percent in 1982.[6]

A surprising feature of the more recent responses to these surveys is that the importance of NATO held constant or *increased* in precisely the two countries where the Alliance has been most controversial: in West Germany, where the INF issue produced profound domestic divisions, and in the United States, where a perceived lack of support from the European allies once again led to discussions of burden-sharing and "go it alone" strategies. This apparent anomaly is probably explained by several factors. The first is the familar "threat-cohesion" response. In the United States, there may be frustration with the apparent uncooperativeness of allies, but there is also a very strong sensitivity to Soviet power, and thus to the utility of the Alliance. In West Germany, attitudes are no doubt also affected by threat perceptions, but there is the additional factor of the lack of alternatives. Most analyses of West German politics emphasize

[5] Walter Laqueur, "Hollanditis: A New Stage of European Neutralism," *Commentary* 72 (August 19, 1981), 19-26.

[6] William Schneider, "Peace and Strength: American Public Opinion on National Security," in Flynn and Rattinger (fn. 4), 339, 356; William Watts and Lloyd Free, "Internationalism Comes of Age . . . Again," *Public Opinion* 3 (March/April 1980), 47.

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that there has been no shortage of debate in the Federal Republic on issues concerning Atlantic security. Nonetheless, as has been true since 1949, West German policy is strongly constrained by suspicions in both East and West that would be strengthened by an overly independent stance in Bonn. Indeed, concern for the future orientation of Germany probably conditions the high level of attachment to NATO in other countries as well. As fears of German neutralism and nationalism sharpened during the INF debate, West Germans moved forcefully to restate the importance of the Atlantic connection and membership in NATO as a stabilizing force in *Western* perceptions.[7]

Just as the total level of support for NATO has been steady over the past few decades, so has the distribution of support among major political parties in all member countries. In the United Kingdom, a 1983 poll showed that Conservative Party voters and supporters of the Liberal/SDP alliance favored NATO membership at the level of 91 percent, while Labour Party members also supported NATO at a high level of 72 percent. The sentiments of the three main Dutch political parties closely resemble those of the British. In 1981, 95 percent of the VVD (Liberal) party voters believed that the Netherlands should remain in NATO, as did 90 percent of CDA (Christian Democratic) voters and 70 percent of PvdA (Labor) supporters. In the Federal Republic, a 1983 poll showed that only Green Party voters were less than enthusiastic about NATO, but even the Greens found the Alliance necessary by an astounding 56 percent. Members of the SPD, CDU/CSU, and FDP supported NATO with 86 percent, 96 percent, and 95 percent, respectively, responding that NATO membership is necessary to German security. Although France has a qualified relationship with the Alliance, only Communist Party voters favored a position of absolute neutrality; members of the other French parties were fragmented among a variety of alternatives to NATO.[8]

Despite frequent mention of European "neutralism," these high levels of support for NATO should not come as a surprise. After all, even the parties that have been most critical of NATO policies, such as INF, continue to assert their strong endorsement of the Alliance itself. Nonetheless, there is a further question to which most scholars and statesmen have turned their attention: a different aspect of the problem lies in the changing values and priorities of the "successor" generation that matured during the era of detente and arms control. Most analyses of generational

[7] The most explicit analysis along these lines is Joseph Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier," *Foreign Policy*, No. 54 (Spring 1984), 64-82.

[8] The figures in the preceding paragraph are taken from Flynn and Rattinger (fn. 4), 61, 167, 94; and from Netherlands Institute for Public Opinion [NIPO], *Bericht* No. 2112 (Amsterdam, April 1981).

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TABLE 1
PUBLIC OPINION AND THE COMMITMENT TO NATO*

	NATO is Essential	*NATO is not Essential*	*Don't Know*
FRANCE			
1967	34%	30%	36%
1969	47	37	16
1971	54	35	11
1973	42	34	25
1976	42	35	23
1977	44	29	27
1978	39	35	26
1980	44	34	23
GREAT BRITAIN			
1967	59	15	26
1969	68	15	17
1971	81	12	7
1976	69	15	16
1977	73	8	19
1978	70	10	20
1980	79	13	8
1981	70	15	15
1984	76	12	12
1985	76	13	11
WEST GERMANY			
1967	67	17	16
1969	76	13	11
1971	84	11	5
1973	73	13	14
1976	85	10	5
1977	79	7	14
1978	84	5	11
1980	88	8	4
1981	62	20	19
1984	87	10	3
NETHERLANDS			
1981	62	27	11
1984	58	20	22

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TABLE 1 (continued)

	Remain in NATO	*Withdraw*	*Don't Know*
NETHERLANDS			
1969	65%	13%	22%
1971	71	12	17
1972	65	16	19
1974	76	9	15
1979	76	12	12
1980	76	14	10
1981	78	14	8

	Increase or Keep Commitment	*Decrease or End Commitment*	*Don't Know*
UNITED STATES			
1974	54	20	26
1978	67	13	20
1982	67	15	18

* In Europe, the question asked is whether "NATO is still essential for our country's security." In the United States, the question is whether the commitment of U.S. troops to NATO should be increased, maintained, decreased or ended.

Sources: For "NATO Essential," Kenneth Adler and Douglas Wertman, "West European Security Concerns for the 1980s: Is NATO in Trouble?" Paper prepared for delivery to the Annual Meeting of the American Association of Public Opinion Research, Buck Hill Falls, PA, May, 1981; United States Information Agency (USIA), "NATO and Burden Sharing," (Washington, DC: Research Memorandum R-11-1984), Table 1. For the United States, Schneider (fn. 6). For the Netherlands, Netherlands Institute of Public Opinion (NIPO), Reports 1648, A-407/42, 2023, and 2112.

change have focused on the young age cohorts with a university education, for it is this generation that experienced the affluence and the secure international environment that are considered the sources of change in values and policy views.[9] Table 2 compares opinions of NATO held by this group to the views of the older generation. Allowing for sampling variation in these small subsamples, differences between the views of these two groups must be considered minor.[10] In West Germany, differences on alliance alternatives are very small between the age groups; in

[9] See Ronald Ingelhart, *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Postwar Europeans* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), and Stephen Szabo, ed., *The Successor Generation* (London: Butterworth's, 1983).

[10] In subsamples of this size, differences of about 15 percentage points are statistically significant.

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TABLE 2
NATO AND ALLIANCE ALTERNATIVES:
VIEWS OF HIGHER-EDUCATED EUROPEANS*

	Higher-Educated Only		*Total Population*
	Under 35	*Over 35*	
FRANCE			
No Alliance	6%	6%	12%
European Alliance	14	20	14
European/U.S.A.	22	24	24
NATO as is	20	17	15
	N = 131	56	995
GREAT BRITAIN			
No Alliance	5%	5%	10%
European Alliance	6	0	5
European/U.S.A.	25	33	27
NATO as is	50	52	48
	N = 81	42	1058
WEST GERMANY			
No Alliance	1%	2%	3%
European Alliance	1	3	4
European/U.S.A.	21	15	20
NATO as is	58	67	64
	N = 71	126	1008
NETHERLANDS			
No Alliance	4%	2%	4%
European Alliance	9	6	7
European/U.S.A.	17	18	18
NATO as is	44	63	53
	N = 250	148	1085

* Full wording of alternatives is as follows: *No alliance*: "without belonging to any military alliance"; *European Alliance*: "an independent West European defense force ... but not allied to the U.S."; *European/U.S.A.*: "establish a unified West European defense force ... allied to the U.S."; *NATO as is*: "continue in NATO ...". Other alternatives (not shown): "accommodate Soviets"; Gaullist NATO model. Higher education is defined as 19 years or older on completion of education. Unless otherwise shown, percentages in this and following tables are based on those expressing an opinion (i.e., excluding don't-knows and non-responses).

Source: Commission of the European Communities, *Euro-barometer 14: October 1980*, (Ann Arbor: ICPSR Study Number 7958).

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any case, well over 70 percent choose one of two options that involve alliance with the United States (majorities of both groups support NATO as is). In Britain, the figures are similar, but the "European option" is more popular than in West Germany. The Dutch figures do show some of the successor-generation effect (the young are less enthusiastic about NATO); but, once again, majorities of both age groups support either NATO as it now stands or a European command allied to the United States. In France, there is neither support for NATO nor consensus on any alternative—a result that seems unsurprising and uncontroversial in light of official French policy. Generational differences are also minor in France.

With regard to membership in the Atlantic Alliance, then, support is high, stable over time, and widespread among party, age, and educational groups. Thus, these polls strongly contradict other surveys that find an apparent affinity for neutralism in many European countries.[11] We believe the polls reviewed here to be more reflective of the options facing citizens in NATO countries because they offer a choice between NATO as currently constituted and a number of real alternatives. Public opinion chooses NATO. Surveys revealing the hypothetical attractiveness of neutralism may reflect the wish, but they do not consider the constraints. Although the figures for the other countries do not match the near-unanimous West German attachment to the Alliance, they do suggest the continuing relevance of interpretations that find the endurance of the Alliance to be rooted in the unpopularity of the alternatives.[12]

Nonetheless, there is the further question of whether this commitment is merely symbolic, or perhaps even reflective of the "free-riding" logic so often discussed in relation to NATO. After all, a continuing commitment to NATO does not preclude disagreement or nonperformance in any number of policy areas. Indeed, commitment to membership might be seen as the minimum condition of free-riding.

To some extent, the answer to this question depends on one's expectations. For alliance minimalists (such as DePorte), it is sufficient to continue membership, with all its implications for commitment of troops and equipment, since those are the components of the Alliance's central purpose of deterring Soviet influence in Europe. The polls are telling on this point, both because the question on commitment to membership is continually posed (frequently under the sponsorship of the U.S. government) and because support for membership reaches levels rarely seen in public opinion surveys on any political issue. Nor can the issue be viewed as en-

[11] See, for example, the two polls reported in *Public Opinion* 6 (February/March 1983), 6.
[12] The most emphatic statement of this interpretation is DePorte (fn. 1, 1979).

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tirely symbolic, because European governments often justify their policies domestically with the need to maintain NATO commitments. The need for NATO is neither self-evident nor cost-free in European eyes, a fact that further underscores the depth of the commitment revealed in the surveys.

Moreover, this commitment underwent a severe test during the early 1980s. Faith in the senior Alliance partner very nearly collapsed during the tense years of 1981 and 1982. The INF issue defined the cost of Alliance membership quite clearly and explicitly. Throughout the debate, the issue of "independence versus alliance" lurked in the background—as in British debates on ultimate control of INF and in German ones on national unity and *Ostpolitik*. Commitment to membership in the Alliance may well be a minimum condition, but that commitment underwent a severe test during the 1980s, and support for NATO emerged higher than ever.

Other areas of public opinion are not marked by similar uniformity. Table 3 sets out assessments of the East-West military balance among younger and older respondents with higher education. The survey shows a different profile in each country. In France, there is stark evidence of a successor generation that sees things quite differently from its elders: 60 percent of young, educated respondents see the West as more powerful—exactly the reverse of the older generation. In Britain, both age groups have a lower opinion of Western military power, but it is the *older* generation rather than the successor generation that is relatively more optimistic. West Germany provides a final variant: there is no difference to speak of between age groups in the Federal Republic. In summary, public opinions on the East-West military balance are much more complex than those on the Alliance itself. There is considerable variation among countries, and each shows a somewhat different pattern of generational cleavage.

Public opinion on military spending produces yet further complications. Table 4 shows opinions on "defense spending in support of NATO." In France and West Germany, both the younger *and* older generations of the more highly educated show disproportionate hostility to defense spending (i.e., greater desire to cut spending than their less educated cohorts); in Britain, only the *older* generation does so.[13] In the Netherlands, the successor generation displays the expected pattern.

A more detailed presentation of these data would involve long and

[13] As noted in fn. 10, caution is warranted when comparing very small subsamples. These differences, averaging about 10%, are not statistically significant. Nonetheless, the pattern shows up in other surveys as well, and the left-right distribution noted below is consistent.

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TABLE 3
THE EAST-WEST MILITARY BALANCE:
VIEWS OF HIGHER-EDUCATED EUROPEANS*

	Higher-Educated Only		*Total Population*
	Under 35	*Over 35*	
FRANCE			
West More Powerful	60%	39%	50%
East More Powerful	40	61	50
Equal	N/A	N/A	N/A
N =	92	62	617
GREAT BRITAIN			
West More Powerful	19%	35%	31%
East More Powerful	72	53	57
Equal	10	12	12
N =	74	49	850
WEST GERMANY			
West More Powerful	43%	41%	45%
East More Powerful	57	59	55
Equal	N/A	N/A	N/A
N =	35	32	802

* "Which do you think is more powerful at the present time—the West, that is the NATO countries, or the East—that is the Warsaw Pact countries?" "Both equal" is volunteered by respondents (allowed in Britain only). The survey was not conducted in the Netherlands.

Source: USIA, *1980 Multiregional Security Survey* (U.S. National Archives and Record Service, Machine-Readable Study Number I8007/RG306).

complicated tables of survey figures, but we can summarize additional findings here. Examination of several surveys over the period 1979-1983 produces further evidence that, in Britain and West Germany, the educated of both generations are on occasion more skeptical of NATO policies than is the population at large.[14] On closer analysis, it turns out that most of these skeptics are members of parties of the center-left (Socialist, Labour, Social Democrat). The educated of the center-right do not show the same pattern. In the young, this is uncontroversial, for most theories of generational change would predict a concentration of young, educated

[14] This pattern is less true of France and the Netherlands, where there is good evidence of largely partisan cleavages complicated by a very skeptical successor generation.

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TABLE 4
OPINIONS ON DEFENSE SPENDING IN SUPPORT OF NATO BY AGE AND LEVEL OF EDUCATION*

	Under 35		*Over 35*	
	Lower Education	*Higher Education*	*Lower Education*	*Higher Education*
FRANCE				
Decrease	46%	58%	34%	53%
Keep Same	49	35	63	38
Increase	4	7	3	10
N =	109	116	247	41
GREAT BRITAIN				
Decrease	17%	20%	16%	26%
Keep Same	53	48	51	44
Increase	30	32	34	29
N =	275	79	474	41
WEST GERMANY				
Decrease	18%	29%	19%	27%
Keep Same	56	46	60	51
Increase	27	25	21	23
N =	246	68	417	131
NETHERLANDS				
Decrease	38%	43%	30%	20%
Keep Same	55	49	56	62
Increase	7	8	14	18
N =	211	231	381	142

* Higher education is defined as 19 years or older on completion of full-time education.
Source: See Table 2.

people in parties of the left. But the data also suggest that at some times and in response to some survey questions, older members of center-left parties have opinions that resemble those of younger party members. In summary, on some issues of perception and policy, there is evidence that an important line of division in public opinion is the traditional one of left and right rather than the much-discussed polarization of young and old.

We do not find this surprising. Domestic politics over 30 years of

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NATO's existence experienced a periodic recurrence of party conflict on such issues as relations with the Soviets, defense spending, and nuclear weapons. To be sure, those debates have at times been muted. But the basic orientations apparently remained, to be sensitized once again when difficult choices reached NATO's agenda. After all, the younger generation was socialized during the time of detente, but their elders grew to maturity during a period of intense controversy on security issues—controversies in which political parties played a prominent role.

This interpretation seems particulary applicable to opinions on defense spending, the issue that produces the deepest and, crossnationally, the most uniform pattern of polarization of any we encountered in our research (see Table 5). When defense spending is considered in the context of recent budgetary politics, the salience of party attachments is revealing. The most recent recession saw a reorientation, if not a drastic overhaul, in the budgetary policy of each country under study here. In the recession of 1981–1982, all Western governments reversed the countercyclical spending pattern that had characterized their responses to the recession of 1974-1975. For example, in the United States, social security spending grew by 12.4 percent during the recession of 1974-1975, but by only 7.3 percent during 1979-1981. The slowdown was noticeable in other countries as well (France: 10.3 percent and 5.6 percent; Britain: 5.6 percent and 4.1 percent; Germany: 10.9 percent and 3.1 percent; Netherlands: 8.7 percent and 2.7 percent). Moreover, the growth rate of spending in the most recent recession was generally lower than it had been even in nonrecessionary years of the 1970s.[15] Whereas in the past there was generally growth in both defense and civilian spending as well as an acceleration of spending at times of recession, in the early 1980s civil spending was curtailed just when demands for increases in defense spending were heard.

Perhaps this situation explains a somewhat unexpected feature of trends in public opinions on defense spending: despite detente and the economic shocks of the 1970s, public opposition to defense spending was actually lower in 1979 in every country examined here than it had been a decade (or more) earlier.[16] It was only in 1981 that sentiment to cut defense spending began to rise. In some countries, such as the United States and Great Britain, public support for defense spending had by 1985 col-

[15] Figures are calculated using data and GDP deflator from Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, *National Account Statistics of OECD Member Countries*, Vol. II, *Detailed Tables* (Paris: OECD, 1983), Table 9.

[16] This summary is based on the following surveys and sources: U.S.A.: Gallup, 1971-1985; Great Britain: Gallup, 1961-1985; France: United States Information Agency [USIA] 1968-1982; West Germany: Federal Ministry of Defense, 1968-1984; Netherlands: NIPO and USIA, 1970-1984.

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TABLE 5
PUBLIC VIEWS OF DEFENSE SPENDING AMONG MEMBERS OF MAJOR PARTIES*

	Decrease	*Keep Same*	*Increase*	*N*[a]
FRANCE				
Communists	71%	24%	4%	51
Ecologists	63	32	6	50
Socialists	48	49	2	135
UDF (Giscard)	20	75	4	51
RPR (Gaullist)	16	76	8	39
Total Population	43%	52%	5%	416
GREAT BRITAIN				
Labour	25%	53%	22%	292
Liberal	18	59	22	109
Conservative	8	50	43	313
Total Population	18%	51%	31%	775
WEST GERMANY				
Greens	69%	28%	3%	32
Social Democrats	19	62	19	362
Free Democrats	25	60	16	94
CDU/CSU (Union)	15	49	36	278
Total Population	21%	56%	24%	792
NETHERLANDS				
Labor (PvdA)	47%	49%	5%	228
D '66	36	56	8	151
CDA (Alliance)	13	75	12	235
VVD (Liberals)	11	61	29	115
Total Population	33%	56%	11%	862
UNITED STATES				*Don't Know*
Democrats	17%	26%	45%	12%
Republicans	7	23	60	10
Independents	12	23	52	13
Total Population	14%	24%	49%	13%

* In Europe, question inquired about "defense spending in support of NATO." In the United States, question asked if "defense spending is too much, too little, or just about the right amount." U.S. percentages include "don't knows" and nonresponses, as shown.

[a] For Europeans, percentages for total population include partisans of other parties not shown here.

Sources: For European countries, *Eurobarometer 14* (Table 2); for the United States, *Gallup Opinion Index*, No. 175 (February, 1980), 10.

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lapsed to levels approaching postwar lows; in other countries, there was either a modest increase in sentiment to cut spending or a modest increase in the percentage of the public who wanted defense spending kept at stable levels. Because the 1970s were a time of growth in both guns *and* butter, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the recent deterioration in support for defense spending is the result of the shift to budget austerity rather than the result of a more general "antidefense" rebellion. Nor is it surprising that citizens would rally to the familiar partisan positions that have long structured distributive debates.

Polarization in budgetary politics occurred simultaneously with one of the most intense controversies in NATO's history: the decision in December 1979 to deploy modern intermediate range nuclear weapons. Public opinion on nuclear weapons and INF has become something of a controversy itself, as the variety of questions put to the public have produced a (predictable) variety of opinion profiles in response. Nonetheless, a comprehensive review of public opinion on nuclear weapons issues across a number of different wordings yields important insights into the public's concerns.

There are several noticeable patterns. The first is somewhat surprising in view of the visibility of protest in Europe: people in general accept the concept of nuclear deterrence. This may not be new as far as the French and the British are concerned, but even the Dutch believed (by a majority in 1982) that nuclear weapons had helped to preserve peace and that NATO would have to depend on them in the future for deterrence purposes. A second pattern is also clear, however: in *all* European countries, the percentage who support first-use of nuclear weapons is very small; substantial minorities (in some cases majorities) favor using nuclear weapons only if the Soviets use them first. There is also strong support for the argument that nuclear weapons should *never* be used. Thus, although European publics support deterrence, they are decidedly hostile to the use of nuclear weapons—a sentiment they share with the American public.[17]

Opinions on the INF deployment are somewhat more complex. Across a wide range of surveys on the issue, it is clear that the best characterization is also the most ambivalent: it is about evenly divided in all countries, with somewhat stronger (British) or weaker (Dutch, West German) levels on some questions. But it is also clear that opinions on INF were heavily colored by the way the questions are worded. For example, when

[17] Lisa Belsky and John Doble, *Voter Options and Nuclear Weapons: A Briefing Book for the 1984 Elections* (New York: Public Agenda Foundation, 1984). European figures are from Richard C. Eichenberg, "The Myth of Hollanditis," *International Security* 8 (Fall 1983), 151, 155.

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NATO commitments are mentioned, support increases. Two additional factors are summarized in Table 6. The figures set out in the Table show responses to two separate questions, one mentioning "Soviet warheads" and the other mentioning arms control negotiations. Both wordings reduce opposition to INF; it is 30 percent to 50 percent in these polls, as compared to the 50 percent to 70 percent found in other published polls. Moreover, mention of arms control seems to elicit an even stronger response than does mention of Soviet arms. Generally, fewer respondents opposed INF when arms control was mentioned than opposed it in the "Soviet warhead" version of the question; this pattern became more obvious during 1982 as the INF negotiations got underway.

According to the extensive survey done by Yankelovich and his associates, the same set of considerations is present in American opinion surveys.[18] Moreover, there is evidence from Europe that attitudes toward INF (and perhaps toward nuclear weapons more broadly) were influenced far more by the general deterioration of the East-West climate than by any evaluation of particular weapon systems. European fears of war rose dramatically after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the reversal in U.S. approaches to the Soviet Union. Moreover, at least some of the blame for the crisis in East-West relations was laid at the American doorstep. In U.S. government polls conducted in Europe, the decline in the image of the United States during this period is one of the most striking findings of the postwar period. In Britain, it dropped from 63 percent favorable in 1978 to 2 percent favorable in 1982. The figures for other European countries are similar, if less dramatic (in France, from 49% to 23%; in Germany, from 81% to 49%).[19]

Writing in 1984, Joseph Joffe indicated the connection between views of INF and nervousness about American policy:

> The peace movement of the early 1980s could not have flourished without the denigration of arms control and detente which accompanied the frightening surge in the quantity and the quality of nuclear weapons. Conversely, would the movement have receded as quickly without the calming moderation in the West's tone and language?[20]

Nor is this generalization confined to the period of the Reagan administration. Although President Reagan certainly intensified European fears about the lapsing of detente and the lack of progress in arms control,

[18] Belsky and Doble (fn. 17).

[19] Leo P. Crespi, *Long-term Trends in Some General Orientations Toward the US and the USSR in West European Public Opinion* (Washington, DC: Office of Research, United States Information Agency, Report R-12-1983), Table 1.

[20] "The Eclipse of the Peace Movement," *The New Republic*, June 11, 1984, pp. 21-23.

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TABLE 6
OPPOSITION TO INF DEPLOYMENT:
TWO SURVEY QUESTIONS*

	Oppose INF When Soviet Warheads Mentioned	*Oppose INF When Arms Negotiations Mentioned*
GREAT BRITAIN		
July 1981	29%	22%
October 1981	35	32
April 1982	37	28
FRANCE		
July 1981	32	29
October 1981	36	33
April 1982	40	33
WEST GERMANY		
July 1981	29	26
October 1981	33	32
April 1982	39	29
NETHERLANDS		
July 1981	51	38
October 1981	56	47
April 1982	n.a.	n.a.

* The figures represent responses to two separate questions. The first contains a preface referring to "450 Russian nuclear warheads"; the second does not contain this warhead reference, but it does offer the choice between opposition to INF and a number of "deploy/negotiate" options.

Source: USIA, *West European Opinion on Key Security Issues* (Washington, DC: Office of Research, Report R-10-1982), Tables 42 and 43.

those fears were already apparent in early 1980 when the Carter administration hardened its approach to the Soviets. Even before Reagan's election, leaders on the continent were expressing concerns about the ratification of SALT II and the prospects for negotiation on INF. Those concerns later became very intense and were not confined to the INF issue.

THE VIEW FROM THE CENTER

The lack of public consensus became a preoccupation of policy makers as polls and protests revealed the depth of domestic division during 1981

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and 1982. Yet, after conducting several comparative surveys and commissioning studies of opinion in all NATO countries, Flynn and Rattinger reached a different conclusion in 1985:

> Restrictions on the range of national security options open to decision makers are far more strongly imposed by the positions taken and articulated by political and social elites and counterelites than by public opinion at large. In terms of popular acceptance, the decision latitude of policy makers still appears to be rather wide.[21]

If this conclusion is correct, the views of political elites are far more important to the Alliance than an undivided focus on the public would suggest.

As noted above, we interviewed approximately 180 members of American and European elites during the fall of 1981 and the early winter of 1982. The clearest theme that emerged in all five countries was the belief that the West in general, and certain nations in particular, faced a period of profound crisis in national security. The causes were spread over a wide range, and prognoses for the immediate future revealed some divergent expectations. But a belief in the existence and the severity of the present crisis was stated clearly in all but a handful of interviews.

In Europe, one reason for this pervasive mood of pessimism was the concern and uncertainty about the direction and consistency of U.S. foreign policy. A uniform source of this concern was the change in direction that had begun with Jimmy Carter and was intensified with the accession of Ronald Reagan and his administration. For Europeans, the new men in Washington represented the end of detente and the shift to a more aggressive approach toward the Soviets, coupled with a cautious, calculating approach to arms control. The new administration endeavored to place emphasis on autonomous American efforts and to restore both the military capability and economic health that would be needed for a variety of (expanding) commitments.

While Europeans hardly endorsed the more militant thrust, an even more troubling feature of the change in American foreign policy was the fact that it represented yet another in a series of shifts and rhetorical campaigns designed to please domestic constituencies. A number of British, German, and Dutch respondents commented on the inconsistency and unpredictability introduced into the Alliance by American *domestic* politics. The possibility of neo-Mansfieldism, of a precipitous withdrawal of American forces to placate an isolationist Congress, was widely acknowledged and even accepted by some as quite probable before the end of the

[21] Flynn and Rattinger (fn. 4), 384.

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1980s. Most often cited were the frequent shifts in nuclear weapons policy. Further shifts were not unexpected: was it not possible that the experience of the neutron bomb would be repeated in the case of INF?

The prevailing image (among some American critics of the Reagan administration as well) was one of a U.S. policy process that was overly flexible and crowded by insistent demands that might be superseded by yet more insistent demands at any point. It was impossible to know when the pendulum would swing again, in disregard of promises made to allies or concessions extracted from them. There were doubts that any American administration could rise above the easy political game of denigrating European contributions to NATO, especially as budgetary difficulties and the costs of competing missions continued to mount.

A second theme that emerged from the interviews is therefore all the more surprising: there was little doubt in our respondents' minds that the Atlantic Alliance *should* and *would* remain the institutional framework of Western security. The present crisis in the Alliance was solvable; specific disagreements—especially across the Atlantic—would have to be overcome. For both the United States and its European allies, the costs of not doing so were too heavy to bear, at present or in the foreseeable future. Without NATO, neither deterrence nor political balance could be maintained. Simply put, there was no alternative to NATO.

A third major theme was the emphasis on the economic components of security, a subject that was repeatedly accorded as much importance as any specific set of security problems. British and German respondents, especially, saw economic vitality as a requirement both for national political unity and for the political capacity to resist external influence. Without a healthy economy, there would be no real security and no citizenry able or willing to defend the society. The postwar democratic restoration of Europe had been built on the state's assumption of social and economic responsibility. To fail to meet these obligations or to sacrifice them to meet short-term military needs was to put at risk one of the cornerstones of postwar Western political systems. Finally, a healthy domestic economy assured external security through a variety of instruments other than the use of force. Trade and the securing of resources through economic links and technology transfer were of increasing significance. Especially Dutch and West German respondents considered these more helpful in some circumstances than the actual use of military force or the maintenance of military equilibrium in all categories of weapons. They, as well as many of the British, expected the predictable challenges to the West to come in the Third World rather than in Europe, and here the ability to persuade and to offer economic incentives would be indispensable.

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This latter point reflected our respondents' view that the crisis in the Alliance was aggravated not just by declining revenues or the need to adjust to structural unemployment. Of at least equal significance was the continuing failure of the United States and Europe to coordinate fiscal and monetary policy. The task of the 1980s was seen as one of developing new, more meaningful definitions of burdens that reflected fiscal and monetary frictions and of achieving more congruence between these burdens and the domestic economic and social orders. The emerging problem of American budget deficits and the flight of European capital to the United States was, of course, a frequent object of these remarks.

The fourth major theme we encountered in our interviews was the growing polarization of domestic political debates—not surprising in light of the fact that the interviews took place during the height of protest against the INF deployment. In each country, there was a perception of distance and even estrangement from important domestic constituencies. Americans were less concerned—a reflection of the timing of our interviews, which were held before the full development of the freeze movement. But Europeans believed that the defense debate had been permanently expanded to include new participants with "alien" understandings of the postwar international order and of the nature of nuclear deterrence.

Many respondents found the principal cause of estrangement to lie in the successor generation. Younger people did not have the memories that had preoccupied their elders, from the "lessons" of the interwar period to the successive crises of the 1940s and 1950s. For the younger generation, detente was the normal state of affairs, and any action (Soviet *or* American) that threatened the status quo was open to challenge. The most frequently proposed remedy to domestic polarization was a more energetic campaign of public education on nuclear strategy. But there was also a mood of reexamination on such issues as the need for greater conventional defense. The French, of course, took strenuous exception to such ideas. In the United States, the prescription was for stronger and more effective political leadership, or for patience until the younger generation matured and entered mainstream politics.

Despite these views, all Europeans—including the Dutch and West Germans—expressed a fundamental trust in the operation of nuclear deterrence. The prospect of any war in Europe was unacceptable at a very basic emotional level. Military forces were considered to exist to *prevent* war, and any attention to war-fighting strategies—conventional or nuclear—was deemed counterproductive and potentially self-fulfilling. There was also a fear that any outright rejection of nuclear weapons

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would increase the chance of decoupling. Our interviews suggest that, as has been the case almost since the birth of the Alliance, European elites see nuclear weapons as the lesser of many evils they could face.

III. Who Is Leading Whom?

We noted previously that recent studies of public opinion have concluded that government decision makers enjoy wide latitude in security policy making. Such a conclusion can be based on at least two sets of circumstances: First, the public shares the assumptions and policy views that guide governmental decisions; second, it may be that the public has developed its opinions in *reaction* to the arguments of government officials and other elites.

The latter view has in fact dominated scholarship on public opinion and foreign policy. For example, in his famous study of American public opinion during the wars in Korea and Vietnam, John Mueller characterized most citizens as "followers" who based their opinions of the wars either on the President's lead or their own partisan leanings:

> . . . many people use their party identification as a shortcut method for arriving at a position on an issue. Rather than sort through the intricacies of argument on an issue, they prefer to take as cues the words or actions of the leadership of the party.[22]

The interaction between the views of European elites, parties, and public opinion has recently been documented by Russell Dalton in an innovative study of citizens' views and the views of candidates for the European Parliament. Dalton shows that there is indeed a strong correspondence between the issue opinions and ideological views of citizens and party elites. In fact, the correspondence is *highest* on the issue of defense spending. Although he does not directly ascertain who is leading whom, Dalton concludes that political parties serve as an important linkage between citizens and leaders, the correspondence of opinions being closest within parties with a centralized party structure. Such characteristics as national-level control of candidate selection apparently clarify party positions: "The political awareness and interest of most voters is limited; characteristics that help clarify party positions make it easier for voters to select a party consistent with their issue beliefs."[23]

The prominence of partisan polarization in our research on public opinion lends support to the interpretation of citizens as "cue takers."

[22] Mueller, *War, Presidents and Public Opinion* (New York: John Wiley, 1973), 69, 116.

[23] Dalton, "Political Parties and Political Representation: Party Supporters and Party Elites in Nine Nations," *Comparative Political Studies* 18 (October 1985), 294.

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Lacking interest in or detailed knowledge of security issues, citizens look either to traditional party approaches or to contemporary debates as they form their opinions. More directly, our interviews with government officials yielded the observation that the "consensus of silence" that had earlier characterized the politics of European security had broken down as the parties once again began to diverge in their approach to choices on NATO's agenda. Finally, even a cursory review of the recent past shows that governments and other elites provided ample "cues" in the debates that have bedeviled the Alliance. As early as 1980, for example, Giscard D'Estaing and Helmut Schmidt hastened to brake the deterioration of East-West relations and to preserve arms control negotiations that were then threatened by Soviet actions and the American response. Their attitude could hardly be lost on the public.

Our research shows that on most security issues there is a close correspondence between public and official views. Despite almost constant irritations over the last several years, both the public and elites see the NATO Alliance as the preferred framework of their security efforts. On the issue of defense spending, both the public and elites emphasize economic factors and the welfare consensus rather than "defense" narrowly defined. And even before the security debates of the early 1980s, Helmut Schmidt provided an arresting example of this priority. In 1977, in the same speech in which he called attention to growing imbalances in intermediate nuclear forces, Schmidt also articulated a view of economic problems that nicely summarizes the public and elite opinions discussed above:

> The answer to our problems cannot lie in dismantling our social achievements, in rolling back social progress. The stability of liberal democracy depends on the extent to which we can secure greater social justice. If the Federal Republic is today enjoying considerable stability, it is because she has made social justice a broad reality.[24]

The convergence of public and official views is dramatic in the case of opinions about the United States. In opinion surveys, the declining image of the United States is one of the more striking features of recent polls. At the elite level, doubts and dissatisfactions with American policy and with the policy process are profound. While it is difficult to tell who is leading whom in these evaluations of American politics and policies, one would not have to search long to find official expressions of doubt—and

[24] Schmidt, "The Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture," reprinted in *Survival* 20 (January-February 1978), 2-10.

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pique—about the consistency and direction of U.S. foreign and security policy.

Although European elites and publics converge on many issues, there is one subject on which they differ somewhat. Our interviews show that European elites, in spite of their doubts about American security policy in general and nuclear policy in particular, still think that nuclear weapons have a role in European security. For all of the familiar reasons (the unattractiveness of conventional options, the decoupling of the United States) these officials felt—despite intense pressure to change their views—that nuclear deterrence must remain a cornerstone of European security.

Our research does not necessarily indicate that public opinion disagrees with these views. Indeed, on such general questions as the need for deterrence and the need to counter Soviet power, European public opinion is actually in tune with official views. Further, it is clear that the public's desire to preserve the arms-control process is hardly out of step with governmental preferences. Rather, the distance between the public and its officials lies in the public's greater ambivalence about the ultimate role of nuclear weapons. We have seen that, when surveys turn to the issue of using nuclear weapons, the public (of all ages) becomes decidedly hostile. Elites, too, object to talk about the *use* of nuclear weapons, but they accept the ultimate threat to use nuclear weapons that underlies NATO's deterrence strategy. It is the attempt to explain this paradox that leads inevitably to the possibility rejected by the public. For elites, the uncertainty of nuclear deterrence is precisely what makes it effective. For the public, it is precisely what makes it unpalatable.

Thus, although the difference may be one of emphasis, the issue of nuclear weapons in Europe is the single example of a divergence between official views and the consensus of public opinion. It is therefore understandable that European governments lobbied so strenuously for the resumption of arms-control talks and for the cessation of talk about the possible use of nuclear weapons. The relative calm of the recent past suggests that these actions were sufficient to quiet, if not to remove, the doubts of the public.

Ironically, that quiet may be shortlived. One recurring theme in our European interviews was the near-fatalistic acceptance of shifts and changes in American policy. Indeed, many of our respondents predicted yet further shifts to come from Washington. That prophecy was of course fulfilled in March 1983, when President Reagan announced his plans for the SDI. From what has been said here, the European reaction was pre-

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dictable. Speaking in confidence to a team of congressional staffers studying reactions to SDI, European officials complained of the suddenness of the announcement and the lack of consultation:

> Virtually every official of an allied government ... complained that the Reagan administration had failed to consult his government. ... [A French official said] "when it's a question of our strategic defense and our future survival, we have to hear it on television like everyone else."[25]

Aside from the fact that SDI came as a surprise, European officials were uncomfortable with its implications for deterrence and for the problem it created with the public: "West European leaders have spent three decades persuading their people that deterrence is the cornerstone of NATO defense policy. Suddenly, ... officials of the Reagan administration announced that nuclear weapons are 'immoral.' "[26]

IV. Conclusions and Implications

We began by inquiring into the *level* and *origins* of domestic consensus and cleavage in NATO. Our research suggests several answers to these questions, each of which has implications for the future of the Alliance and for the relative ease or difficulty of harmonizing policy within it.

Concerning the *degree* of domestic consensus, we must distinguish the level of agreement between governmental elites and public opinion and the level of agreement *within* the public. Concerning the elite-public consensus, there is much evidence to suggest that it is strong. Despite the many controversies that have plagued the Alliance and its governments, and despite suggestions that domestic audiences were turning to neutralist or pacifist solutions, we found that on almost every issue public opinion is largely in tune with the views of governmental elites. A division between public and elite perceptions occurs only on the nuclear issue. Thus, it seems fair to say that popular depictions of governments held hostage to a recalcitrant public opinion are exaggerated.

That is not to say that there are no domestic divisions. European polities are divided primarily by partisan cleavages, and in some cases complicated by generational cleavages. We have argued that the prominence of partisan divisions is neither new nor particularly surprising in view of the European historical tradition of ideological differences on security policy. Although we do not assert that these conflicts are historically

[25] Paul E. Gallis and others, *The Strategic Defense Initiative and United States Alliance Strategy* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 1, 1985), 27.
[26] *Ibid.*, 40.

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novel, it seems clear that simplistic conceptions (neutralism, pacifism) as well as single-factor theories (generational change) are inadequate to explain the pattern of domestic cleavage on security issues.

It is the very complexity and diversity of these divisions that complicates policy harmonization within the Alliance, for opinion profiles vary in several ways. First, opinions are not uniform across countries. In some there are deep divisions on security issues while in others these are less severe. Second, the *nature* of opinion cleavages varies; in all the countries, there is evidence of partisan cleavage, but in some it is complicated by generational differences.

The implication of this diversity seems clear. To the extent that NATO governments must depend on domestic consensus to implement policies, the pace of harmonization and even the ability to harmonize will be complicated by the diversity of opinions within member states. Further complications will arise because of differences in the political institutions and domestic conditions that mediate domestic opinion. For example, although it is clear that there is a general consensus against increasing defense budgets at the cost of social programs, the impact of this constraint in different countries will depend on rates of economic growth. Further, the abilty to manage budgetary tradeoffs depends to some extent on the particular structure of the welfare state in each member country; in West Germany, for example, close to 40 percent of governmental revenues are tied to social security through payroll taxes, while in Britain the figure is only 15 percent.[27]

Although our research suggests that the simple model of governments held hostage is inaccurate, on the nuclear issue there is some evidence that public opinion is estranged from official views. Officials are willing to live with the ultimate threat of using nuclear weapons as the cornerstone of deterrence policy, but public opinion is negative about precisely this aspect of the Alliance's doctrine. To be sure, this might be seen as a rather narrow disagreement. Governments as well as the public reject gratuitous talk of using nuclear weapons, and European governments are just as committed to arms control as are their domestic constituencies. Nonetheless, it is difficult to discuss NATO strategy without discussing the ultimate role of nuclear weapons, and on this point, the potential clearly exists for a negative public reaction, and thus for renewed unrest in Alliance planning.

This set of circumstances explains the widespread interest in alternatives to nuclear deterrence, now summarized under such phrases—and

[27] Percentages calculated from OECD figures (fn. 15), Table 9.

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even acronyms—as the conventional defense initiative (CDI). Although cost estimates vary, a major effort at lowering the nuclear threshold clearly raises the prospect of budgetary tradeoffs; and, as we have seen, under present circumstances there is neither public nor official sentiment for major increases in defense spending *if these increases come at the expense of social programs*. For European governments, the most hopeful prospect would be the avoidance of tradeoffs through economic growth sufficient to allow modest increases in conventional defense spending without threatening other budgetary priorities. Although such an outcome would be modest, on past patterns it clearly falls within the realm of the possible. During the 1970s, most European governments increased defense spending in real terms without incurring the wrath—or even the notice—of the public.

Nonetheless, modest improvements in conventional armaments seem unlikely to remove dependence on nuclear weapons completely. Moreover, although European officials now talk routinely of the need to lower the nuclear threshold, the depth of their attachment to some nuclear deterrence should not be underestimated. Thus, both budgetary conditions and doctrinal tradition suggest a continuing role for nuclear weapons in Alliance strategy.

The final question is therefore whether nuclear deterrence, so long a thorn in NATO's existence, has finally been caught in the contradictory web of domestic constraint and strategic rationale. Our research shows that the answer depends on two critical issues. The first is the future of arms control. Clearly, arms control has served the important function of reassuring the public that the dangers of nuclear weapons were at least being addressed politically. Once the INF negotiations were underway, opinion polls registered a decline in concern, and deployment has proceeded calmly under (re-elected) governments in every host state. Since 1983, domestic audiences have remained very quiet despite the fact that little progress has been seen in the negotiations.

If this pattern is any guide, the single most important development of the recent past may be the decision of the Reagan administration to forgo compliance with SALT II and to call into question the permanence of the ABM Treaty. Should this deterioration in arms control be accompanied by an increase in international tensions, European publics *and* their governments are likely to be joined in another round of bickering with their American ally.

The second critical issue is the future of SDI and the commitment of the U.S. government to nuclear deterrence in Europe. As we have noted, the traditional European attachment to nuclear deterrence is unlikely to

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be removed by foreseeable conventional improvements. The British and French have their own reasons for opposing SDI. Should progress on SDI be accompanied by an abandonment of the ABM Treaty, Euro-American relations could reach a new low.

Of course, the worst-case scenario is for both of these developments to occur. Whether the abandonment of both deterrence and arms control would be sufficient to reverse the abiding attachment of Europeans to the NATO Alliance is difficult to predict. What can be said at present is that European governments and public opinion have both made it clear that deterrence *with* negotiation is the mixture of policies that allows a fragile balance between fear of nuclear weapons and support for the policy of deterrence. On this issue there is a European consensus to the point of unanimity.

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Review Articles

MAOISM AND THE LIBERATION OF THE POOR

By EDWARD FRIEDMAN

Jan Myrdal, *Return to a Chinese Village*. New York: Pantheon, 1984, 153 pp.
Fei Hsiao Tung (Fei Xiaotong), *Chinese Village Close-up*. Beijing: New World Press, 1983, 269 pp.
Steven Mosher, *Journey to Forbidden China*. New York: Free Press, 1985, 180 pp.
Steven Mosher, *Broken Earth*. New York: Free Press, 1983, 317 pp.
M. Steifel and W. F. Wertheim, *Production, Equality and Participation in Rural China*. London: Zed Press, 1983, 172 pp.
Keith Griffen and Ashwani Saith, *Growth and Equality in Rural China*. Singapore: Maruzen Asie Pte. Ltd., 1981, 165 pp.
Anita Chan, Richard Madsen, and Jonathan Unger, *Chen Village*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984, 293 pp.
William Hinton, *Shenfan*. New York: Random House, 1983, 785 pp.

WHILE Mao Zedong was promoting self-reliant, grain-first development that abjured the market and material incentives, liberation theologians seeking an end to rural misery, international dependency, and capitalist exploitation found in China's Cultural Revolution the utopian liberation based on spiritual forces of altruism that they were seeking. Although Gustavo Gutierrez, in *A Theology of Liberation*, focuses on Latin America and the Maoist words of Che Guevara, he presents the Cultural Revolution as revolution incarnate, the realization of Utopia, the solution to the problems of the rural poor.[1] Liberation theologian Al Imfeld's *China as a Model of Development* was published by Maryknoll's Orbis Books, the major English-language publisher of liberation theology. He also expounded Mao's China as the answer to the prayers of impoverished rural dwellers.[2] The most prestigious American economist who accepted this Maoist vision of liberating the poor as a reality maintained that Pope Paul VI had captured the spirit of Maoism when the Pope stated that Maoist doctrine "is 'a moral socialism of thought and

[1] Gutierrez, *A Theology of Liberation* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1973), 32, 91, 235, 237.
[2] Imfeld, *China as a Model of Development* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1976); cf. Raymond Whitehead, *Love and Struggle in Mao's Thought* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1977).

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conduct' and China 'looks toward the mystique of disinterested work for others, to inspiration to justice, to exaltation of a simple and frugal life, to rehabilitation of the rural masses, and to a mixing of social classes.' "[3]

Yet in the post-Mao era—with China rebuilding its statistical system which Mao had destroyed, for the first time welcoming outsiders even to the poorest reaches of China, and opening wide its doors and its books—economists both in and out of China agree with professionals working for international financial institutions and development agencies that the record of the Mao era was far from impressive.

Liberation theologians used to say, "Every Chinese child can learn to read and write";[4] the actual figures for literacy in China are on a par with Indonesia, with over 40 percent illiteracy for females. Today, the consensus is that during the Mao era, the rural poor of China stagnated and dependency actually increased. Grain production barely kept up with population growth, income from rural collectives grew but one-half of one percent over the whole period of the Cultural Revolution, and China became the world's largest importer of grain, cotton, and edible vegetable oils.[5] Some recent books based on first-hand experience in rural China allow us to seek data on the human dynamics of Maoism, and why it proved not to be a successful path to raise and enrich the rural poor of the Third World; these books permit us to put flesh on the statistical skeleton which shows that post-Mao reforms have done much better than Maoism in helping the poorest of the poor.

Assessing Maoist Performance

Interestingly, a number of these first-hand observers reject the scholarly consensus. Jan Myrdal, in his fourth book on a village just south of Mao's revolutionary-era capital of Yan'an,[6] declares that unless China is saved by revolutionary Maoist Naxalites (as India was not),[7] then China,

[3] John Gurley, *Challengers to Capitalism* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1979), 182.

[4] Imfeld (fn. 2), 157.

[5] Gurley has responded to the new data by rewriting *Challengers to Capitalism* in 1982. The single most up-to-date and easily accessible English-language work with the most comprehensive data is *China Looks Toward the Year 2000* (Washington, DC: Congress of the United States, Joint Economic Committee, 1986), two vols. For the data on illiteracy, see vol. I, p. 319.

[6] Myrdal's first three books were *Report from a Chinese Village* (New York: Signet, 1966); *China: The Revolution Continued* (New York: Pantheon, 1970); *China Notebook 1975-1978* (Chicago: Liberator Press, 1979).

[7] The Naxalites were a Maoist group in India that was crushed during China's Cultural Revolution when its members tried to establish rural bases among the most miserable rural poor as a tactic to seize power by annihilating landlords, police officers, and anyone who sided with such people. Sendero Luminoso, a self-identified Maoist group in Peru, employs tactics similar to those of the Naxalites.

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too, will end up with "a half-starving redundant mass of poor peasants, on the one hand, and a few million successful (and rich) peasants . . . , on the other" (p. 148). Myrdal's belief is that the world is divided between a rich and powerful few and a hungry and oppressed many; that Western or European civilization (including Nazism, racism, and colonialism) are really barbarisms whose gains come from war and plunder; and that the traditional Stalinism of the Soviet Union is at least as bad as liberal Western market societies.[8] He considers Maoism to be the rational alternative, the only way to liberate the poor. With this world view, Myrdal is committed to supporting Maoism not only in China, but also in Cambodia with Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge and in India with the Naxalites and their self-proclaimed policy of "annihilationism."[9]

Yet in his first book, which was written before the Cultural Revolution, Myrdal acknowledged that Mao's supercollectivism of 1958 to 1960, the so-called Great Leap Forward, produced a famine.[10] According to French, American, and Soviet demographers, 25 to 30 million people perished[11]—far more than in either the Stalin famine or the recent African famine, and more than the number killed by hunger in the entire history of post-independence India. Increasingly, scholars refer to Mao's famine as the most murderous in human history.[12]

Subsequently, Myrdal reported that Mao's communist fundamentalism of 1974-1976 resulted in two disastrous years for the Chinese countryside.[13] This poverty is also sketched for a section of China's southwest—part of the region badly hurt by the 1974-1976 campaign "to cut capitalist tails"—in Steven Mosher's *Journey to Forbidden China*. In his observations stemming from a week of travel there by van (perhaps illegally), this author describes virtually medieval misery. International aid administrators with experience in poverty-stricken regions of Africa and Latin America found the poorest areas of rural China to suffer from poverty even more severe than in those areas.

Myrdal is aware that during the 1968-1971 Cultural Revolution in the

[8] Myrdal, *Confessions of a Disloyal European* (New York: Random House, 1968).

[9] See Sumata Banerjee, *In the Wake of Naxalbari* (Calcutta: Subarnarekha, 1980). For a sketch of the personal, organizational, and ideological links of the Khmer Rouge and other Maoist groups, see Edward Friedman, "After Mao," *Telos*, No. 65 (Fall 1985), 23-46.

[10] Myrdal (fn. 6, 1966), xxxiv.

[11] Cf. Basil Ashton et al., "Famine in China, 1958-61," *Population and Development Review* 10 (December 1984), 613-45.

[12] Carl Riskin, "Feeding China," paper prepared for UNU/WIDER Conference on Hunger and Poverty, Helsinki, July 21-25, 1986.

[13] Myrdal (fn. 6, 1979), 6, 73. In 1976 alone, according to *Renmin Ribao*, September 30, 1986, over 300,000 residents fled by train from one southwestern province (Sichuan) to escape from the man-made famine that hit some ten million people; many of them, especially women, were reduced to urban beggary or were even sold into undesired marriages or prostitution.

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countryside similar Maoist policies of state-enforced high investment, low income distribution, forced labor corvées, and a war on private plots, household sidelines, markets, traditional culture, and individual incentives were imposed on the peasantry by the state. In *Return to a Chinese Village*, he champions these damaging policies as "profound and rational" (p. 148). By contrast, a Danish scholar working within a Marxist framework describes this Maoist policy package as an expansion of Stalinist elements that injure the peasantry.[14]

When Myrdal is taken to Fengyang County in Anhui Province, which suffered the highest percentage of Great-Leap famine deaths of any province in China,[15] he dismisses the peasants' accounts of misery. Although he considers himself a recorder of the words of poor peasants, no tale of suffering appears in his latest book. Instead, he merely confesses, "I never understood, and still do not understand, why things should have been so wretched there" (p. 146). Instead of inquiring why Mao's program of self-reliance, grain-first, and market destruction was of little assistance to the poor, Myrdal is reduced to maintaining that post-Mao bumper harvests are pure inventions and that the Great Leap was not a catastrophe (p. 60).

Old and unsubstantiated assertions that Maoist policies raised the poorest of the rural poor out of poverty are belied by new and credible data ascribed to by a broad variety of scholars. Careful studies have established that Maoism actually resulted in a widening of the gap between richer and poorer areas.[16] Under the policy of "self-reliance," the barely subsisting poor with no surplus were forced to depend almost completely on their own meager resources for investment. The destruction of the market undid any economic advantages that might have been enjoyed by poor regions. Finally, without basic change, China since 1949 had in place a Soviet-style command economy that favored urban dwellers and undermined rural price incentives. Maoism thus increased regional inequalities, locking the poor into their poverty. When land was taken out of producing economic crops such as soybeans and peanuts, and put in-

[14] K. E. Brodsgaard, "State, Party, and Economy in the Transition to Socialism in China," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 18 (January-March 1986), 46-55.

[15] Cf. Tom Bernstein, "Starving to Death in China," *New York Review of Books*, June 16, 1983, pp. 36-38, and "Stalinism, Famine and Chinese Peasants," *Theory and Society* 13 (May 1984), 339-77.

[16] Peter Nolan and Gordon White, "The Distributive Implications of China's New Agricultural Policies," in Jack Grey and Gordon White, eds., *China's New Development Strategy* (London: Academic Press, 1982), 182; Mark Selden, "Income Inequality and the State," in William Parish, ed., *Chinese Rural Development* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1985), 193-218; Martin Whyte, "Social Trends in China: The Triumph of Inequality?" in A. Doak Barnett and Ralph Clough, eds., *Modernizing China* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 103-23. Tom Rawski, Nicholas Lardy, and others who have examined the data also reach the conclusion that Maoism greatly increased the gap between richer and poorer regions.

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stead into grain and cotton, the result was not enriching self-reliance in food and clothing. Rather it was a general economic decline. When the production of secondary foods such as soybeans was cut back, the result was protein malnutrition. By contrast, in the post-Mao era of market expansion, decollectivization, household farming, specialization, and price incentives, China has been able to stop importing American wheat; it now competes with the United States for the Japanese corn market. The dependency accentuated by Maoism has ended in the reform era.

The Limits of Field Research

Perhaps because they did their fieldwork back in 1979, when the post-Mao reforms were just starting, Steifel and Wertheim as well as Griffen and Saith depict the Mao era as a developmental success based on economic equality, fair and meaningful incentives, direct democracy, and gradual collectivization. In fact, Mao's instantaneous coerced collectivization in 1956 alienated tens of millions of peasants who lost income and were never fairly recompensed for their land, animals, and tools.[17] In a paper based on a just-completed field study and presented to the Association for Asian Studies in early 1985, Griffen found post-Mao reforms to have been successful in ending poverty in a long-stagnant region. Thus it may not be fair today to focus on Steifel and Wertheim's major comment on the Great Leap, which killed almost 30 million poverty-stricken peasants, to the effect that, although hurt by natural calamities, a "fair distribution system motivated the peasants to carry on, despite serious hardships experienced by everyone" (p. 135). Perhaps the newly available data would persuade Steifel and Wertheim to revise their published judgment that the rural Cultural Revolution of 1968-1971 produced "awareness of collective interest and a trend to delay immediate consumption in favour of building for the future," and "motivated [peasants] to develop all kinds of new and dynamic initiatives" (p. 110).

At stake is the question why field research in most Leninist states is problematical. Steifel, Wertheim, Griffen and Saith all made prodigious efforts to get at the truth, combining critical intelligence with sophisticated research methods and statistical techniques of high scholarly quality. But quick visits to many places by outside researchers cannot produce trustworthy data when a socialist state wishes to foster a notion of triumphal progress toward communism. The people interviewed are bound to feel constrained to respond with self-interested caution when power reali-

[17] Mark Selden, "Cooperation and Conflict," in Mark Selden and Victor Lippit, eds., *The Transition to Socialism in China* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1982), 32-97.

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ties—stemming from a pervasive police apparatus combined with a statist command economy—permit local powerholders to ruin family destinies at a whim. Fei Xiaotong describes an atmosphere of such fear that villagers hesitated to tell him about their post-collectivization grain crisis. They had learned to be careful about stating truths that were embarrassing to ruling groups.

To be sure, Maoism was not a total disaster for *all* peasants. Approximately 20 percent were able to monopolize benefits and to move ahead at internationally respectable rates.[18] In China, that means that 150 million rural dwellers did well. Hence, visitors who are taken to a successful area by their Chinese hosts may be reporting accurately while missing most of the story that is bad news. When one puts the observations of Griffen and Saith in this less happy context, they acquire a different meaning. They remark that the "outstanding characteristic" of the Mao era's enlarged collectives (communes) was "high rates of saving and capital accumulation" (p. 125). True; but low or no cash and few consumption gains for farm laborers injured the incentive to work and made for massive corruption, black markets, and bribery.

Griffen and Saith also find that, while Mao replaced the private with the collective to increase equality, ironically "the private sector ... reduces local inequality" (p. 125). Again, true; they would not have seen their finding as so remarkable had they known that the static, antimarket Maoist system drastically increased the income gap between poorer and richer regions. Consequently, one of the first results of the post-Mao market reforms that liberated individuals from the collective—a result that is predictable based on Griffen and Saith's data—was to allow most of the peasant poor to break out of economic stagnation. However, the finding that market reforms help the poor in Leninist systems which have already abolished landlord power and which make cheap credit available to the poor should not be conflated with the idea that, in market societies which have impoverished and marginalized the peasantry, more of the magic of the market will save the poor without basic reforms. Liberation theologians may at a distance have misperceived Maoism to be a solution, but their first-hand knowledge of the problems of the rural poor was acquired elsewhere.

Feudal Socialism

William Hinton is the most complex and knowledgeable supporter of Maoist solutions. *Shenfan* is based on return visits to a suburban village of

[18] In a private conversation, William Hinton's estimate was 30 percent.

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a bustling county capital. Hinton started to study this village at the time of the establishment of the People's Republic. He embraces the big collective as the only socialist solution to peasant poverty; yet, as a reliable observer, he also describes the alienating essence of China's collectivization. He blames corrupt powerholders for the cruel problems inherent in Chinese collectives, and ignores the literature which shows that the problems are institutional and systemic, not personal and idiosyncratic.[19]

Hinton shows how collectivization rendered villagers powerless and left them totally dependent on the state. They were not liberated or empowered, as liberation theologians have asserted. The peasantry's status was reduced to less than a commodity. Peasants could not even sell their labor; they were locked onto a piece of land, forced to accept the work and wages assigned to them. Hinton describes this collectivization as refeudalization. In the comparative literature, this categorical framework is often applied to state-imposed collectives; the analogy with feudalism should not be carried too far, however, since a socialist state runs on very different goals and values.

Hinton is wise to point out that collectivization resembles re-enserfment. Not only are the peasants forced to work land they do not own; others decide what work they will do. They cannot legally choose to leave the land and seek work elsewhere, and their children cannot go to school elsewhere. They cannot travel, eat, or reside elsewhere: scarce state ration coupons for grain are specific to a place, and permission slips for travel have to be shown to the security services. Theirs is a demeaning and alienating social existence.

Alienated members of the collective have frequent run-ins with the law. Hinton superbly describes numerous young rural males who experienced life on the collective as so unrewarding that they became involved in semi-legal schemes in search of work elsewhere—leaving the demeaning, valueless basic field work to women.

The Maoist Disaster

The author who reports with unrelieved negativity, not only about Maoism but also about the entire socialist record in China, is Steven Mosher. In *Broken Earth*, he focuses on a village not far from Canton. Mosher's work is a mirror image of Myrdal's: whereas the latter dismisses other outside observers for hiding alleged great achievements of Maoism,

[19] For most recent statements on the antipeasant essence of collectives, see Moshe Lewin, *The Making of the Soviet System* (New York: Pantheon, 1985); Lev Timofeev, *Soviet Peasants: The Peasants' Art of Starving* (New York: Telos Press, 1985); Robert Conquest, *The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine* (New York: Oxford, 1986).

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Mosher contends that foreign visitors only reported Maoist achievements and naively recounted "idyllic commune life in the rustic Chinese countryside" (p. 12).[20] Like Hinton, Mosher offers a compelling account of rural life, rife with physical violence, crude sexism, and deep corruption—crucial matters hardly mentioned by Myrdal, Griffen and Saith, or Steifel and Wertheim.

Mosher records how the disaster caused by the rural economic policies of the Cultural Revolution led peasants to flee to Hong Kong. "Escape attempts reached an unprecedented high" as "leftists pushed an agricultural policy which they hoped would further communize the countryside but which in fact led living standards to drop precipitously" (p. 159). In contrast to Myrdal, who would have Chinese Naxalites finish the project begun by Mao's Cultural Revolution, Mosher hopes that authentic democrats, appalled at "the arbitrary abuse of power that had characterized the Cultural Revolution . . . will rip apart the bureaucratic totalitarian structure" (p. 168).

The Bonds of Communal Solidarity

Mosher mainly denounces; Chan/Madsen/Unger, who interviewed refugees from one village over a twelve-year period, magnificently situate and explicate Maoist dynamics of political vigilantism. In *Chen Village*, they show how Maoist policies, rationalized as class struggle, brought about ferocious internecine violence without advancing any decent larger purpose. Their description of the 1964-1965 Four-Cleans campaign and the 1968-1969 Cleansing-of-Class-Ranks movement shows that what was at stake was not some progressively liberating project, but lineage, neighborhood, and factional groups struggling to hold on to power. Jack Chen, publishing in 1973, found similar bloody lineage struggles in a village in Henan Province in which he lived during the rural Cultural Revolution of 1968-1971,[21] and Hinton details how the Cultural Revolution became a purposeless bloody carnage, not advancing anything positive (pp. 493-681).

According to Chan/Madsen/Unger, villagers perceived political strug-

[20] For more balanced overviews of the work of students of modern China, see Dwight Perkins, "Research on the Economy of the People's Republic of China: A Survey of the Field," *Journal of Asian Studies* 42 (February 1983), 345-72; Harry Harding, "From China with Disdain: New Trends in the Study of China," *Asian Survey* 22 (October 1982), 934-58; Chalmers Johnson, "What's Wrong with Chinese Political Studies?" *Asian Survey* 22 (October 1982), 919-33; Edward Friedman, "In Defense of China Studies," *Pacific Affairs* 55 (Summer 1982), 252-66.

[21] Chen, *A Year in Upper Felicity: Life in a Chinese Village During the Cultural Revolution* (New York: Macmillan, 1973). Chen's explanations follow each twist of the changing party line, but his descriptions of events seem reliable and insightful.

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gles as rituals that rewarded with power the most active vigilantes, those who were most able to generate and mobilize resentment and hatred. They came to see such activists as "mouth revolutionaries" who "wanted to become big officials" (p. 83). Thus, these class-struggle campaigns not only failed to improve life; they also victimized ever more peasants, spread bitterness, and deepened cynicism. The people in power further institutionalized a system of corrupt, protective personal networks in order to survive.

In contrast to Chan/Madsen/Unger, Mosher's *Broken Earth* offers no dynamic structure to comprehend the dark side of rural life. Moreover, Mosher's data are presented in a distorted framework that vitiates his achievement. He contends that the Revolution was an accident which injured the peasantry, that rural life was far better before the Revolution, and that the post-Mao reforms are but "a temporary palliative," mere "flotsam," and will change nothing (pp. 292, 293). In dismissing the achievements of the post-Mao reforms, Mosher is indistinguishable from Myrdal. Mosher's ultimate revelation is that in the period prior to the establishment of the People's Republic, China enjoyed a bountiful reign "under the benign leadership" of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek); that it was a happy nation of "peace and plenty," of "good food and feasting" for the peasantry (p. 305); and that everything has been going downhill since the establishment of the People's Republic. One yearns for Myrdal's more reliable 1963 volume, *Report from a Chinese Village*, in which old peasants tell of their desperate flight from starvation and deprivation to Yen'an where land was available because the region had recently been depopulated in deadly wars.

Although Mosher would have us believe that, except in the poorest parts of north or northwest China, the peasants were feasting before the establishment of China's socialist state, the anthropologist Fei Xiaotong found that in 1936,[22] peasants in central China were being pushed under as prices fell and markets were lost.[23] He noted that this general phenomenon created a "dissatisfied class . . . revolutionary in nature" (p. 143), which was willing to support the political struggle of Mao's base-area regime (p. 92).

Fei discovered in 1936 that this rural economic decline was experienced in popular cultural consciousness as leaving no money for the opera fairs that once brought communities together. These fairs were extraor-

[22] Fei's classic work is *Peasant Life in China* (New York: Dutton, 1939).

[23] On China's integration into the world market, see Loren Brandt, "Chinese Agriculture and the International Economy, 1870-1930," *Explorations in Economic History* 22 (1985), 168-93.

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dinarily happy and memorable events. Villagers often describe them as the happiest moments in their lives. Yet, by 1959, Mao was destroying these market fairs.

Chan/Madsen/Unger superbly describe how, in the Great Leap famine, peasants of Chen village near Hong Kong preferred to scavenge for food rather than grow crops that would be taken away by the socialist state. Peasants assumed that the harvest was used to feed strangers who were lazy, and who certainly were not working to help Chen villagers. Peasants tend to be parochial people who are wary of strangers and live in fear of being publicly taken advantage of; they will go to any length to avoid such a disgrace imposed by indolent outsiders. Instead of expanding bonds of solidarity, the statist collectivist system thus intensified mistrust and deepened privatization.

Peasant Moral Economy

The works by Fei and Chan/Madsen/Unger on the response of peasant culture to deprivations suggest that studies of the peasant poor require knowledge of the moral economy of that peasantry.[24] Yet none of these authors grapple with the complex interaction of revolutionary innovation and cultural restoration in the Chinese countryside. It is as if one were to describe Iran and ignore Islam, discuss India and forget Hinduism, study Israel and overlook Judaism, write on Ireland and leave out Protestants and Catholics. Mosher, writing from a right-to-life perspective, dismisses as immoral cultural relativists those scholars who would comprehend the ethos of the peasantry. He condemns the Chinese for accepting birth control and abortion, for lacking "a religious tradition grounded in the sanctity of human life. Man is not made in god's image in China. Confucius never said, 'Thou shalt not kill' " (p. 258). It is thus not surprising that Mosher's *bête noire* is John King Fairbank, a historian who has an empathetic comprehension of the deep consequences of China's historic culture and traditional values.

In contrast to Mosher, who envinces no sympathy for peasant culture, Myrdal is rooted in Swedish village life; his original study of the Yan'an

[24] See, for example, James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), a pathbreaking work. I would put more stress on peasant religion, however, than does Scott. See Edward Friedman, *Backward Toward Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), part 3, "Rural Revolution," 115-64. Even Samuel Popkin, who argues powerfully that peasants are profit maximizers, finds that, to be successful, leaders of peasant revolution must act in harmony with local religious notions and their initial organization must be "focused on local goals and goods" (*The Rational Peasant*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979, 261). In Confucian China that often meant issues touching on matters of lineage survival such as marriage and mourning.

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County village (fn. 6, 1966) was most sensitive in exploring family, mourning, new years' celebrations, and the like. Such popular customs were revived in the short period of reform following the Great Leap famine. So were the market fairs.

Myrdal is aware that Maoists kept attacking the popular culture of the poor. He notes that "super-revolutionary apostles of clean living" "campaigned against everyday interests and against the justifiable end-of-day relaxation of common workers," moralistically fighting "everything which normal people considered fun" (fn. 6, 1979, pp. 85, 77). Yet he derides what China's post-Mao reformers have learned from Singapore's campaign to pass on Confucian civic virtues. He does not investigate the popularity of that Confucian return for China's poor, whose cultural world was ruptured by Mao's campaigns against the traditions of the backward. Tremendous sums are again being spent by patriarchal peasants on marriage; burial and house-building regularly take away fertile land.

Fei Xiaotong's account of a village in 1936, 1957, and 1981 offers the most information on peasant moral economy. He found that the prerevolutionary economic decline threatened to end sacred eternal lineages and to impose virtually immoral forms of marriage. For poor peasants, then, the Revolution restored what was being lost—marriages, children, house-building, and ritual celebrations of the rites of passage in the family's eternal life cycle. Maoist collectives in patriarchal, Confucian China paid far more, proportionately, to older men than did collectives in Eastern or Central Europe. Chinese peasants initially experienced the Revolution less as a transvaluation of values than as a restoration of unjustly denied rights—land, progeny, and proper burial.

Agricultural Collectivization

The best guide to how China's collectivization actually hit this peasantry is also by Fei Xiaotong. In 1957 he returned to Kaixian'gong in Jiangsu Province, the village he had studied in 1936. Fei's is the only detailed, first-hand, professional, and contemporary description of Chinese collectivization.

In 1957 Fei found that, as a result of land reform and other socialist state policies, grain production had gone way up, and education, health care, and clothing had been tremendously improved for the poor. Nonetheless, he concluded that certain negative factors made this a false prosperity which created a blind optimism. He correctly predicted that the

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peasants would not be able to survive any large disaster if grain reserves disappeared.

Since grain production did not decline after collectivization, Fei tried to figure out why peasants experienced a grain crisis, accompanied by decreasing income and a lack of faith in collectives. More grain was available to the socialist state for export and for the military, for urban dwellers, and for the state sector, all at a low price; but the peasants had less grain and were paid little. By the 1970s, Chinese peasants dubbed this situation "rich state, poor people."

Fei explained this phenomenon in 1957: the socialist state had closed rural grain markets and monopolistically purchased all grain at a low price; therefore, the villagers were left at a bare subsistence level unless they could earn income in nonagricultural work. But because of the socialist state's attempt to wipe out small, private enterprise, employment in rural industry, sidelines, and services had fallen from 26.1 percent in 1936 (when Fei first visited the village), to 6.4 percent in 1956, the initial year of collectivization. The popular perception therefore was that collective work was worthless toil; what could be earned outside of the collective for good cash was all-important. So young males proceeded to engage in illegal extra-collective economic activities, just as Hinton records.

The peasants started to suffer in the early mid-1950s, when the socialist state took bureaucratic monopoly control of grain. According to a contemporary, recently declassified inner-party report, the anti-market policy created a famine in Zhejiang Province.[25] Mao produced one disaster after another in the Chinese countryside as he tried to abolish what he considered to be the remaining sources of nonsocialist income. His supercollectivism took from the peasants even concessions that Stalin had made to the peasantry, such as the tilling of private plots. Intensified Maoist policies from 1968 to 1971 and from 1974 to 1976 brought stagnation and decline, especially to the poorest peasants. Both material and cultural life were badly injured.

Fei reminds us that, when Mao limited the peasantry to agriculture, there was a loss of income from other enterprises such as processing peanut oil, which resulted in a general decline in cash available from supplementary industries. The loss of the right to grow feed for household animals led to a decrease in animal production, natural fertilizer, and available meat. Most of the respected producers, the so-called middle

[25] *Dangshi yanjiu ziliao* [Materials for the study of party history] 3 (Chengdu: Sichuan People's Publishing House, 1982), 693-708.

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peasants, were therefore worse off as a result of nationalization of the market and collectivization of the land.

Mao's Fundamentalism

In order to shrink the market further, Mao subsequently tried to make each small rural region industrially self-reliant by producing everything from bicycles to tractors, steel, and chemical fertilizers. The few regions that the poorly endowed socialist state blessed with its limited capital, technicians, and infrastructure were able to succeed. Yan'an County, the focus of Myrdal's work, was highly subsidized.[26] Elsewhere, much of the rural industrial investment was wasted due to a lack of skills, infrastructure, supplies, and so forth. The government squandered huge amounts of wealth. In devastated Fengyang County, for example, in the decade after the Great Leap famine, the peasants preferred to consume their surplus in traditional feasting to reinvesting it in wasteful, useless, collective projects. The poorest regions were served worst by Mao's communist fundamentalism.

Grinding poverty and cruel cultural choices faced the peasants in northern Shanxi and Shaanxi, the provinces that are home to the suburban villagers studied by Hinton and by Myrdal. Between 1968 and 1971—the period of fundamentalist war on the market, economic crops, mobility, consumption, and household sidelines—mothers in poor households in north Shanxi were regularly compelled to abandon their infant daughters. Cash-poor patriarchal families found it impossible to raise girls until they were of marriageable age because they received no economic return from them. The mothers would knit beautiful blankets, wrap them around the infants, and leave their daughters on the Datong train station with money and notes asking travelers to take the babies. The mothers watched at a distance until the infants were picked up. Travelers came to know where to find the baby girls.

In northern Shaanxi, which was even poorer, stagnation and decline

[26] Liulin (Willow Grove), the village described in Myrdal's four books, was poor, but uniquely endowed. As early as 1969, there were more wrist watches than families; girls in nursery school wore colorful skirts; roads were paved and lit by electric lights; and sufficient fertilizer was available. Such access to scarce resources (available to no more than two percent of hinterland villages) could only come from special political connections. The village was a commune headquarters; it regularly sent delegates to Beijing for national meetings, which was impossible for 99 percent of China's hundreds of thousands of villages. Liulin villagers sat on key county committees in Yan'an. The whole area seems to have benefited from resources related to connections to the top of the socialist state, linked in part perhaps to Liulin's neighboring Date Garden commune, once the headquarters of the ruling party's Central Committee. By 1972, Liulin was visited by a stream of tourists. In 1985, the Chinese government announced an end to special subsidies for Yan'an County.

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threatened the existence of male lineages in the worst-off villages. Young men worked hard well into their forties, saving every penny, until they accumulated enough money to buy a bride from elsewhere. Keeping the lineage going was the single, overwhelming focus of village gossip and life. Among the authors under review, only Chan/Madsen/Unger discuss this economic stagnation of the seventies, which crushed the morale of the peasants.

Alienation

As early as 1957, Fei described how collectivization and the concentration of power combined to infantilize people. When state officials became responsible for progress, the villagers lost their incentive to act as autonomous beings. Honesty, hard work, and innovation largely disappeared among the alienated rural laborers. Even the hoeing of weeds was done carelessly. So was the pruning of fruit trees and the application of fertilizer. People just did not care. In Kaixian'gong, silk production declined when mulberry groves were not taken care of. Because progress was permitted to come only in supposedly socialist forms, and because the peasants' preferences could be denounced as capitalistic—with the denunciation ruining the family's prospects—the peasants grew private, narrow, and passive. They waited for officials to come up with solutions.

In addition, Fei discovered that peasants who customarily lived frugally and tended to save for the long haul responded to state-imposed collectives in an irresponsible and short-sighted manner. They ate up as much as they could of their surplus grain, assuming that if a disaster hit, the socialist state would ship in grain from elsewhere. It was a formula for disaster—the famine of the Great Leap.

Mao's Famine

Fei offers us one example of how the Great Leap famine was experienced in the patriarchal, Confucian, exogamous world of village China. He records that out of the approximately 300 households of Kaixian'gong, "the wives of 23 men went away to beg, thus leading to divorce" (p. 251). In short stories such as Li Jian's "The Women's Bridge" and Zhu Lin's "The Web,"[27] the focus is also on women; in the wake of famine, they are forced out of villages they had married into, to wander as strangers, at times with their daughters, to beg, scavenge, and survive by their

[27] Zhu Lin, "The Web," *Renditions*, No. 16 (August 1981), 113-21. The only information we have on Li Jian's work comes from attacks on the story.

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wits. Thus, the burden of the life-crushing famine seems to have been placed on the shoulders of the weakest and often most vulnerable in Confucian China: females without blood lineage ties in a village.

Fei, publishing in China, does not describe the famine. Instead, he comments that writings in the West make it unnecessary for him to elaborate on that catastrophe. But there are few such writings. Hinton's suburban village of Changchuan (Long Bow), which lost one-third of its land to its county town, did not experience famine; it only experienced hunger—as did most of suburban China.

Shockingly, there is no human, vivid, detailed study of the Great Leap famine which devastated mainly the poorest parts of the North China plain. In Henan Province, a pace-setter in the Great Leap, where the rulers kept insisting that the Leap was triumphant and that grain could be shipped out, entire villages were virtually wiped out. When relief grain finally arrived, the starving peasants were bereft even of the energy needed to get the food. More peasants died in Henan than in any other province in China.[28]

Ruling groups in Mao's China concealed the famine. Party officials in disaster regions that were visited by foreigners were directed not to reveal the extent of the tragedy. Local peasants were pacified by the scapegoating of local leaders, some of whom were publicly tried, denounced, and executed. News of the famine in one district was barred from the media even in the next district. When soldiers (a disproportionate number of whom were from poor areas of the North China plain) received mail from home detailing the disaster, they were called to special meetings and given briefings about local criminal or subversive bad elements, now caught and punished, who were said to be the cause of the famine, and how families of soldiers would get special care.[29] Foreigners were fed a diet of lies to spread outside the country, to the effect that there was no famine in China.[30] The fact that liberation theologians did not know of the sufferings of China's poor shows that the cover-up was a success.

In one of the few vivid descriptions available, John Avedon reports that, according to refugees from Tibet,

[28] This was revealed long ago in captured 1961 army documents about Henan Province. See J. Chester Cheng, ed., *The Politics of the Chinese Red Army* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1966).

[29] See Edward Friedman, Paul Pickowicz, Mark Selden, with Kay Johnson, *Chinese Village, Socialist State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, forthcoming 1987).

[30] See Felix Greene, *China: The Country Americans Are Not Allowed to Know* (New York: Ballantine, 1961, 1962), chap. 32, "Food and Famine." Anna Louise Strong, who wrote an irregular *Newsletter from China*, complained privately: "I am not allowed to admit that anyone in these three years ever starved to death." Tracy Strong and Helen Keyssar, *Right in Her Soul: The Life of Anna Louise Strong* (New York: Random House, 1983), 318.

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> Parents fed dying children their own blood mixed with hot water and *tsampa*. Other children were forced to leave home to beg . . . and old people went off to die alone in the hills. Thousands of Tibetans took to eating the refuse thrown by the Chinese soldiers to the pigs each Han [military] compound kept, while those around PLA outposts daily pieced apart manure from the soldiers' horses looking for undigested grain.[31]

In addition to the peasant poor, large numbers of political prisoners were victims of the famine. They were denied even a subsistence diet and died in the hundreds of thousands after trying to survive on "undigested corn in the shit of the guard's horses," "worms found in the shit of cows and oxen," and "eggs of praying mantises." The occasional "cockroach was a luxury." The prisoners were fed corncobs, marsh water plankton, and paper pulp, which were worthless.[32]

The Power of the State

In a recent biography of Deng Zihui, who headed the ruling party's Rural Work Department, who opposed Mao's economically destructive initiatives, and who was removed from office and placed under house arrest, the Chinese authors remain constrained and can only inform us that, during the Great Leap, on seeing reports from the countryside, Deng was broken-hearted. He won permission to investigate a western section of Fujian Province in which he had served during the revolutionary war. There and in old base areas in general (poor regions with little food surplus even in good times), Deng discovered that grain production had fallen by more than half; in the people's desperate search for fire and nutrition, mountain tops had been denuded of trees. In addition, he found that despite the peasants' obvious discontent with Maoist initiatives, "officials fearing being labeled 'rightists' did not dare respond factually in officially informing higher levels."[33] The power structure rewarded ca-

[31] Avedon, *In Exile from the Land of Snows* (New York: Random House, 1984), 237.

[32] Bao Ruo-wang and Rudolph Chelminski, *Prisoner of Mao* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1973, 1976), pp. 242, 225, 219, 216-17. A woman living just west of Beijing—that is, in a relatively privileged area—reported how famine diets caused constipation: "The mothers would even have to dig the feces out of their children's rectums with sticks." Further, "I always had to take with me [to the latrine] a long, stout stick to keep away the desperately hungry pigs who would follow me and try frantically to snatch the fresh excrement right from my body as I squatted. They were large animals and dangerous because of the extreme hunger, making me dread the daily ordeal of having to strain to move the bowels and at the same time fight off the pigs." Yue Daiyun and Carolyn Wakeman, *To the Storm: The Odyssey of a Revolutionary Chinese Woman* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 82.

[33] Jiang Boying in Hu Hua, ed., *Zhong gong dang shi renwu zhuan* [Personal biographies from Chinese communist party history] 7 (Nanchang: Jiangxi People's Publishing House, 1983), 372-74. It is not surprising that Chinese interviewees would not reveal truths to short-term foreign visitors.

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reers based on zeal and triumphalism, not on honesty or whistle-blowing. The state's skewed distribution of its resources was responsible for improvements, both for official careers in Fujian and for poor peasants suddenly doing better in Yan'an.

The structure of state power has not changed that much in the post-Mao era. Once-devastated Fengyang County, which produced beggars in the Mao era, is now growing at a phenomenal rate. Myrdal and Hinton can be faulted for not using their time in Fengyang to illuminate the Maoist catastrophe for the rural poor there; but reports of the recent great success of Fengyang are misleading: it was subsidized by special state inputs including paved roads for market access, rural electrification, and gold-mining equipment.

Liberating the Poor

Virtually all investigators agree, however, that the poorest of the poor were the first who enthusiastically embraced the reforms that ended their impoverishing enserfment. Maoist "self-reliance most hurt the destitute areas."[34] The implications of this for the rural poor of the Third World goes beyond China or Maoism, because certain strains of dependency theory and liberation theology are premised on opposition to the market and on food-first and self-reliance policies similar to those that were so devastating to the rural poor in China.

In the post-Mao era of reform communism, rural incomes have doubled. The number of those living barely above starvation levels has been reduced by two-thirds. Households are more autonomous and less dominated by unaccountable local party bosses. Traditional cultural life has revived spontaneously. The means to celebrate life's most significant moments are again available. There is great ordinary human happiness in the Chinese countryside.

Quite naturally, post-Mao decollectivization is experienced as a second, liberating land reform and is celebrated by peasants, as was the revolution in 1949, in traditional forms. Fei Xiaotong informs us that in the economically good time of 1981, an average marriage in Kaixian'gong cost over 2,000 yuan; a good marriage much more. In the Maoist worldview, expensive weddings are feudal and therefore bad. The high price of marriage keeps the young, who have little savings, in an angrily subordinate position while scarce capital is spent in conspicuous consumption. But the high price also provides for a dignified old age. It is the expense paid by

[34] Jonathan Unger, "The Decollectivization of the Chinese Countryside," *Pacific Affairs* 58 (Winter 1985-1986), 601.

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mothers and fathers that obligates children to care for elderly parents in the future. The young men may be angry, but the practice of obligating the children is a rational and moral economic action for the rural elderly in a poor country that still provides no pensions or old-age health insurance for villagers. We hardly encounter these weighty imperatives of the moral economy of the peasant political culture in any of the books under review except Fei's; however, Chan/Madsen/Unger persuasively describe how lineage relations have shaped power relations in Chen village.

The Vicissitudes of Pro-peasant Policies

Before conquering state power and conceiving of peasant culture as an obstacle to socialism, Mao Zedong showed that he understood the traditional peasant world. His revolutionary tactics identified with and fulfilled many of the peasants' values and dreams. He went out of his way to commemorate the heroic dead. In her biography of Zhu De, Agnes Smedly describes one of Mao's funeral orations:

> Zhu and Mao both spoke at a big memorial meeting for the Red Army dead. It was attended by throngs of civilians from the entire region who had never before heard of dead soldiers being honored. . . . In the future, Mao told the throngs, free China would honor every soldier or civilian killed in the course of the revolution, would give his family pensions and educate his children at state expense.[35]

Brantly Womack has reported how Mao discovered in the Jiangxi base that the quickest single indicator of the poorest of the poor was not tenancy or land, but trouble getting married.[36] At the same time, however, Mao saw the traditional small peasant world as antithetical to the collectivistic, statist, scientific socialism to which he was committed. With the establishment of the People's Republic, Mao used the state's power to destroy the economic base of the small peasantry in the countryside and to force it out of its unscientific and unsocialistic worldview. The revolution that was meant to save the poor also declared war on the material and cultural life they cherished.

Mao's ideas for liberating the rural poor came from the tradition of Marx and Lenin, which identified the landowning small peasantry as backward and capitalistic. James Scott has perceptively analyzed all that is lost by Marxist wars on the "petty bourgeoisie."[37] From the outset,

[35] Smedley, *The Great Road* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1986), 260.

[36] Womack, *The Fountain of Mao Zedong's Political Thought* (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1982), 128.

[37] See the work of James C. Scott, especially "Socialism and Small Property—Or—Two Cheers for the Petty Bourgeoisie," *Peasant Studies* 12 (Spring 1985), 185-97.

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Mao's goal was to push the poor into collectives and to snuff out peasant religion. When the People's Republic was established, the socialist state tried to demolish temples (asserting that the bricks were necessary for schools and dikes), and argued that class enemies used and hid behind peasant religion. Gruesome public trials were staged. The result was a Stalinist antireligion campaign that destroyed much of what gave succor to the poor.[38] Elderly women who still went to demolished temples and prayed before broken images were ridiculed by young party militants. Local party bosses settled grudges by ruining adversaries whom they accused of engaging in superstition and counterrevolutionary religion.

But lineage, religion, and tradition—the sacred world of popular culture—provided the moral glue that held family and community together. Hinton could have taught us a lot in this regard: the village he studied has a large Catholic population.[39] Yet religion does not appear at all in his recent book, which covers the period from 1949 to 1971. It will be more central to his next volume, which will include the post-Mao era in which a public revival of religion has been permitted.

Fascist Socialism

The return of religion is not solely a matter of the good replacing the bad. As should be obvious from this essay's discussion of the culture of China's poor—including easy violence, degrading patriarchy, false fronts, extreme familism, and deep, narrow suspiciousness which limits cooperation—there has been much complex and nasty continuity. The volatile passions and prejudices of the poor are now, as in the Mao era, fraught with a reactionary, even a fascist potential. Marx was not wrong in worrying that traditional, poor, religious tillers could and did at times serve the forces of stagnation, order, and repression. Barrington Moore, Jr., in his profound and subtle study of the danger of fascism in peasant France for over a century after the French Revolution, calls our attention to the continuing forces that nurture fascism during the long transition through modernization.[40] China's paramount post-Mao leader, Deng Xiaoping, has made a similar analysis; in fact, China's communist re-

[38] There is a huge literature by Christian teachers and missionaries—who were persecuted, jailed, or deported during this period—on how the state invented its accusations. According to one pastor, "the purpose of their reform was to do away with the church. Pretty soon we weren't allowed to teach children religion anymore." See Bao and Chelminski (fn. 32), 58. In the post-Mao era, communist reformers have tried to woo everyone from Daoists to Lamaists by halting the persecution of religion.

[39] William Hinton, *Fanshen* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966).

[40] Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), esp. chaps. 2, 7, 8, 9.

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formers have dubbed the leader-based, antimodern, political vigilantism of the Mao era "social fascism."[41] Social fascism is a policy response of Leninist ruling groups when Stalinism is delegitimated but reform communism seems impossible. This policy mobilizes support by using cosmopolitans as scapegoats and by claiming to advance communism through leveling attacks on specific sectors (denounced as bourgeois) that are hated by narrow chauvinists. An example is the Polish party's antisemitism of 1968.

In the Mao era, the purifying anti-intellectual, anticommercial, antiurban impetus was situated in the leaders of backward regions. Despite their present large material gains, many people in those regions today consider themselves losers as a result of the post-Mao reforms: they no longer receive special subsidies and, because of a lack of educational qualifications, have lost the favored access of their sons to the military, and from the military on to desirable jobs on state payrolls. In addition, traditional religion has revived in those regions in the form of a fundamentalism that condemns the evils of the modern world, especially the liberation of the young and of females. Poor, traditional-minded people think that modern, foreign culture pollutes and subverts healthy Chinese values, and threatens family and morality.

Post-Mao reformers try to woo such people by improving their material condition, by promoting conservative Confucian values, and by leading a war against corruption and foreign pollution. At the same time, Myrdal, Hinton, Mosher, and Chan/Madsen/Unger all agree that the combination of popular corruption long fostered by Leninist statist privilege and massive cynicism has often led people to see the newly successful as immoral, and to take cases of corrupt wealth as paradigmatic. The reforms thus can be perceived as immoral and un-Chinese. Consequently, there is a popular base with strong roots in the poor peasantry that would respond, as it did in the Mao era, to a call to purify China of the modern, the intellectual, the foreign, and the commercial.

More work is needed to clarify the relation of Maoism and social fascism.[42] It is clear, from the Ayatollah Khomeini's Iran to Pol Pot's Cam-

[41] For a summary of Chinese analyses of social fascism, see Edward Friedman, "The Societal Obstacle to China's Socialist Transition: State Capitalism or Feudal Fascism," in David Mozingo and Victor Nee, eds., *State and Society in Contemporary China* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 148-71.

[42] "In Hitler's Germany as well as Mao's China, one sees a paradoxical obsession with large-scale industrialization combined with a spiritual revolt of the countryside with its *völkisch* values against the decadent cosmopolitan cities." "The Nazi's killed cosmopolitan Jews, the Japanese persecuted citified Chinese in Southeast Asia (often to the applause of the rural Malays), and so did the Vietnamese and Cambodian communists thirty years later." (Ian Buruma, "Japanese Lib," *The New York Review*, May 13, 1986, p. 4.)

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bodia to all kinds of religious fundamentalism, that a reliance on the least modern societal elements in the name of purifying a national community is not liberating. Seeing the poor as malformed by the inhumanity they suffer, Marx—like the liberation theologians—hoped that class struggle would transform the wretched of the earth into rational, universal liberators. Studies of peasant China suggest that Maoist class struggle leaves most of the hard-working, family-oriented, brave, and patriotic peasant poor—who are ill-educated, mistrustful of outsiders, and parochial—unchanged in some of their worst tendencies. They tend to be almost as violent, sexist, vengeful, intolerant, and superstitious as they were before the Revolution. Yet, as Scott (fn. 37) persuasively argues, whatever the flaws of the poor peasantry, they do far better for themselves and for all of society than those who would war upon them.

Backlash against Reform

Maoism did not liberate the peasant poor. Moreover, it left them in no position to liberate others. It left narrow-minded, envious, and nativist sections of the poor threatening many of the gains won through recent reforms that further openness, prosperity, and internationalism. But the traditional poor peasants are not alone in their antireform passions. Such emotions have been kindled in many sectors of society. The experience of seeing foreign students obtaining better rooms and food than Chinese students, of seeing market-oriented peasants do better than white-collar urbanites, of seeing foreign tourists and businessmen placed in luxury accommodations that are, as in the Mao era, off-limits to most Chinese, fosters resentment. In their quest for a singular revolutionary liberation, the liberation theologians misunderstand the *problématique* of social progress. Gains in the painful passage through modernity can be ambiguous and fragile, not only in China, and not only for the poor—with both the beneficiaries and the obstacles refractory, contradictory, and explosive.

Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge embodies this social fascism. This "fascism is produced" by a joining of the "peasants's ancient distrust of the city and towns, the tax collector and the intellectual" with the theories of leaders about commerce and imperialism "and the role that the city, the bureaucrats, the middle class, and the intellectuals play to help imperialists and corporations oppress the peasant." Elizabeth Becker, *When the War Was Over: The Voices of Cambodia's Revolution and Its People* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), 152.

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IDEOLOGY AND LEARNING IN SOVIET THIRD WORLD POLICY

By GEORGE W. BRESLAUER*

Francis Fukuyama, *Moscow's Post-Brezhnev Reassessment of the Third World*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1986, 91 pp.
Jerry F. Hough, *The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1986, 293 pp.
Mark N. Katz, *The Third World in Soviet Military Thought*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982, 188 pp.
S. Neil MacFarlane, *Superpower Rivalry and 3rd World Radicalism: The Idea of National Liberation*. London: Croom Helm, 1985, 238 pp.
R. Judson Mitchell, *Ideology of a Superpower: Contemporary Soviet Doctrine on International Relations*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1982, 159 pp.
Daniel S. Papp, *Soviet Perceptions of the Developing World in the 1980s: The Ideological Basis*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1985, 176 pp.
Elizabeth K. Valkenier, *The Soviet Union and the Third World: An Economic Bind*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983, 188 pp.

SINCE World War II, Soviet policy in the Third World has gone through regular, frequent cycles, marked by different emphases in the choice of foreign policy targets and by different expectations about the nature and magnitude of the gain to be had from foreign policy initiatives. Stalin was generally disinterested in global competition in regions that were assumed to be dominated by the "imperialist" camp; he tended (with some exceptions) to deny support to nationalist regimes and radical social movements alike. Khrushchev's break-out into the Third World in the 1950's focused on nationalist regimes (India, Indonesia, Ghana, etc.) as well as radical social movements ("national liberation movements"); it was based on the expectation that, in the near future, there would be a large number of socialist states in the Third World, and that they would become allies of the socialist camp against the imperialist camp.

Those expectations were dashed in the early and mid-1960s. Brezhnev initially fostered a lowering of expectations about the prospects for radicalism in the Third World and about the gains to be derived from investing heavily in Third World activism; instead, he placed new empha-

* I would like to thank the following colleagues for their comments on an earlier draft of this article: Andrew Carpendale, Alexander George, Ernst Haas, Stephen Hanson, Jacques Lévesque, and Alex Pravda.

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sis on pragmatic economic and political relations with selected nationalist regimes. That changed in the 1970s, when Brezhnev reemphasized assistance to *radical* regimes and movements in the Third World and displayed high expectations of considerable near-term payoffs in the struggle with imperialism. By the 1980s, though, these expectations were thwarted as well; the result was greater Soviet activism in seeking political influence among nationalist regimes (Mexico, Brazil, ASEAN, for example), smaller expectations of payoffs from investing in radicalism, and, in general, reduced expectations of large new strategic gains from competition in the Third World as a whole.[1]

In light of this cyclical pattern, what are the consequences for Soviet perceptions and perspectives? Have the periodic retrenchments been, in Soviet eyes, mere respites for digesting gains and awaiting new opportunities? Or have they been accompanied by cumulating intellectual and political reevaluations of basic assumptions? And, since ideology has surely played some role in motivating and shaping Soviet competitive behavior in the Third World, what has been the impact on Soviet ideology of the ups and downs of the Soviet Union's experience with Third World competition?

In recent years, a large (and still growing) body of literature has documented the evolution of Soviet official and specialist perspectives on the Third World during the 1970s and 1980s. The works under review allow one to explore the interaction of ideology and learning in Soviet Third World policy, and to advance on previous thinking about the role of ideology in Soviet foreign policy more generally. One of the unfortunate consequences of earlier assertions that Soviet foreign policy had become "pragmatic," or had substituted "national interest" for ideology,[2] was that they obscured the fact that certain core values, commitments, assumptions, and predispositions remained very much alive among Soviet decision makers. While seeking to protect their national security, Soviet leaders simultaneously sought to advance these values in their international behavior, based upon ideologically influenced assumptions about the nature of the international political order.

A more differentiated and structured approach to the problem treats foreign policy ideologies as four-dimensional.[3] From this standpoint, ide-

[1] For useful surveys of the historical evolution of Soviet policy in the Third World, see Stephen T. Hosmer and Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Policy and Practice Toward Third World Conflicts* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1982), and Carol R. Saivetz and Sylvia Woodby, *Soviet-Third World Relations* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985).

[2] For a trenchant discussion of analytic problems in much literature on this topic, see Hannes Adomeit, "Ideology in the Soviet View of International Affairs," in Christoph Bertram, ed., *Prospects of Soviet Power in the 1980s* (London: Macmillan, 1980), 103-10.

[3] In suggesting that we think of ideologies as four-dimensional, I am following Alexander

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ologies comprise *normative commitments* to the realization of a desired end-state, *philosophical assumptions* about human nature and about the course of historical development, *empirical beliefs* about the character of the contemporary international era, and *strategic prescriptions* for the conduct of foreign policy. The normative dimension incorporates attitudes and preferences; the philosophical and empirical dimensions incorporate beliefs at different levels of generality and falsifiability; and the prescriptive dimension incorporates more detailed beliefs about the relationship between current policy actions and likely outcomes.

The Leninist-Stalinist tradition shaped the original content of each of these dimensions of Soviet foreign policy ideology.[4] Leninist ideology included a commitment to "make the world safe for socialism," both by maintaining Soviet power in the U.S.S.R. and by providing varied sorts and degrees of assistance to radical and other "anti-imperialist" forces abroad. Thus, it became the historical responsibility of the party leadership to reconcile these normative imperatives by seizing opportunities for expanding the anti-imperialist camp without jeopardizing the continuation of party power in the socialist homeland.

In pursuit of these goals, Soviet strategies were conditioned by philosophical assumptions: that, historically, time was on the side of socialism, and that the victory of socialism on a world scale was ultimately inevitable; that, until then, conflict, war, and change would be the normal conditions of international politics; that, in the interim, history would proceed in ebbs and flows to which the U.S.S.R. must adjust; but that, in the longer term, progress would be unilinear rather than cyclical, and gains for socialism would cumulate.

Empirical beliefs about the character of the contemporary era (in this case, the 20th century) were also components of the Leninist heritage: that imperialism in this stage of its final crisis was diabolical and conspiratorial; that the struggle with the imperialist enemy was zero-sum in character; that imperialism would seek to inflict cumulative losses on socialism if given the opportunity; but that growing contradictions among

George, "Ideology and International Relations: A Conceptual Analysis," paper prepared for a conference on "Ideology and Its Influence on International Politics" (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, January 7-9, 1985). My labels for the dimensions differ from George's, as does my specification of the content of each dimension. Other terms could be used to characterize what I am calling "ideology." "World-view" and "elite political culture" perhaps come closest. For a catalogue of the numerous ways in which the term ideology has been used in social science, see Robert D. Putnam, "Studying Elite Political Culture: The Case of 'Ideology,'" *American Political Science Review* 65 (September 1971), 651-81.

[4] For the classic catalogue of the components of that tradition, see Nathan Leites, *The Operational Code of the Politburo* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951), and his *A Study of Bolshevism* (Glencoe, IL.: The Free Press, 1953). For a reformulation, see Alexander L. George, "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making," *International Studies Quarterly* 13 (June 1969), 190-222.

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imperialist forces and growing opposition to imperialist exploitation among the peoples of the Third World would frustrate imperialist efforts to turn back the clock of history.

Finally, strategic prescriptions for the conduct of struggle on the international stage encouraged Soviet leaders to seize opportunities for advance only after careful calculation of costs, risks, and likely payoffs, but then to push to the limit of attainable, cumulative gains. At the same time, though, strategic prescriptions called for avoiding adventurism, for knowing when to stop, and for retreating before superior force. Because of such contradictions (e.g., "push to the limit" but "know when to stop"), there was a great deal of ambiguity about the extent to which these strategic prescriptions could serve as consistent guides to action. This ambiguity lent a contingent quality to specific Soviet international behavior, which defied easy prediction from knowledge of Leninist strategic prescriptions even when other dimensions of the ideological heritage influenced foreign policy deliberations and decisions.

The literature under review evokes questions that can be posed in terms of this four-dimensional treatment of Soviet ideology: Have documented changes in Soviet perceptions of the current situation eroded broader empirical beliefs about the nature of the contemporary era, or eroded philosophical assumptions and normative commitments at the core of the ideological heritage? Have recent experiences given Soviet leaders reason for a diminished belief in the *validity* of philosophical assumptions about the unilinear and ultimately irreversible character of radical change in the Third World? Are they less inclined to believe in the *feasibility* of realizing normative commitments to head up an ever-growing, anti-imperialist alliance of states, at acceptable cost and risk to the security of the socialist homeland? In sum, what kind of learning has the Soviet leadership engaged in as a result of its experiences in the Third World in general, but especially during the 1970s?

Note that I am treating (and defining) learning as a process of cognitive reevaluation rather than as an observed change in behavior.[5] In the books under review, the authors are less interested in how Soviet policy in the Third World has changed over time than in how Soviet policy makers and policy influentials have altered their appraisal of the situation they face in seeking to advance their long-range goals. Moreover, as a process of cognitive reevaluation, learning is not being defined narrowly—for example, as requiring a change in fundamental assumptions. Rather, I treat

[5] I am grateful to Stephen E. Hanson for drawing my attention to this definitional distinction. For discussion of different schools of thought about how to define individual "learning," see Spencer A. Rathus, *Psychology* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1984).

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both ideology and learning as multidimensional phenomena. Learning can be a process of normative, philosophical, empirical, or strategic reevaluation. The question becomes: what learning has taken place at each level of the ideology?

The literature under review is composed of works that bear on the first three of these levels. Since the results of current Soviet strategic reevaluations are not yet apparent, we cannot determine whether current Soviet rethinking of general perspectives will result in changes of strategic prescriptions for the conduct of competition in the Third World. The authors are interested primarily in documenting the evolution of general Soviet perspectives on one aspect of the international order.[6] For the most part, they follow Soviet theoretical literature in generalizing about the nature of the Third World; they do not usually discuss the circumstances that surrounded specific Soviet decisions with respect to specific countries or continents. Hence, readers interested in why the Soviets took the actions they did in Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Afghanistan, and so on, must search elsewhere for the answers.

Yet these works do provide mutually reinforcing evidence for the proposition that in the early and mid-1970s Soviet leaders had high expectations for cumulative, radical change in the Third World—change that would alter the balance at the expense of imperialism and to the advantage of the socialist camp. The studies also document that, since the late 1970s, a precipitous decline in expectations—and a shift in focus—has occurred. (Most Sovietological analysts refer to this phenomenon in the language of mood changes: a rise and decline of optimism. I will attempt, where appropriate, to use more precise terminology.) By examining the character of such cognitive reevaluations, and by placing them in the context of earlier reactions to frustrated expectations, we may gain insight into the nature (i.e., level and extent) of the learning that has taken place.

The Post-Stalin Background: 1956-1969

A major example of philosophical learning occurred during the first years after Stalin's death. The implications of nuclear weapons for the advance of socialism and Soviet power in the contemporary world caused

[6] For an impressive study which argues that Soviet strategic prescriptions for dealing with crisis situations have changed little since Stalin and continue to mirror the strategic prescriptions discussed in Leites's work (fn. 4), see Hannes Adomeit, *Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1982). I discuss strategic prescriptions more fully in "Updating the Operational Code of the Politburo," in Albert Salter, ed., *Soviet Propaganda and Disinformation* (forthcoming).

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Khrushchev to introduce doctrinal revisions in 1956 that effectively removed the apocalyptic element from the philosophical assumptions about the means by which socialism would ultimately prevail. The "fatalistic inevitability of war" was discarded; "peaceful transition to socialism," especially within the imperialist camp, was now accepted as a realistic possibility; and the image of a world marked by two camps, poised in irreconcilable confrontation, was replaced by that of a world in which the two camps had a common interest in avoiding nuclear war, and in which the decolonizing world constituted a promising arena for relatively safe competition in the nuclear age.

Still, the fundamental assumption that socialism would cumulate gains in the world at the expense of imperialism had not changed. If anything, a *rise* in expectations of competitive gains coincided with this *decline* in the apocalyptic component of the philosophical dimension. In contrast to Stalin, Khrushchev began to compete vigorously with the West for the allegiance of Third World nationalist regimes that he viewed as inclined toward anti-imperialism in their foreign policies and toward socialism in their domestic policies. In the late 1950s, Khrushchev went still further: he proclaimed the emergence of a bandwagoning tendency in the Third World, as newly decolonized countries declared themselves to be emulating the Soviet model of development and began to ally themselves with the socialist camp. By developing its own economy and lending relatively low-risk support to anti-imperialist forces in the Third World, Khrushchev argued, the Soviet Union would avoid nuclear war and simultaneously advance the cause of socialism in a zero-sum struggle with imperialism.

This perception of the rapid transformation of the imperialist-dominated international system proved to be short-lived—a consequence of setbacks in the Third World, declining prospects for U.S.-Soviet detente, a slowdown in the rate of Soviet economic growth, and the Sino-Soviet schism. By the early 1960s, Soviet perspectives had changed. A more sober, prolonged timetable for the victory of anti-imperialist forces emerged in the authoritative Soviet literature.

Several extraordinary features of Khrushchevian ideological revision during 1963-1964 are documented in a seminal study by William Zimmerman.[7] Khrushchev's growing pessimism about the transformability of the international order was reinforced by a sudden, strong fear of accidental or catalytic nuclear war and by pessimism about the Soviet

[7] This part of the discussion, including the three previous paragraphs, is based on William Zimmerman, *Soviet Perspectives on International Relations, 1956-1967* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969).

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Union's ability to create unity within the world communist movement. He therefore subordinated the task of global competition to that of superpower cooperation. Taken together, these changes amounted to an open questioning of the validity of certain philosophical assumptions and the feasibility of ever fully realizing certain normative commitments at an acceptable risk.

By 1967, Khrushchev's successors formally rejected these revisions of 1963-1964 while maintaining the more differentiated view of the international order that had been incorporated into Soviet empirical beliefs during 1956-1963 as well as the philosophical revisions introduced at the 20th Party Congress in 1956. The reaction of the Brezhnev regime placed competition back on an equal footing with superpower cooperation, increased commitments to certain allies within the world communist movement, and returned to a more diabolical image of the imperialist enemy. However, this reaction also incorporated lower expectations about the indigenous course of events in the Third World (with respect to both radical and nationalist regimes and movements as well as to the prospects for an anti-imperialist front), and further prolonged the time perspective for victory in the global struggle.

Yet, the Brezhnev reaction was only that—a reaction. Although it extended the time perspective for victory, it did not show signs of discarding either the belief in or the commitment to ultimate victory. Nor did it abandon a bifurcated view of the international order and the faith that a resurgence of Third World radicalism was only a matter of time. Accordingly, the detente years were accompanied by a resurgence of official optimism about the Soviet Union's ability simultaneously to avoid nuclear war and to witness and assist a decisive shift in the global correlation of forces to the advantage of socialism. The literature under review describes these beliefs.

Rising Expectations under Brezhnev

In *Ideology of a Superpower*, R. Judson Mitchell seeks to document and specify the optimism that emerged in authoritative Soviet speeches and articles between 1974 and 1976. The picture drawn by Mitchell is that of a highly ambitious global power, which perceived that the tide of history had shifted decisively in its favor, and which was inclined—perhaps determined—to exploit that situation to the fullest. Soviet theoretical writings emphasized polarization and conflict in the Third World as a condition and a means for furthering the detachment of units from the imperialist camp and their attachment to the socialist camp. They viewed

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Third World radicalism as resurgent, and as prospectively a reliable ally of the U.S.S.R. The United States was considered to be a world power in decline, and for that reason obliged to come to terms with the U.S.S.R. on the latter's conditions. Soviet writers perceived the enemy as being effectively deterred from attacking the U.S.S.R. or its allies because the Soviet Union had attained strategic nuclear parity. The international order was now viewed as being conducive to a pro-Soviet bandwagon, in which Soviet gains could cumulate rapidly.[8]

Other studies support Mitchell's basic conclusion that, during the early detente years, the Soviet leaders went through a period of high expectations about their ability to gain the advantages of detente, including the avoidance of confrontation, without sacrificing their commitment to exploit the rapidly growing opportunities for competitive gains in the Third World.

Thus, in *The Third World in Soviet Military Thought*, a careful study of military literature, Mark Katz discovers a surge of optimism at this time about the Soviet Union's ability to advance the cause of Third World radicalism at relatively low cost and risk. Specifically, between 1969 and 1975, a set of beliefs about Soviet policy in the Third World emerged in the military literature that mirrored the findings of Mitchell's research (and that of others)[9] in the party literature:

—the correlation of forces between East and West was shifting decisively in the direction of socialism;

—revolutionary prospects were high for radical forces in the Third World, with only limited Soviet military aid required to assure victory and irreversibility;

—peaceful coexistence would make it less likely that a forward strategy would result in an American military response;

—even without detente, the Soviet Union's recently acquired military strength would deter an escalatory response from the imperialist camp;

—a Marxist-Leninist party that came to power in Third World coun-

[8] On "bandwagoning" tendencies in world politics (which are counterposed to "balancing" tendencies), see Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), and Stephen Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," *International Security* 9 (Spring 1985), 3-43.

[9] See, for example, Coit D. Blacker, "The Kremlin and Detente: Soviet Conceptions, Hopes, and Expectations," in Alexander George, *Managing US-Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis-Prevention* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982), 119-38; Jacques Lévesque, *The USSR and the Cuban Revolution: Soviet Ideological and Strategic Perspectives, 1959-1977* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1978), chap. 6; Adam B. Ulam, *Dangerous Relations: The Soviet Union in World Politics, 1970-1982* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 146-48; David E. Albright, "Vanguard Parties and Revolutionary Change in the Third World: The Soviet Perspective," mimeo (Montgomery, Ala., Air War College, 1986).

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tries and aligned its foreign policy with that of the U.S.S.R. could make radical changes in the Third World both irreversible and cumulative.

S. Neil MacFarlane's skillful study, *Superpower Rivalry and 3rd World Radicalism*, incorporates extensive research into the writings of high party officials and specialists in the Soviet Academy of Sciences, reaching conclusions about this period that reinforce those of Katz and Mitchell.[10] McFarlane finds that, after the diminished expectations of the early post-Khrushchev years,

> in the early and mid-1970's, the U.S.S.R. faced an environment in the Third World in which important constraints limiting its activities had been removed or weakened, important stimuli for such activity had emerged or re-emerged, and its capabilities to undertake such activities had increased (p. 140).

This new-found perception of opportunity induced a shift in the dominant foreign policy mood in Moscow.

Elizabeth Valkenier, in *The Soviet Union and the Third World*, examines the specialist literature on Soviet economic relations with the Third World and discovers patterns that supplement those we have been outlining thus far. Valkenier's periodization, however, is somewhat different from that of the others, principally because she inquires into economic rather than military-political issues. She treats the period 1965-1974 as one during which the Soviets adopted a more pragmatic, self-interested approach to economic relations with radical and nationalist forces in the Third World while retaining an optimistic perspective on the course of global economic competition between the two camps. Although they had abandoned the Khrushchevian euphoria about the imminent victory of the socialist market, they retained their zero-sum perspective, geared toward recruiting former colonies into "an alternate, socialist international division of labor" "that would eventually supplant the existing system dominated by the rapacious West" (pp. 47, 21). Similarly, while their perspective on economic development in the Third World was more sober than that professed under Khrushchev, "the ultimate goal of development was still liberation from Western domination and exploitation, as well as the elimination of capitalist relations" (p. 80). Indeed, when the oil shock of 1973-1974 was followed by demands for a New International Economic Order, the Soviets expressed considerable "optimism about the thrust of the Third World's demands for the reconstruction of global eco-

[10] MacFarlane's study also contains lengthy discussion of conceptions of national self-determination and national liberation in the Marxist tradition and in contemporary Third World thought.

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nomic relations, the leverage the developing countries could exert, and the ability of the Soviet Union to shape the new forces" (p. 112). These rising expectations were also reflected in Brezhnev's address to the 25th Party Congress (1976).

The perspectives of this period differed from the Khrushchevian ones of the late 1950s (in both their security and economic dimensions) in that they did not envisage an imminent fundamental transformation of the international order; yet they were similar in their Leninist optimism that anticipated the possibility of imminent cumulative gains by anti-imperialist and pro-Soviet forces in the Third World.

If our analysis ended at this point—the mid-1970s—we might conclude that very little learning had taken place in Soviet thinking about the Third World since the philosophical revisions of 1956. We might argue that Soviet policy makers remain inclined to exaggerate opportunities for gain among both radical and nationalist forces and very eager to seize such opportunities when they are available at low risk to their national security. We would view the mid- to late 1960s as a respite between offensives, in anticipation of new opportunities. But the literature under review includes books that document the decline in expectations since the mid-1970s and continuing to the present.

Declining Expectations in the 1980s

Many of these studies proved to be mutually reinforcing, not only in documenting rising expectations among three communities of policy influentials—party, military, and specialist—but also in documenting declining expectations among all three groups. According to MacFarlane, the changing fortunes of Soviet policy in the Third World "led to the reemergence of a more jaundiced view of what the Soviets perceived to be non-marxist-leninist leftists in the Third World" (pp. 140-41).

Katz finds this change reflected in the military literature of 1976-1981. In particular, he sees a heightened consciousness of the reversibility of radical gains in the Third World: "Particularly pessimistic has been their assessment of the ability of a Third World nation that has entered onto the path of socialist development to maintain that path" (p. 96). Previous optimism about the staying power of "progressive military regimes" has also evaporated. And a new type of war has entered the classification scheme of the Soviet military: wars by newly socialist regimes against internal and external opponents backed by imperialists (in Angola, Mozambique, Kampuchea, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua). It is no longer

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taken for granted that socialist forces will remain victorious and retain power.

A similar decline in expectations characterizes Soviet military discussions of the prospects for alliance formation and alliance maintenance in the Third World. There is a new stress on the unreliability of indigenous forces. And, "as for the rest of the non-capitalist but also non-socialist Third World, the Soviets appear to have given up hope of it becoming allied to the USSR" (p. 117). In order to prevent the worst, they now acknowledge that "more and more direct Soviet involvement" in conflicts would be required (p. 115). Still, Katz believes that the military literature is playing down the Soviet Union's commitment to defend regimes of "socialist orientation."

Valkenier's book lends further support to this change in perceptions. Since the mid-1970s, she has detected a new perspective in the Soviet specialist literature on economic relations with the Third World—a perspective that has been reflected in leaders' speeches as well as in policy shifts. A "pessimistic and sober tone" has accompanied

> an implicit, if not explicit, admission in government circles and the academic community that the establishment of an alternate, worldwide economic order, patterned on integration arrangements set up in the CMEA, is both an impossible and an impractical proposition. To one extent or another, Soviet officials and scholars now admit that the Socialist countries have to act in a world that resists bifurcation (p. 26).[11]

This attitude has been voiced by Politburo members and leading officials of the Central Committee alike. Valkenier notes that some specialists have gone still further: they have substituted a "global interdependence" perspective for the previous "two-camp" doctrine on international economic relations. This revision has received some echo in leaders' speeches and in Soviet policy toward aid, superpower economic cooperation in the Third World, and Third World demands for a New International Economic Order.

The Struggle for the Third World, by Jerry Hough, is an encyclopedic outline of debates among Soviet academic specialists on the Third World that reinforces Valkenier's conclusion. Hough finds that Soviet scholarly debates have been marked by growing complexity over time, by the emergence and relative strengthening of contending schools of thought, and by a secular decline in expectations about the direction of change in

[11] The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) is the East European equivalent of the Common Market.

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the Third World.[12] Thus, he points out the growing pessimism among specialists about the ability of socialist countries in the Third World to outperform capitalist countries economically: "It is difficult to find those who treat the socialist path as the preferable path of development from an economic point of view" (p. 99). Hough's study is more comprehensive than Valkenier's in that it deals with political and military relations as well as economic ones. He discovers growing numbers of specialists who doubt the ability of radical forces in the Third World to make the transition to socialism in the foreseeable future; growing awareness that unanticipated local factors—not imperialist machinations—explain the failures of Third World radicalism; growing skepticism about the political payoffs of Soviet military and economic aid to Third World countries; growing concern that these governments might be using the Soviet Union opportunistically; and growing fear of the potential for crisis escalation in certain regions.

Francis Fukuyama's *Moscow's Post-Brezhnev Reassessment of the Third World* is a concise study of selected publications by Soviet scholars, officials, military commentators, and party leaders. It deepens the findings of Katz and MacFarlane, which do not extend beyond the late-Brezhnev era, and those of Hough and Valkenier, which concentrate largely on specialist literature. Fukuyama finds that three themes have become more prominent in Soviet articles and speeches since the death of Brezhnev: (1) that Soviet economic stringency requires more modest pursuit of potentially costly Third World activism; (2) that the collapse of detente requires lower expectations about the ability to assist Third World radicalism without sacrificing higher-priority foreign policy goals (the fruits of detente and of the avoidance of confrontation); and (3) that a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party in Third World countries is unlikely to provide a durable, long-term basis for the consolidation of Soviet influence. Fukuyama argues that these points are invoked in the literature to justify a policy of diminished Third World activism on the part of the Soviet Union. In an examination of the relationship between theory and behavior, however, he discovers that an actual policy of retrenchment is not yet in evidence. He concludes, therefore, that current debates are likely to be discussions about the course of future action in case new opportunities appear to open up.[13]

[12] Hough does not attempt to document the optimism of the early 1970s; nor does he deny its existence. He is more concerned with documenting the decline in optimism about the Third World that has taken place among Soviet academics since Khrushchev's euphoric expectations were shattered.

[13] The decline of optimism in party, specialist, and military literature is also ably analyzed in Albright (fn. 9); a useful update of this decline in party and specialist literature is found in

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Daniel Papp's study, *Soviet Perceptions of the Developing World in the 1980s*, encompasses a broad array of party, specialist, and military literature published between 1980 and 1984. Both the research design (which, like Fukuyama's, does not involve a close comparison with the literature of the early 1970s), and the purpose of the study (which, unlike Fukuyama's, seeks to display the points of consensus about the Third World that unite even Soviet debaters, as well as the features of that consensus that are consistent with the Leninist ideological heritage) lead this book toward themes, emphases, and conclusions somewhat different from those of the other volumes under review. Basing his inquiry upon a reading of secondary literature about Soviet perspectives of the 1970s, Papp acknowledges a decline in the optimism of the 1970s with respect to all three factors identified by Fukuyama (Papp, 24-25, 32-33, 39, 84-85, 90-91, 117-118, 136, 137). However, he views this decline as a minor deviation from a larger theme: the fundamental optimism about the long term and the fundamental antagonism toward imperialism, both of which continue to inform almost all literature published in the U.S.S.R. during the 1980s: "All Soviet analysts deny that regressive revolutions have any long-term impact on the historical process itself. Despite occasional setbacks, the historical trend toward socialism remains unchanged and inevitable" (pp. 36-37).

When the issue is not the *fact* of changes in Soviet expectations for the 1980s (on which all the authors under review agree) but rather the interpretation of their significance, the differences widen. Specifically, the authors diverge in their opinions about the implications of recent perceptual changes for elite learning with respect to (1) the feasibility of realizing normative commitments; (2) the validity of philosophical assumptions about the course of history; and (3) the validity of empirical beliefs about the nature of the contemporary era. It is to this question of the relationship between ideology and learning that we now return.

Ideology and Learning

MacFarlane joins Papp in playing down the possibility that the recent decline in Soviet expectations may have implications for fundamental learning:

> The evidence in this chapter does not appear to support the hypothesis that Soviet analyses of Third World problems, and the policies which presum-

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Elizabeth K. Valkenier, "Revolutionary Change in the Third World: Recent Soviet Reassessments," *World Politics* 38 (April 1986), 415-34.

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> ably draw to some extent from these analyses display a Soviet "learning curve" with regard to Third World politics. The basic outlines of Soviet doctrine on the Third World have remained quite stable since the death of Stalin. What variation occurs tends to be cyclical, and can be accounted for largely in terms of political exigency and shifts in Soviet attitudes between optimism and pessimism with regard to their own development, the international correlation of forces, and the course of events in the Third World (MacFarlane, 185-86).

Presumably, these shifts between optimism and pessimism, while deepening Soviet appreciation of specific complexities in the Third World, have not created cumulative revisions in perspective that would undermine belief in central postulates of the ideological heritage beyond the revisions introduced in 1956.

Although arguing that "all Soviet analysts and ideologues, at least on the public level, remain firmly wedded to Marxism-Leninism's accuracy and utility" (p. 137), Papp allows for the possibility of major changes resulting from the recent reevaluation. But his view of the nature of these changes, and the means by which they would come about, differs greatly from the learning envisaged by other authors. Papp proposes, for example, that "too many questions [about the current course of Third World development], even if all are relatively minor, may undermine the persuasiveness of major ideological tenets, even if those major tenets are not at first questioned" (p. 136). He does not explain, however, why core beliefs should collapse when peripheral beliefs erode.[14] A second route is a loss of faith borne of the frequent changes in regime policy: "Even a devoted Marxist-Leninist may become cynical about the content of his ideology if it argues that the USSR can either provide extensive support for progressive change or ignore progressive change. Too much policy flexibility can undermine ideology . . ." (p. 136). Here, too, Papp does not elaborate on the consequences; specifically, what core postulates would guide the thinking of a disillusioned Soviet ideologue as he formulated Third World policy?

Hough and Valkenier would surely disagree with both MacFarlane and Papp. Both of the former emphasize the unprecedented substantive content of the most recent Soviet reevaluations of the Third World. Both point to the emergence of a "global interdependence" perspective, economic as well as political, reflected in speeches both by Central Committee officials and by academics, that is incompatible with belief in the inevitable polarization and bifurcation of the international political and

[14] On the relationship between changes in core and peripheral beliefs, see Milton Rokeach, *The Open and Closed Mind* (New York: Basic Books, 1960).

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economic orders. (For a Leninist regime, an admission of global political interdependence is more difficult to accept and espouse than an admission of global economic interdependence. A Leninist regime will usually seek to reinforce insulation of the political realm from contamination at a time of growing economic interdependence.) In addition, both Hough and Valkenier point to new thinking among high party officials about the long-term (though not indefinite) prospects for Third World economic and political development—thinking that is incompatible with the proposition that the Soviet model of development will again be perceived as applicable to the Third World in the foreseeable future. They also point to the expressed concern of Soviet officials that many Third World situations may turn out to be not only zero-sum games, but negative-sum games, in which both superpowers lose. That constitutes not just "ideology erosion," but a fundamental challenge to core philosophical assumptions and empirical beliefs.

Neither Hough nor Valkenier interprets these changes as resulting in Soviet leaders believing that competition for influence and allies in the Third World should be abandoned or is a pursuit that fails to bring benefits to the U.S.S.R. Rather, both stress that the ambitiousness of competitive goals, the modalities of competition, the propensity to become engaged in radical ventures, and the potential receptivity to cooperative (and partially accommodative) U.S. gestures will in all likelihood be quite different from the positions of the 1970s in light of the fundamental learning that has taken place.

These arguments may be reinforced by several other features of the contemporary Soviet landscape that could facilitate cognitive reevaluation.

Politics

Current learning processes are taking place at a time of broad generational change throughout the Soviet political, military, and specialist establishments (a point strongly emphasized by Hough). Moreover, this generational change coincides with a major political succession in the party leadership. Both of these political changes facilitate regime learning by providing the impetus, political incentive, and political opportunity for a significant reevaluation of assumptions.[15]

[15] The impact of political succession on Soviet foreign policy change since Stalin is explored in George W. Breslauer, "Political Succession and Soviet Foreign Policy," paper presented at the World Congress of the Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Washington, DC, November 1985.

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Knowledge Environment

The network of Soviet institutes and academic specialists, and the volume of their publications, have increased enormously since the retrenchment of the mid-1960s. Within the Academy, the emergence of multiple schools of thought and the growing appreciation of complexity make available to Soviet leaders and Central Committee officials a steady stream of analyses that may be used to legitimize fundamental reevaluations or to de-legitimize simplistic policy prescriptions. (On the other hand, Hough, p. 257, points to several features of the structure of Soviet institutes that could impede learning.)

Precedent

Since the present period of declining expectations is the third in less than 25 years, it will be more difficult for overly optimistic Soviet officials to sell the argument that the current ebbing of the "radical" tide is a passing phenomenon. Moreover, there are noteworthy parallels between the present situation and Khrushchev's core revisions of 1963-1964. Both then and now, there was a sense of urgency in high party circles about the course of the arms race. Both then and now, a sense of economic stringency on the domestic front caused a reevaluation of foreign policies. Both then and now, ambivalence was growing about the burden placed on the Soviet Union by extended alliance commitments. Both then and now, Moscow's expectations about the ability to protect superpower collaboration from the fallout resulting from Third World competition had recently been disappointed. Both then and now, a strong leader was in power, capable of pushing through changes of direction. And both then and now, a "world system" perspective suddenly emerged in the academic literature, and was echoed in the statements of some leaders.

More recent evidence than that in the books by Hough and Valkenier further supports the case for fundamental learning and for parallels with 1963-1964. Mikhail Gorbachev's speech to the 27th Party Congress (February 1986) incorporated the theme of global interdependence (both economic and political) and virtually ignored Third World radicalism.[16] Moreover, Gorbachev appointed Anatolyi Dobrynin, the former Ambassador to the United States, to replace Boris Ponomarev as head of the International Department of the Central Committee, which is responsible for Soviet relations with Third World regimes and movements. This extraordinary appointment suggests a determination to ensure that Soviet Third World policy is sensitive to goals with higher priority.[17] That

[16] *Pravda*, February 26, 1986.

[17] Global interdependence themes that emphasize the need for superpower crisis-preven-

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brings us to a final consideration that could facilitate far-reaching learning.

Priorities

The Third World is not a high-priority item within Soviet foreign policy. Issues closer to home (Europe, China, border security) and issues central to the Soviet-American political-military relationship are, and long have been, of far greater importance to Soviet leaders. Studies of Soviet debates about NATO and about China reveal a much narrower band within which disagreement takes place.[18] Precisely because most Third World issues are not so close to Soviet national security concerns, it is easier to legitimize positions that, in other issue areas, would be condemned as "revisionist" or would gain few followers. Put differently, the political price to be paid for deep-seated learning may be lower in this area than in others.

Those who deny the actuality of fundamental learning can reply that such arguments underestimate the difficulty of revising normative commitments and philosophical assumptions in the foreign policy of an ideological regime that has little to show in the way of sustained progress toward the ideological vision on which its domestic policy is based. This, in fact, is a major theme of R. Judson Mitchell's book. Moreover, the case against fundamental learning could be strengthened by pointing to a variety of epistemological, political, and international factors that impede "revisionism."

Epistemological Factors

Cognitive consistency theory emphasizes the universal human obstacles to changing core attitudes and beliefs. Given the nature of the human mind, predictions of continuity are better bets than predictions of change.[19] But beyond such universal tendencies (and they are only tendencies, for fundamental learning does occur regularly), there are distinc-

tion regimes can also be found in V. Zhurkin et al., *Global Problems of Mankind and the State* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1985), and E. Primakov, "Put' v budushchee," *Pravda*, January 22, 1986, p. 4. Some implications of the acceptance in Moscow and Washington of "negative-sum" images of Third World competition are discussed in Alexander L. George, "Problems of Crisis-Management and Crisis-Avoidance in U.S.-Soviet Relations," paper presented to the Nobel Institute Symposium on War and Peace Research, Oslo, Norway, June 1985.

[18] Michael Sodaro, "Soviet Studies of the Western Alliance," in Herbert J. Ellison, ed., *Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983), 234-65; Gilbert Rozman, "Moscow's China-Watchers in the Post-Mao Era: The Response to a Changing China," *The China Quarterly* 94 (June 1983), 215-41.

[19] On elite learning (and non-learning), see Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 217-315.

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tive features of the Soviet ideological heritage that would reinforce a prediction of fundamental continuity. Philosophical assumptions built into the Leninist heritage are essentially unfalsifiable; hence, they resist reality-testing. This is especially true of all assumptions that are not time-bound (e.g., that victory is "ultimately" inevitable). Premises that cannot be disproven until an *unspecified* future can always be defended against rejection by rationalizing that insufficient time has passed to draw conclusions. In the case of the Leninist ideological heritage, the open-ended time dimension is crucial to precisely those assumptions that are intended to buttress the normative commitments of the regime and its legitimizing message. Since normative commitments are empirically falsifiable only by demonstrating that the desirable is unfeasible, philosophical assumptions that are not time-bound simply reinforce normative commitments.

Political Factors

R. Judson Mitchell and many others make the plausible case that competitive globalism, based on "two-camp" thinking, is crucial to the legitimation of Soviet power at home—in the eyes of both elite and mass audiences. Hence, concessionary policies or policies of abdication in the Third World would be difficult to justify and sustain over extended periods. Even if rhetoric about total victory has become a ritualized component of the legitimizing strategy of the CPSU (or a "vital lie" in the political establishment's identity-maintenance), it affects the political climate of decision making, provides recurring opportunities for traditionalist thinkers to seize the political initiative, and creates a constant temptation to engage in wishful thinking. Those who argue that, to some degree, exaggerated optimism, two-camp competition, unilinear thinking about history, and a predisposition to perceive bandwagoning rather than balancing tendencies in world politics, all are fundamental to regime identity and legitimation in the U.S.S.R. have a point that has not been addressed or defused by their critics.

Fukuyama's research suggests still another political constraint on fundamental learning. Recall that Fukuyama identifies three justifications for diminishing expectations of gain from Third World activism—economic stringency, impact on higher-priority goals, and political instability even among states of "socialist orientation." But he then demonstrates that the individual arguments tend to cluster around identifiable communities of commentators. Economic stringency is emphasized by members of the Politburo. Damage to detente is cited by key figures in the journalistic and scholarly communities. Regional factors are stressed by leading officials within the International Department of the Central

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Committee. To be sure, Hough and Valkenier point out that the scholaraly community is more diverse than this breakdown suggests, and Albright has shown that considerable differences of perspective exist within the International Department.[20] Fukuyama's clusters may be caused by the size of his sample. If they reflect a genuine tendency, however, they remind us of additional impediments to fundamental learning: (1) the degree and type of diversity of perspectives within the Politburo, and within deliberations of the Politburo, may be quite different from those within the journalistic and scholarly communities; and (2) when policy makers or policy influentials draw the same lesson for different reasons, their perspectives are likely to evolve in diverse directions, for objective circumstances to which they point may change at differential rates.

International Factors

The international situation and the nature of competition in the Third World should provide plenty of scope for even ritualized optimism to be periodically validated in Soviet foreign policy. Fundamental learning can be impeded if Soviet leaders shift focus onto more modest (but activist) goals that are consistent with the optimistic and bifurcated assumptions central to their ideological heritage. This would entail a shift of emphasis from acquisitive to denial goals, or from radical to nationalist forces, or both.

One of the features of an ideological heritage based on two-camp thinking is that it allows belief, if not in the advancement of acquisitive goals, at least in the realization of denial goals (that is, consolidation of previous gains, and efforts to block gains by the imperialists). Even if they do not expect to live to see the victory of socialism on a global scale, Soviet leaders can at least legitimize their global role by demonstrating their belief in the defense of major existing commitments on a global scale during their lifetime. Indeed, Fukuyama's examination of Soviet behavior in the 1980s demonstrates precisely this: a deepening of Soviet involvement with major Third World allies (Syria, Angola, North Korea, Afghanistan), even as expectations of future acquisitive gains are declining. What's more, the concept of "anti-imperialism" can accommodate multiple dimensions of Soviet Third World policy—that is, both the radical and nationalist, as well as the regime and movement, dimensions. If expectations of radical transformations and "national liberation" (preindependence) movements are declining, emphasis can be placed on competition for the allegiance of nationalist regimes that are assumed to be

[20] See Albright (fn. 9), passim.

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actual or potential allies in, at a minimum, curbing the excesses of imperialism. Both Fukuyama and Hough discern precisely such a trend in recent Soviet policy.

Conclusion

The fact that Hough and Fukuyama agree on the prospect of assertive Soviet competition for the loyalty of Third World nationalist regimes is an important clue to a synthesis of the positions reviewed in this article. Fundamental learning may be taking place in Moscow regarding the developmental prospects and foreign policy reliability of most Third World radical regimes and movements. At the same time, the normative commitment to "anti-imperialism," while more modest in scope than the *maximalist acquisitive goal of "global victory," inhibits fundamental* learning about the prospects for achieving *denial* goals among Third World nationalist regimes. It also inhibits the enactment of policies that would concede the Third World competitive arena to the imperialists. Perhaps, under current circumstances, and in contrast to 1975-1976, the commitment to anti-imperialism can be diluted somewhat when superpower relations are cooperative and the image of the imperialists changes. But when times are bad and the U.S.S.R. is on the defensive in the Third World, the concept of anti-imperialism predisposes Soviet decision makers toward *defiance* of perceived provocation, combined with *optimism* about the realization of denial goals. Even under those conditions, fundamental learning—in a pessimistic direction—can be taking place about the longer-term prospects for a pro-Soviet bandwagon among either radical or nationalist forces in the Third World.

Thus, a bifurcated view of the international order can coexist with a global interdependence perspective in a policy maker's mind. Each part can be applied to different issue areas, to the pursuit of different types of goals, and to competition for the support of different types of regimes or movements. Similarly, optimism about some aspects of Soviet Third World policy can coexist with pessimism about other aspects. Fundamental learning, in which changes in empirical beliefs lead to revision of the philosophical core, can take place along some dimensions of Soviet policy even though it may fail to take place along other dimensions. This may well be what is happening in Moscow at present.

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

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

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